SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON WHEN APPEAL LIES AS OF RIGHT FROM DECISION OF GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION TRIBUNAL
By virtue of section 246(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), an appeal shall lie as of right from decisions of the Governorship Election Tribunals, on any question as to whether:
(i) any person has been validly elected as a member of the National Assembly or of a House of Assembly of a State under the Constitution;
(ii) any person has been validly elected to the office of Governor or Deputy Governor; or
(iii) the term of office of any person has ceased or the seat of any such person has become vacant.
Section 246 of the Constitution simply provides for an appeal to the Court of Appeal, as of right, from decisions of the Tribunals on any question as to whether any person has been validly elected to the office of a Governor or Deputy Governor. The provisions merely create the right of an appeal against a decision or decisions or judgments by a Governorship Election Tribunal on the issue or question of validity of the election of a person to the office of a Governor or Deputy Governor of a State in an election conducted as provided for in the Constitution and the Electoral Act.
Undoubtedly, a decision as to whether any person has been validly elected to the office of a Governor or Deputy Governor of a State in Nigeria can only be arrived at after a complete and final determination of the question as to the validity of such an election by the Tribunal in line with the Constitution and Electoral Act.
In the instant case, the decision on the validity of the election to the office of a Governor or Deputy Governor of a State by the Tribunal, in the final judgment delivered on the 27th May, 2024, was one in respect of which a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal was created by and under the provisions of section 246 of the Constitution.
However, what is discernable from the provisions is that, being the grund norm and foundation of all other laws and statutes in Nigeria, they just created and provided the right of appeal, but not the person or party entitled to the right or the manner or procedure to be used in the valid exercise of the right. For this reason, the provisions could not be relied on, on their own, for the validity of the procedure employed for the exercise of the right provided for therein.
Thus, there was nothing in the provisions of the section which confers two rights of appeal against determination of validity of the election of a person to the office of a Governor or Deputy Governor since the opening words of subsection 1 only created and gives the right to appeal.
[Dingyadi v. INEC (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1255) 347; Igbeke v. Okadigbo (2013) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1368) 225 referred to.] (Pp. 99, paras. F-A; 100-101, paras. E-D)
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON WHETHER RIGHT OF APPEAL AGAINST DECISION OF ELECTION PETITION TRIBUNAL ENVISAGES MULTIPLE APPEALS
In the exercise of the right of appeal from or against the determination or final judgment of an Election Tribunal to the Court of Appeal, a person or a party is entitled to file an appeal, or a single appeal, to ventilate any dissatisfaction or grievance against any determination of any of the issues or points, interlocutory or otherwise, decided and contained in the final judgment of the Tribunal.
The provisions of section 246 of the 1999 Constitution do not provide for or envisage multiple appeals against a single final judgment of the Tribunal in the exercise of the right of appeal to the Court of Appeal as of right from the decisions of the Tribunals.
In the instant case, the admitted facts in the appeal were that it was brought or filed in the Court of Appeal against the same final judgment of the Tribunal delivered on 27th May 2024, after Appeal No. CA/AB/EP/BY/13/2024 was filed by the same appellants on the 4th June 2024 against the same final judgment of the Tribunal, thereby filing multiple appeals in the purported exercise of the right of “An Appeal” to the Court of Appeal expressly provided for in the provisions of section 246 of the Constitution.
What the appellants did by filing two separate Notices of Appeal against the single final judgment of the Tribunal was to split and fragment the sole and single right of “an appeal” into bits and pieces of the several decisions on the interlocutory issues or points raised in the various interlocutory objections or applications made by the parties in the course of the proceedings or trial of the petition and in the final judgment.
That would create, if accepted, the absurd situation of separate multiple appeals against each and all decisions by an Election Tribunal on interlocutory issues or points raised by the parties, which by the prescription in section 285(8) of the Constitution, were suspended to the stage of final judgment for decisions by the Tribunal to be delivered along with the decision on the merit of the petition.
Such an absurd and implausible situation would undoubtedly be in total disregard of the sui generis nature of election matters in which time is of the very essence; the very reason why the Constitution, for the first and only time, imposes timelines or limits for the commencement and final disposal of judicial proceedings in Nigeria.
[Kalu v. Odili (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt. 240) 130; Sanwo-Olu v. Awamardi (2020) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1736) 436; CBN v. Adedeji (2022) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1847) 361; Jegede v. INEC (2021) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1797) 409 referred to.] (Pp. 101-103, paras. H-A)
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON PROPRIETY OF FILING MULTIPLE APPEALS AGAINST INTERLOCUTORY AND FINAL DECISIONS
Separate multiple appeals against interlocutory decisions and final decisions are discouraged by the courts due to the waste of time and delays occasioned thereby in ordinary civil judicial proceedings and criminal proceedings in which accused persons enjoy the constitutional right of presumption of innocence, where no time limits are mandatorily imposed.
In the instant case, the appellants’ case was not one of filing more than one Notice of Appeal against the judgment of the Tribunal within the time limited for so doing, as permitted in ordinary proceedings, civil or criminal, but one of the failure to exercise the right of appeal created and vested by the Constitution in line with the constitutional provisions specially enacted to regulate and govern election matters that require expeditious determination and disposal.
[U.B.N., Plc v. Astra Builders (W.A.) Ltd. (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1186) 1; Okwuagbala v. Ikwueme (2010) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1226) 54; Williams v. Adold/Stamm International Nig. Ltd. (2022) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1822) 33 referred to.] (P. 103, paras. A-D)
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON PROVISION OF COMPOSITE NOTICE OF APPEAL FOR INTERLOCUTORY AND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN ELECTION PETITION
Just like the composite single and final judgment to be delivered by a Tribunal comprising all decisions on interlocutory issues, points, or objections as well as on the merit of the substantive petition, in line with the provisions of section 285(8), section 246(1) provides for an appeal, the notice of which shall also be composite against all such decisions on the interlocutory issues, points, or objections as well as the merit of the petition.
The single Notice of Appeal shall contain grounds against both interlocutory decisions and the merit of the petition contained in the composite final judgment. (P. 106, paras. E-G)
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON IMPROPRIETY OF APPEAL WITHIN APPEAL
An appeal within an appeal is bad, particularly if both appeals are against a single final judgment.
[Sanni v. Oruku (2022) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1833) 407 referred to.] (P. 106, paras. G-H)
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON WHEN PARTY MAY FILE APPEAL ON INTERLOCUTORY DECISION SEPARATE FROM FINAL DECISION
By virtue of paragraph 6 of the Practice Directions of the Court of Appeal, an appellant shall file in the registry of the tribunal or court his notice of appeal within 14 days where the appeal is against an interlocutory decision and 21 days where the appeal is against a final decision.
These provisions allow the filing of appeals against both interlocutory decisions and final decisions of a tribunal in an election petition. However, they deal with situations in which separate interlocutory decisions were delivered by a tribunal in the course of the trial or hearing in respect of other issues or points not covered by the provisions in section 285 of the 1999 Constitution and Paragraph 12 of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, before the stage of final judgment in the petition.
Where separate decisions or rulings were delivered by an Election Tribunal on any interlocutory or preliminary issues in the course of or during the trial or hearing of an election petition and before the stage of final judgment, the provisions of paragraph 6 of the Practice Directions apply in respect of filing of the notice of appeal against such decisions within the fourteen days prescribed therein.
However, if the appeal is against a final decision in an election petition, which in line with the provisions in section 285 of the Constitution and Paragraph 12 of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, includes decisions on preliminary objections or any other interlocutory issue touching the jurisdiction of the tribunal or court or on the competence of the petition itself, the time for filing an appeal is 21 days.
Paragraph 6 regulates the time within which Notices of Appeal specifically provided for by statutes (including the Constitution), which are the only valid source of the right of an appeal in election matters, are to be filed. The paragraph neither creates nor vests the right of appeal but regulates the time within which the validly vested right can be exercised.
In the instant case, the right of appeal to the Court of Appeal from decisions of the Governorship Election Tribunals was created and given by section 246 of the Constitution, which overrides the provisions of subordinate legislation such as the Practice Directions. (P. 106-108, paras. H-A)
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON DUTY ON PARTY WISHING TO EXERCISE RIGHT OF APPEAL TO ACT IN CONFORMITY WITH PRESCRIBED PROCEDURE
The right of an appeal is not a common law right but is created and donated by specific statutory provisions. A party or person wishing to exercise the right must act strictly, in conformity with the provisions and procedure prescribed.
The exercise of the right of appeal donated by the Constitution can only be valid and competent if it complies with the procedure and the said provisions.
[Aroyewun v. Adebanji (1916) 11 SC (Reprint) 21; Emokpae v. Stanbic IBTC P.M. Ltd. (2021) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1776) 465; Itok v. Udoyo (2021) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1765) 49; Anyakorah v. P.D.P. (2022) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1843) 1; Oyegun v. Nzeribe (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1194) 577; Oredoyin v. Arowolo (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 114) 17; Ngige v. Obi (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 999) 1 referred to.] (P. 108, paras. B-D)
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON TREATMENT OF APPEAL NOT SUPPORTED BY ELECTORAL ACT OR CONSTITUTION
An appeal in an election petition not supported by provisions in sections 246 and 285 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), as well as Paragraph 12 of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2022, or any other statutory provisions providing for the right of appeal from decisions of an election tribunal, amounts to an abuse of court process and is liable to be dismissed.
[A.G. Lagos State v. A.G. Federation (2014) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1412) 217; Ihedioha v. Nwosu (2020) 50 (Pt. 1717) 291; Ajibode v. Gbadamosi (2021) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1776) 475; A.P.P. v. Obaseki (2022) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1846) 1; Okorocha v. P.D.P. (2014) 7 (Pt. 1406) 213 referred to.] (P. 109, paras. E-H)
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON NEED TO INCORPORATE COMPLAINT AGAINST INTERLOCUTORY DECISION IN GROUND OF APPEAL FROM FINAL JUDGMENT IN ELECTION PETITION
A ground of appeal from a final judgment in an election petition incorporating a complaint against an interlocutory decision given in the course of a trial is competent.
This approach saves time, as election petitions are time-sensitive. Proper procedure requires incorporating grounds of appeal against interlocutory decisions together with grounds against substantive decisions in a single Notice of Appeal, guarding against multiplicity of appeals.
Section 246 of the Constitution envisages only one appeal against the “decisions” of the trial tribunal. Filing multiple appeals constitutes an abuse of court process.
[Aondoakaa v. Ajo (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt. 602) 206; Onibu v. INEC (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt. 94) 323 at 355 referred to.] (Pp. 127-128, paras. C-B).
OMEH V UTYO (2025) 12 NWLR 1 SC
ON WHEN APPEAL LIES AS OF RIGHT FROM DECISIONS OF HIGH COURT OR FEDERAL HIGH COURT TO COURT OF APPEAL
By virtue of section 241(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), an appeal shall lie from decisions of the Federal High Court or a High court to the Court of Appeal as of right in the following cases:
(a) final decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings before the Federal High Court or a High, court sitting at first instance.
(b) where the ground of appeal involves questions of law alone, decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings. (P. 20, paras. B-D)
Per OGBUINYA, J.S.C. at page 25, paras. A-F:
“This oracular pronouncement, warehoused in these ex cathedra authorities, which wear the insignia of finality in virtue of the provision of section 235 of the Constitution (as amended), the fons et origo of our laws, emasculates and drowns the propriety of the lower court’s deployment of the provision of section 242(1) of the Constitution (as amended) in relation to the appellant’s appeal before it. Put differently, the lower court, with due reverence, misunderstood and misapplied the crystal clear provision of section 241(a) of the Constitution, as amended, which clothed the appellant with an appeal as of right against the trial court’s decision on the satisfaction of the twin conditions that are sine qua non for its invocation. In other words, since the judgment of the trial court was a final decision par excellence and it sat as a court of first instance, the requirement for leave to appeal against the decision became vaporised by the appeal as of right. The lower court, with due respect, fractured and treated the Constitutional Law with disdain and contempt when it stigmatised and crucified the appellant appeal on the undeserved altar of indelible incompetence and struck it out. It was a decision that was, highly, offensive to the law. It will smell of idolising judicial sacrilege to allow a decision which has disclosed a mountainous hostility to the letters and spirit of the law to stand. Per contra, it is a qualified candidate which deserves to be mowed down by the unbiased judicial sword of this court. This is the only way to pacify the law”
OMEH V UTYO (2025) 12 NWLR 1 SC
ON WHEN APPEAL LIES AS OF RIGHT FROM DECISIONS OF HIGH COURT OR FEDERAL HIGH COURT TO COURT OF APPEAL
An appeal from the final decision of a High Court; Federal, FCT and/or State, sitting as a court of first instance, to the Court of Appeal, is as of right, irrespective of the nature of the questions involved in the grounds of the appeal; i.e. whether they are of pure law, mixed law and facts or facts alone, by dint of the provisions of section 241(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as altered). In the instant case, the appeal of the appellant before the Court of Appeal was incontestably a final decision of the High Court of Justice, Benue State sitting at first instance. Such decisions are appealable as of right, irrespective of whether the grounds are of law alone, of mixed law and facts or of facts alone. Since the appeal is as of right, there is no requirement to seek for and obtain the prior leave of either the High Court or the Court of Appeal for the grounds of such an appeal to be legally valid and competent to be capable of properly invoking the requisite jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal over the appeal. The party desirous to appeal against such a decision has and enjoys the constitutional right, liberty and unfettered discretion to file his notice of appeal without the need for prior resort to either the High Court or the Court of Appeal for the positive nod, the go ahead, green-light, permission or leave to do so. The provisions in section 241(1)(a) of the Constitution is distinct, separate and independent of the later provisions in section 242(1) which deals with situations in which the right of appeal is not as fright, but which require, as a condition precedent, to the exercise of the right of appeal vested therein, the prior permission of either the High Court or the Court of Appeal, by way of leave to appeal. [A.N.P.P. v. Albishir (2010) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1198) 118; Nig. Laboratory Corp. v. P.M.B. Ltd. (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1324) 505; Organ v. NLNG (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1381) 506; F.R.N. v. Dairo (2015) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1454) 141; State v. Omoyele (2017) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1547) 341; Metuh v. F.R.N. (2018) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1628) 399; Ecobank (Nig.) Ltd. v. Honeywell Flour Mills Ple (2019) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1655) 55; Aqua Lid. v. Ondo State Sports Council (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 91) 622; Ezennaka v. C.O.P., Cross River State (2022) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1862) 369 referred to.] (P. 26, paras. B-H; 28, paras. A-D)
OMEH V UTYO (2025) 12 NWLR 1 SC
ON NATURE OF RIGHT OF APPEAL
Right of appeal is statutorily-allotted to citizens by the Constitution and other legislations. The Constitution (as amended) creates categories of rights of appeal from the trial superior courts of record to the Court of Appeal. While section 241 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) consecrates appeal as of right from the trial superior courts of record to the Court of Appeal, section 242 thereof ordains rights of appeal with the leave of those courts or the Court of Appeal. [Garuba v. Omokhodion (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1269) 145; Tukur v. Govt., Gongola State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 68) 39; F.R.N. v. Dairo (2015) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1454) 141; Kakih V. P.D.P. (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1430) 374; Ugo v. Ugo (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1597) 218; Shittu v. P.A.H. Ltd. (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1642) 195; Boko v. Nungwu (2019) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1654) 395; Dankofa v. ER.N. (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1678) 468 referred to.] (P. 20, paras. E-H)
OMEH V UTYO (2025) 12 NWLR 1 SC
ON SIGNIFICANCE OF LEAVE AND EFFECT OF FAILURE TO SEEK AND OBTAIN WHERE REQUIRED
Leave signifies permission. Where leave of court, trial or appellate, is required before filing an action, a process or ground of appeal, but a party ignores seeking and obtaining the requisite leave before filing same, the action, process or ground is rendered incompetent which incompetence will impinge on the jurisdiction of the court to entertain it. [Ojemen v. Momodu II (1983) 1 SCNLR 188; Nwadike v. Ibekwe (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 181; Garuba v. Omokhodion (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt.1269) Eli 145; Otu v. A.C.B. Int’l Ltd. (2008) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1073) 179; U.B.A. Plc v. Songunro (2006) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1006) 504; Thor Ltd. v. F.C.M.B. Ltd. (2002) 4 NWLR (Pt. 757) 427; Ugboaja v. Akitoye-Sowemimo (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1113) 278; Akinyemi v. Odu’a Inv. Co. Ltd. (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 209; Okwuagbala v. Ikwueme (2010) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1226) 54; Nwaolisah v. Nwabufoh (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1268) 600; Njemanze v. Njemanze (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1356) 376; Imegwu v. Okolocha (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 347; Ugwu v. State (2013) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1374) 257; Ngere v. Okuruket ‘XIV’ (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1417) 147; Ekunola v. CBN (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1377) 224; Allanah v. Kpolokwu (2016) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1507) 1; Anaechebe v. Ijeoma (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt.1426) 168; B.B. Apugo & Sons Ltd. v. O.H.M.B. (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 206; Obasi v. Mikson Est. Ind. Ltd. (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1539) 335; Otti v. Ogah (2017) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1563) 1; Sogunro v. Yeku (2017) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1570) 290; Mato v. Hember (2018) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1612) 258; Fost Royal Homes Ltd. v. E.F.C.C. (2021) 8 NWLR (Pt.1778) 312 referred to.] (P. 21, paras. A-F)
BAGUDU V BALKISU [2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 317 S.C
ON WHEN SUPREME COURT WILL INTERFERE WITH CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF FACTS BY LOWER COURTS AND WHEN WILL NOT
The Supreme Court does not make it a habit of disturbing the concurrent findings of lower courts and would only do so if exceptional circumstances are shown; that is, the appellant must show there are substantial errors in law or procedure leading to a miscarriage of justice. In other words, concurrent findings of fact would, and should, only be interfered with by the appellate court for good reason shown on the pages of the printed record. This position also applies under Islamic law. In this case, the Sharia Court of Appeal and the Court of Appeal found that the appellant did not lead credible evidence as required by the Islamic law to sustain his claims before the Upper Sharia Court. The appellant did not show that the concurrent judgments of both the Sharia Court of Appeal and the Court of Appeal are perverse. So, the findings and conclusions of the Sharia Court of Appeal and the Court of Appeal cannot be tampered with by the Supreme Court. [Ohaegbu v. Regd. Trustees, Capuchin Friars Minor Nigeria (2022) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1839) 48; Oyeyemi v. State (2023) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1882) 181; Barde v. I.N.E.C. (2024) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1932) 561; Ahiwe v. IN.E.C. (2024) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1935) 437; Friday v. State (2024) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1940) 267; Antonio Oil Co. Ltd v. A.M.C.N. (2024) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1961) 215; Hada v. Malumfashi (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 303) 1; Kakale v. Noma (2021) LPELR 55093 referred.] (Pp. 359, paras. F-H; 360, paras. B-H)
BAGUDU V BALKISU [2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 317 S.C
ON DUTY ON RESPONDENT IN AN APPEAL AND HOW RESPONDENT’S BRIEF ATTACKING JUDGMENT APPEALED AGAINST IS TREATED
The duty of a respondent in an appeal is to urge the correctness of the judgment appealed against. Where a respondent desires to depart from that role, he must file either a notice of cross appeal or a respondent’s notice. Where a respondent who did not file a notice of cross appeal or a respondent’s notice, like the 11th respondent in this appeal, files a brief of argument that does not urge the correctness of the judgment appealed against, the brief of argument is useless and irrelevant in the appeal. Therefore, the 11th respondent’s brief of argument is of no use in this appeal and it would be discountenanced by the court. [Dahiru v. A.P.C. (2017) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1555) 218; Zakirai v. Muhammad 2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1594) 181; Bakari v. Ogundipe (2021) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1768) 1 referred to.] (Pp. 357-358, paras. F-A)
BAGUDU V. KYAUTA (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 379 S.C
ON WHETHER COURT OF APPEAL MUST DETERMINE AFRESH ISSUE DETERMINED IN SISTER APPEAL
Where an issue for determination arises in two sister appeals, predicated on the same or very similar facts, and the issue is resolved and determined in one of the appeals, there is no need for the appellate court to resolve and determine the issue again in the sister appeal. So, the Court of Appeal, though an intermediate appellate court, will be exempted from determining afresh an issue which it has determined in a sister appeal, involving the same parties/issues and arising from the same judgment of the trial court. Under such circumstances, such undetermined issue would be considered subsumed in the issues determined and disposed of in the sister appeal. The rationale for this position of the law is that the further consideration and resolution of the issue for determination in the sister appeal will only be superfluous as the court cannot come to a contrary or contradictory decision on the same issue for determination in the sister appeal. In this case, the core issue that arose for determination in the appellant’s appeal at the Court of Appeal was considered and unanimously determined against him on the merits by the Court of Appeal in its judgment in his other appeal against the judgment in the consolidated suit. [4.P.C. v. A.I.E.S.C. (2022) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1845) 411; Ayakpo v. Dickson (2023) LPELR 60023; P.D.P. v. Johnson (2023) LPELR 61390; Lar v. Zuma Steel West Africa Ltd. (2024) LPELR 62260; Emebo v. Zuma Steel West Africa Ltd. (2024) LPELR 62264; Madumere v. Gov., Imo State (2024) LPELR 62825 referred to.) (Pp. 399-400, paras. B-E)
BAGUDU V. KYAUTA (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 379 S.C
ON POWER OF SUPREME COURT TO MAKE ORDER COURT OF APPEAL SHOULD HAVE MADE
Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act, 1960 entitles the Supreme Court, in appropriate cases, to make an order which the Court of Appeal would have made. A pronouncement on the merits of the appellant’s appeal to the Court of Appeal on the strength of the reasoning and conclusions reached by the Court of Appeal in the sister appeal is one that the Supreme Court can make in the circumstances of this case under its powers in section 22 of the Supreme Court Act. In the circumstance, the order of the Court of Appeal striking out the appeal of the appellant is set aside and an order dismissing the appeal on the merits is made in its stead. [Nishizawa v. Jethwani (1984) 12 SC 234; Macaulay v. NAL Merchant Bank Ltd. (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 144) 283; Otogbolu v. Okeluwa (1981) 6-7 SC 99; A.-G., Oyo State v. Fairlakes Hotel Ltd. (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt. 92) 1; Jallco Ltd v. Owoniboys Technical Services Ltd. (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 391) 534; G & C Lines v. Hengrace (Nig.) Ltd. (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt. 711) 51 referred to.] (P. 401, paras. E-B)
BAGUDU V BALKISU [2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 317 S.C
ON ROLE OF APPELLATE COURTS UNDER ISLAMIC LAW AND PROCEDURE
The role of appellate courts in appeals based on Islamic law is different from the role of such courts under the common law system. Thus, under Islamic law, unlike the position under the common law system, the appellate courts are not restricted to the grounds or issues raised by the parties before them. At the appellate stage, the appeal court can re-hear or re-try the case in whole or in part. [Dauda v. Asabe (1998) 1 NWLR (Pt. 532) 102; Danja v. Danj (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt. 550) 467; Nasi v. Haruna (2002) 2 NWLR (Pt. 750) 240 referred to.] (P. 360, paras. G-H)
BAGUDU V. KYAUTA (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 379 S.C
BAGUDU V. KYAUTA (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 379 S.C
ON PROPER SUBSEQUENT DECISION BY COURT OF APPEAL IN SISTER APPEALS RAISING SAME ISSUES AFTER DECIDING ONE
Where issues for determination based on the same or very similar facts arise in sister appeals, as in this case, the proper step for the Court of Appeal after deciding one of the appeals, is to pronounce on the merits of the sister appeal by adopting and transporting therein its reasoning and conclusions reached on the issues for determination in the other appeal, and not to strike out the other appeal. In this case, the Court of Appeal should not have struck out the appellant’s appeal. (Pp. 399-401, paras. B-B)
STANBIC IBTC BANK PLC V. L.G.C. LTD. (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 361
ON WHEN SUPREME COURT WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF FACT BY TRIAL COURT AND COURT OF APPEAL
It is not in the character of the Supreme Court to interfere with the concurrent findings of the High Court and the Court of Appeal in absence of special circumstances, such as where such findings are perverse.
[Ahmed v. Reg. Trustees, Archdiocese of Kaduna of the Roman Catholic Church (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1655) 300 referred to.]
(P. 411, paras. E-G)
AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC V. C.B.N. (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 255
ON NEED FOR GROUNDS RELIED UPON IN RESPONDENT’S NOTICE TO BE APPARENT ON THE RECORD
The grounds relied upon in a respondent’s notice must be apparent on the record having regard to the facts of the case, the law applicable thereto and the judgment on appeal. In the instant case, the grounds relied upon by the appellants in their respondent’s notice at the Court of Appeal were neither canvassed nor did they form part of the judgment appealed against.
[Gwede v. INEC (2014) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1438) 56 referred to.]
(Pp. 294–295, paras. F-A)
STANBIC IBTC BANK PLC V. L.G.C. LTD. (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 361
ON HOW TO CHALLENGE COMPETENCE OF GROUNDS OF APPEAL
It is the established rule of practice in Nigerian appellate jurisprudence that when a party is querying the competence of grounds of appeal, he can only do so through a motion on notice.
It is never done by way of a preliminary objection or oral argument originated in a brief of argument as was done by the 1st to 4th respondents’ counsel in the instant case.
In that wise, the application was not properly before the court, so the jurisdiction of the court was not properly been activated to entertain their objection challenging the competence of the appellant’s grounds 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 which touched on the competence of the appeal.
(P. 385, paras. G-H)
BAGUDU V. KYAUTA (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 379 S.C
ON NEED FOR ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION FORMULATED BY RESPONDENT TO ARISE FROM GROUNDS OF APPEAL
Where a respondent does not file a cross appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal and/or a respondent’s notice to affirm the judgment on other grounds, it is incumbent on the respondent to formulate his issues for determination in the appeal from the grounds of appeal of the appellant. In other words, the issue for determination and the arguments canvassed thereunder must be predicated upon and be directed at the ratio decidendi of the decision of the court appealed against. [Ameh v. Ameh (2023) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1882) 1; Sembcorp Engineering (Pte) Ltd. v. IPCO (W.A.) Holdings Ltd. (2024) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1968) 531; Archianga v. A.-G., Akwa Ibom State (2015) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1454) 1; Omoniyi v. Alabi (2015) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1456) 572; Olawoye v. State (2023) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1867) 1; Ironbar v. Federal Mortgage Finance Ltd. (2024) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1952) 257 referred to.] (Pp. 294-295, paras. F-A)
BAGUDU V. KYAUTA (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 379 S.C
ON EFFECT AND TREATMENT OF ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION WHICH DOES NOT ARISE FROM GROUNDS OF APPEAL
Where an issue for determination is not distilled from the grounds of appeal of the appellant and does not arise from and/or is not directed at the ratio decidendi of the judgment appealed against, it is incompetent and liable to be struck out. In this case, the issue for determination formulated by the 1st – 7th respondents does not arise from the grounds of appeal of the appellant and has no correlation to the ratio decidendi of the judgment appealed against. It is incompetent and it is struck out along with the arguments canvassed thereon. [Atanda v. Comm., Land and Housing, Kwara State (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1599) 32; Tabansi v. Tabansi (2018) 18 NWLR (Pt.1651) 279; Ugwu v. State (2020) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1746)1 referred to.] (P. 395, paras. A-B)
BAGUDU V BALKISU [2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 317 S.C
ON DUTY ON RESPONDENT IN AN APPEAL AND HOW RESPONDENT’S BRIEF ATTACKING JUDGMENT APPEALED AGAINST IS TREATED
The duty of a respondent in an appeal is to urge the correctness of the judgment appealed against. Where a respondent desires to depart from that role, he must file either a notice of cross appeal or a respondent’s notice. Where a respondent who did not file a notice of cross appeal or a respondent’s notice, like the 11th respondent in this appeal, files a brief of argument that does not urge the correctness of the judgment appealed against, the brief of argument is useless and irrelevant in the appeal. Therefore, the 11th respondent’s brief of argument is of no use in this appeal and it would be discountenanced by the court. [Dahiru v. A.P.C. (2017) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1555) 218; Zakirai v. Muhammad 2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1594) 181; Bakari v. Ogundipe (2021) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1768) 1 referred to.] (Pp. 357-358, paras. F-A)
C.B.N. V. OCHIFE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 1
ON WHETHER RESPONDENT’S NOTICE TO AFFIRM JUDGMENT ON OTHER GROUNDS CAN BE FILED AT SUPREME COURT
There is no provision for the filing of a respondent’s notice at the Supreme Court. Therefore, where a respondent supports the judgment of the Court of Appeal, but wants it affirmed on other grounds than those relied on by the Court of Appeal, the respondent can only file a cross appeal.
(P. 75, paras. E-F)
UDOH V. MIN., F.M.I.T. & INV. (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 419
ON WHEN APPEAL BECOMES ACADEMIC AND WHEN DOES NOT
An appeal can become academic where changed circumstances during the pendency of the appeal result in a cessation or discontinuance of the situation upon which the suit was filed so that the issue in the appeal that was once real becomes moot.
However, the present appeal is an instance where the above principle does not apply.
Having regard to the peculiar facts of the case that the matter upon repeal of 2004 Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) is not an academic exercise.
There is still a live Issue to be determined here assuming the appeal succeeds.
The appellant filed the instant case to challenge what he considered to be a violation of certain provisions of CAMA and Legal Practitioners Act by the 1st respondent’s subsidiary legislation which according to the appellant effectively enabled CAC to do that which the above legislation permits only legal practitioners to do.
By relief of the appellant’s amended originating summons he prays the court to set aside all the transactions and incorporation of companies made by the 2nd respondent pursuant to regulation 11(b) and the consequential schedule 3 of companies regulations as amended in April, 2017 and most importantly directing the 2nd respondent to communicate the order to the affected victims of the failed transaction/incorporation within 30 days of the order being made.
Therefore, the Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that the issue of whether the transaction and incorporation made under the repealed subsidiary legislation ought to be set aside for allegedly violating the mandatory provisions of CAMA and Legal Practitioners Act remains a live issue irrespective of the repeal of the subsidiary legislation or CAMA.
The relief to set aside such transaction and incorporation in the event that the appeal succeeds is clearly to protect the rights that CAMA 2004 and Legal Practitioners Act vest in the appellant.
To agree with the 2nd respondent that the appellant’s suit is now academic on account of repeal of CAMA, 2004 will be similar to a situation where a suit filed to challenge a wrongful act becomes academic because there has been a cessation of the issue complained of as constituting the wrong.
To hold that a suit is academic once a statute is repealed will be similar to applying the new legislation retrospectively.
The determination of the relief for nullification of transaction and incorporation done in violation of the mandatory requirement of the law holds value for the appellant even after the repeal of CAMA 2004.
The appeal is not academic.
There are live issues in it that will be resolved on their merit.
Thus, the preliminary objection of the 2nd and 3rd respondents were accordingly dismissed.
[Johnson v. Eze (2021) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1759) 90 distinguished.] (Pp. 440-441, paras. D-C)
AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC v. N.D.I.C. (2025) 12 NWLR (Pt. 2000) 453
ON NEED FOR LEAVE AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT IN DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
Companies and Allied Matters Act clearly provides that derivative actions must be instituted with leave of court, and this makes the requirement of leave in derivative actions a condition precedent and therefore, a substantive matter of law that goes to the jurisdiction of the court.
The condition of leave in derivative actions being a legal provision and a condition precedent to instituting any derivative legal action does not merely affect the procedural jurisdiction of the court but its substantive jurisdiction.
It is one of the conditions bestowing jurisdiction on the court that the suit be brought by due process. A defect against the condition of the substantive legal provision which requires leave for derivative action is a defect against the substantive jurisdiction of the court, and has the effect of rendering the proceeding conducted therein incompetent because substantive jurisdiction cannot be waived.
[Adeogun-Phillips v. Gateway Portland Cement Ltd (2024) LPELR-62108 referred to.]
(P. 481, paras. A-H)
Per NWOSU-IHEME, J.S.C. at pages 481-482, paras. H-E:
“The appellants in the present appeal conceded that they did not apply for and/or obtain leave of court before commencing the present action, which they also agree is a derivative action.
Their contention was that the leave they obtained in earlier derivative action against the Central Bank of Nigeria in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1286/2009 should be transported and allowed to abide in the present action.
This is because, according to the counsel to the appellants, the leave of court they obtained in the earlier action conferred on them a vested right to maintain their present claims, given that the earlier suit remained unresolved.
Without engaging with the allusion to “vested right” to maintain an action made by the counsel to the appellants, it is commonsensical that whatever vested right claimed can and will only be in respect of the claims in the earlier action, Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1286/2009, and not in the present action.
MUHAMMAD V. UMARU (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 3012
ON ESSENCE OF GROUNDS OF APPEAL
The essence of the grounds of appeal is to give sufficient notice to the adverse party of the nature of the appellant’s compliant that such adverse party will be confronted with in court. Once the notice is passed and the adverse party reacts to it without any complaint, it means the notice is clear and well understood. [Achonu v. Okuwobi (2017) 14 NWLR
MUHAMMAD V. UMARU (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 3012
ON PURPOSE OF NOTICE OF APPEAL AND EFFECT OF CHALLENGE TO COMPETENCE OF SAME
Any challenge to the competence of a notice of appeal is a challenge to the competence of that appeal. It is imperative to recognize that the purpose of the notice of appeal is to inform the parties of the specific aspect of the lower court’s judgment that will be contested.
Once the contested portion of the judgment becomes clear to all the parties involved, the notice of appeal may lose some of its perceived importance. The notice of appeal assumes its true significance as a reflective lens through which the court peers into the heart of the appeal. These grounds are not mere formalities but serve as an initial inquiry into the merits of the case, offering a preliminary glimpse into its potential trajectory.
While they do not solely determine the appeal’s outcome, they act as a beacon, guiding the court toward a deeper examination of the case.
(P. 315, paras. F-H)
MUHAMMAD V. UMARU (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 3012
ON RULES GUIDING FORMULATION OF GROUNDS OF APPEAL
The rules of our appellate procedure relating to formulation of grounds of appeal are primarily designed to ensure fairness to the other side. The application of such rules should not be reduced to a matter of mere technicality whereby the court will look at the form rather than the substance.
The prime purpose of the rules of appellate procedure, both Supreme Court and in the Court of Appeal, that the appellant shall file a notice of appeal which set forth concisely the grounds which he intends to rely upon on the appeal and that such grounds should not be vague or general in terms and must disclose a reasonable ground of appeal, is to give sufficient notice, an information to the other side of nature of the complaint of the appellant and consequently of the issues that are likely to arise on the appeal. Any ground of appeal that satisfies that purpose should not be struck out notwithstanding, that it did not conform to a particular form. Thus, while the drafting of the notice of appeal and the eloquence of the grounds is significant, they should not be allowed to diminish the appeal’s intrinsic competence. The true essence of the appeal, its merit, transcends the imperfections of the technicalities in the process.
The appeal must be assessed through the lens of judicial inquiry, guided by the spirit of justice. The court’s task is not merely to examine the technicalities of language but to delve into the substantive issues on hand, ensuring that the appeal is adjudicated on its true merit, unclouded by formalistic flaws.
[Achonu v. Okuwobi (2017) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1584) 142 referred to.]
(Pp. 316-317, paras. D-C)
MUHAMMAD V. UMARU (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 3012
ON EFFECT OF GROUNDS OF APPEAL AND ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION IN APPEAL UNDER ISLAMIC LAW
Under Islamic Law, a court is duly accorded with an unfettered discretion to consider facts and circumstances of the case before it and do justice to the respective parties devoid of technicalities. The courts look at the substance rather than the form.
Thus, a court under Islamic Law is not restricted to the issues raised by the parties for determination in the case or appeal, provided there are sufficient materials upon which a just decision can be reached by the court. The grounds of appeal or issues raised before a court under Islamic Law need not to be framed in a technical manner or legal phraseology.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeal critically examined the grounds of appeal before the Sharia Court of Appeal and found that the issue of Nukool was raised and the Sharia Court of Appeal made a pronouncement in it and that the issue of Nukool was therefore not a fresh issue that required leave before it could be raised.
The Supreme Court found itself in complete alignment with the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, as stated above.
(P. 318, paras. B-F)
HERITAGE BANK LTD .v. MEENS NIGERIA LTD. (2025) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1994) 321 (SC)
ON WHEN SUPREME COURT WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF FACTS BY LOWER COURTS
The Supreme Court is loath to set aside concurrent findings of facts by the lower courts where they have not occasioned miscarriage of justice.
In this case, the concurrent findings of facts and conclusions of law by the trial court and the Court of Appeal are consistent, legally sound, and cannot be faulted. There is no perversity in them. Therefore, the Supreme Court will not interfere.
[Jime v. Hembe (2023) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1899) 463; Okoli v. Morecab Finance (Nig.) Ltd. (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1053) 37; Durosaro v. Ayorinde (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt. 927) 407; Ayeni v. Adesina (2007) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1033) 233 referred to.]
(Pp. 375-376, paras. G-B)
NICON INSURANCE LIMITED .v. BRIGHTHOUSE ESTATE LIMITED (2025) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1993) 469
ON TIME FOR APPEALING TO SUPREME COURT
Section 27 of the Supreme Court Act states that where a person desires to appeal to the Supreme Court, he shall give notice of appeal or notice of his application for leave to appeal in such manner as may be directed by rules of court within the period prescribed by a subsection of the section that is applicable to the case. And subsection states that the periods prescribed for the giving of notice of appeal or notice of application for leave to appeal are: in an appeal in a civil case, fourteen days in an appeal against an interlocutory decision and three months in an appeal against a final decision; in an appeal in a criminal case, thirty days from the date of the decision appealed against. Further subsection provides that where an application for leave to appeal is made in the first instance to the court below, the person making such application shall, in addition to the period prescribed by subsection of section 27,be allowed a further period of fifteen days, from the date of hearing of the application by the court below, to make an application to the Supreme Court. And by subsection of section 27, the Supreme Court may extend the periods prescribed in subsection of section 27.(Pp. 483-484, paras. D-A)
NICON INSURANCE LIMITED .v. BRIGHTHOUSE ESTATE LIMITED (2025) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1993) 469
ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT
By Order 2 rule 31(1) of the Supreme Court Rules(as amended), the Supreme Court may enlarge the time provided by the Rules for the doing of anything to which the Rules apply, or may direct a departure from the Rules in any other way when that is required in the interest of justice. Provided that in any civil proceedings, such enlargement of time or departure from the Rules may be granted only in exceptional circumstances. Further, Order 2rule 31(2) of the Rules states that every application for an enlargement of time in which to appeal or in which to apply for leave to appeal shall be supported by an affidavit setting forth good and substantial reasons for the failure to appeal or to apply for leave to appeal within the prescribed period; and that there shall be exhibited or annexed to such affidavit:
(a) a copy of the judgment from which it is intended to appeal;
(b) a copy of other proceedings necessary to support the complaints against the judgment; and
(c) grounds of appeal which prima facie shows good cause why the appeal should be heard.
And by virtue of Order 2 rule 31(3) of the Rules, when time is enlarged, a copy of the order granting such enlargement of time shall be annexed to the notice of appeal. In this case, the fact that the application relates to an arbitral award by an arbitration tribunal/arbitrator freely chosen by the parties to settle dispute(s) arising from their agreement/contract, makes the requirement for special circumstances provided for in Order 2 rule31(1) of the Supreme Court Rules (as amended)more imperative for the Supreme Court to be in a proper position to exercise its discretion judicially and judiciously as required by Law. (Pp. 484, paras.B-G; 492, paras. A-B)
NICON INSURANCE LIMITED .v. BRIGHTHOUSE ESTATE LIMITED (2025) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1993) 469
ON DISCRETIONARY NATURE OF POWER OF SUPREME COURT TO GRANT OR REFUSE EXTENSION OF TIME TO APPEAL
The Supreme Court’s grant or denial of an application for extension of time to appeal or apply for leave to appeal is subject to the judicious exercise of discretion by the court. [Amaechi v. Omehia (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1381) 417 referred to.](P. 484, para. G)
NICON INSURANCE LIMITED .v. BRIGHTHOUSE ESTATE LIMITED (2025) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1993) 469
ON CONDITIONS APPLICANT FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT MUST SATISFY TO SUCCEED
In order to succeed in an application for extension of time to appeal or apply for leave to appeal, the applicant has to show by his supporting affidavit that he has good and substantial reasons for failure to appeal or apply for leave to appeal within the prescribed period. Further, the proposed notice of appeal must have grounds of appeal that show good cause why the appeal should be heard. Therefore exceptional circumstances must be shown to warrant the grant of the application. However, the applicant is not required to show that the appeal would succeed if leave were granted. It is sufficient to show that there is an arguable appeal; that is, the grounds of appeal are not frivolous but substantial and show a clear case of either misdirection or non-direction in law or fact, or an erroneous conception of the case of the parties by the Judge, or an erroneous evaluation of evidence and erroneous findings of facts occasioning a miscarriage of justice to warrant the hearing of the appeal on those grounds. In other words, it is enough for the applicant to show a prima facie case that the court from whose decision leave to appeal is sought has committed an error of law, or has failed to exercise its discretion judicially, or has based the exercise of such discretion on wrong principles. In this case, the applicant’s grounds of appeal complained about lack of jurisdiction of the arbitrator. But it is neither apparent from the particulars of error of the grounds of appeal nor from the record of appeal that the grounds of appeal on jurisdiction are substantial. Grounds of jurisdiction should not be fanciful, but should arise from the judgment appealed against and the record of appeal. In the circumstances, the applicant’s claim of want of jurisdiction is baseless. Put in other words, the application of the applicant has neither shown any cogent materials nor coherent facts and circumstances upon which the discretion of the Supreme Court should be exercised in favour of the applicant. [Amaechi v. Omehia (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt.1381) 417; Holman Bros (Nig.) Ltd. v. Kigo (Nig.) Ltd.(1980) 8-11 SC 43 referred to.](Pp. 484-485, paras.H-F; 491, paras. B-F; 493-494, paras. H-A)
NICON INSURANCE LIMITED .v. BRIGHTHOUSE ESTATE LIMITED (2025) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1993) 469
ON NEED FOR GROUND OF APPEAL ALLEGING LACK OF JURISDICTION TO ARISE FROM JUDGMENT APPEALED AGAINST AND RECORD OF APPEAL
Grounds of appeal on jurisdiction should not be fanciful. They must be shown as arising from the judgment appealed against and the record of appeal. In this case, it is neither apparent from the particulars of error of the applicant’s grounds of appeal nor from the record that the grounds of appeal border on jurisdiction and are substantial. In the circumstances, the applicant’s claim of want of jurisdiction is baseless. (P. 491, paras. D-E)
NICON INSURANCE LIMITED .v. BRIGHTHOUSE ESTATE LIMITED (2025) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1993) 469
ON DUTY ON PARTY SEEKING INTERFERENCE WITH CONCURRENT FINDINGS BY LOWER COURTS
An applicant seeking interference with concurrent findings by lower courts at the Supreme Court, must establish that the findings are perverse to warrant such an interference by the Supreme Court. In this case, the applicant did not do so. [Ude v. State (2016) 14 (Pt. 1531) 122; Kayili v. Yilbuk (2015) 7 NWLR (Pt.1457) 26; Amadi v. A.-G., Imo State (2017) 11 NWLR(Pt. 1575) 92 referred to.] (Pp. 493-494, paras. G-A
BAWA DADA & ORS V TANKO YANDAYI & ANOR (2025) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1993) 517
ON IMPORTANCE OF RECORD OF APPEAL TO AN APPEAL
The importance of the record of appeal in our appeal system cannot be overemphasized as cases have to be decided based on the record of appeal and without it, hearing of appeals will be difficult to undertake. Although an appeal is a rehearing of the matter, the rehearing is by considering the case based on the printed record before the appellate court, which includes but not limited to the processes filed that are relevant to the determination of the appeal, as well as exhibits tendered if any, and the judgments/rulings of the courts below. Therefore, until there is before the court a record of appeal duly prepared and transmitted, hearing of appeals will be difficult to undertake by an appellate court.[Garuba v. Omokhodion (2011) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1269)145; Olorunyolemi v. Akhagbe (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt.1195) 48 referred to.] (Pp. 528, paras. E-H; 529-530, paras. F-A)ADEYEMI V. A.P.C. (2024) 4 NWLR (PT. 1927) 63
ON RELEVANT CONSIDERATION IN DETERMINATION OF VALIDITY OF GROUND OF APPEAL
The relevant consideration in the determination of the competence or validity of a ground of appeal is whether it discloses a triable, arguable or reasonable complaint against the judgment appealed against. So that even if it is improperly or poorly or inelegantly couched, phrased or framed, if it discloses a triable or reasonable complaint, then it would be valid and how it is couched or framed would not matter. (P. 92, paras. E-G).
BAWA DADA & ORS V TANKO YANDAYI & ANOR (2025) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1993) 517
ON IMPLICATION OF INCOMPLETE RECORD OF APPEAL IN AN APPEAL
The court is bound by the record of appeal before it and cannot depart therefrom. An appellate court only hears an appeal on the record before it and must ensure that the record is complete, as it would amount to a legal sacrilege for an appellate court to adjudicate upon an appeal in the face of an incomplete record of appeal. A complete record of appeal is not, therefore a privilege. It is mandatory, failing which the appellate cannot re-hear the appeal. An incomplete and/or incorrect record of appeal being unutilisable renders the appeal incompetent. In this case, the incompleteness of the record of appeal deprived the Supreme Court of its means to effectively hear and determine the appeal, as the whole decision complained about was not before the court. The omitted judgments were imperative for the just determination of the appeal and could not be waived or considered immaterial. The lead judgment alone could not be the judgment of the lower court. Therefore, without access to the whole decision complained of, the court would not be in a position to reach a just resolution of the issues submitted before it, as any decision reached in such circumstances affecting the rights of the parties, would no doubt lead to a miscarriage of justice. Thus, it was impracticable for the court to reach a just decision on the issues submitted before it for the determination of the appeal based on an incomplete record. An act to the contrary would constitute a miscarriage of justice. [Access Bank v.Onwuliri (2021) 6 NWLR (Pt.1773) 391; Ibrahim v.Akinrinsola (2022) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1862) 455; Maku v. Sule s (2022) 3 NWLR (Pt.1817) 231; Abonyi v.State (2023) 15 NWLR (Pt.1907) 397; Ekpemupolov. Edremoda (2009) 8 NWLR (Pt.1142) 166; Okochiv. Animkwoi (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt.851) 1; Ukiri v.EFCC (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt.1639) 195 referred to.](Pp. 531, paras. A-C; 532, paras. D-G; 534, paras.D-E)
CHIEF (HON.) NKWO NNABUCHI & ORS V. I.G.P. & ORS (2025) 8 NWLR (PT. 1993) 495
ON WHAT APPEAL MUST BE PREDICATED UPON
An appeal and an issue for determination in an appeal, together with the arguments canvassed thereunder, must be predicated upon and be directed at the ratio decidendi of the decision of the Court appealed against. Where an appeal or an issue for determination does not arise from and/or is not directed at the ratio decidendi of the judgment appealed against, it is incompetent and liable to be struck out. [Atanda v. Commissioner for Land and Housing, Kwara State (2018) 1 NWLR(Pt. 1599) 32; Tabansi v. Tabansi (2018) 18 NWLR(Pt. 1651) 279; Ugwu v. State (202vv0) 15 NWLR (Pt.1746) 1; Musa v. State (2024) 16 NWLR (Pt 1964)301; Archianga v. A.-G., Akwa Ibom State (2015) 6NWLR (Pt. 1454) 1; Ominiyi v. Alabi (2015) 6 NWLR(Pt. 1456) 572; Olawoye v. State (2023) 2 NWLR (Pt.1867) 1; Ironbar v. F.M.F. Ltd. (2024) 12 NWLR (Pt.1952) 275 referred to.] (P. 510, paras. A-D)
CHIEF (HON.) NKWO NNABUCHI & ORS V. I.G.P. & ORS (2025) 8 NWLR (PT. 1993) 495
ON WHETHER APPEAL LIES AGAINST OBITER DICTUM
An appeal does not lie against an obiter dictum of the lower court. An appeal or ground of appeal against mere obiter dictum is incompetent. Where an opinion or remark is expressed by a Judge and such an opinion amounts to nothing and is baseless, it is not appealable. In the instant case, the appeal was directed at a passing remark of the Court of Appeal. It was therefore, a misuse and abuse of the processes of the court. It was incompetent and was struck out. [Agbabiaka v. F.B.N. Plc (2020) 6 NWLR(Pt. 1719) 77; Umar v. F.R.N. (2021) 4 NWLR (Pt.1766) 291; Abba v. Abba-Aji (2022) 11 NWLR(Pt. 1842) 535; Ado (Dangajere) v. State (2017) 15NWLR (Pt. 1587) 65; National Democratic Party v.I.N.E.C. (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt 1350) 392 referred to.](Pp. 510-511, paras. F-C)
MR. PATRICK OKECHUKWU UBABUIKE V. G.T.B. PLC & ANOR (2025) 8 NWLR (PT. 1993) 427
ON WHETHER SUPREME COURT HAS APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER A MATTER WHERE COURT OF APPEAL LACKED SAME
Where the Court of Appeal lacks the requisite competence or jurisdiction, by being wrongly constituted, to deliver the judgment appealed against, the Supreme Court is also automatically robbed of the judicial vires or jurisdiction to adjudicate over the appeal on the merit. [Oke v. Mimiko (2014) 1 NWLR (Pt. 88) 225; A.P.C. v. Marafa (2020) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1721) 383; B.O.I. Ltd. Awojugbagbe Light Ind. Ltd. (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt.1615) 220; Ezenwankwo v. APGA (2022) 18 NWLR(Pt.1863) 537 referred to.] (P. 450, paras. G-H)
ADEYEMI V. A.P.C. (2024) 4 NWLR (PT. 1927) 63
ON DETERMINATION OF WHETHER GROUNDS OF APPEAL AGAINST CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF FACT BY TWO LOWER COURTS DISCLOSE TRIABLE AND REASONABLE COMPLAINT
In determining whether grounds of appeal against the concurrent findings of fact by two lower courts disclose any triable or reasonable complaint, the scope of the power of the Supreme Court to determine such an appeal is limited only to the complaint that the decision is perverse in that the inference or findings of facts is or are not supported by the evidence or that there is serious violation of some principle of law or procedure that has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, only a complaint that the decision appealed against is perverse in that the inference or findings of facts is or are not supported by the evidence or that there is a serious violation of some principle of law or procedure that has occasioned a miscarriage of justice is triable and reasonable. (Pp. 92-93, paras. H-B).
ADEYEMI V. A.P.C. (2024) 4 NWLR (PT. 1927) 63
ON DETERMINATION OF WHETHER ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION DISTILLED FROM GROUND OF APPEAL
An indication by an appellant under an issue for determination suggesting what ground the issue was distilled from is not what determines the relationship between the issue for determination and the ground. What determines the relationship is the subject-matter of the complaint in the ground of appeal and the subject matter of the issue for determination. If the subject matter of the ground of appeal and that of the issue for determination are the same, then the issue is connected to the ground of appeal. If the subject matter of the complaint in the ground of appeal is different from that in the issue for determination, then the issue for determination is not derived from that ground of appeal.
MAGAJI V. A.P.C. (2024) 1 NWLR (PT. 1918) 1
ON PURPOSE OF NOTICE OF APPEAL AND HOW INELEGANTLY DRAFTED GROUNDS OF APPEAL ARE TREATED
The purpose of a notice of appeal is to set forth concisely, the grounds and particulars to be relied upon in order to give sufficient notice and information to the respondents, of the precise nature of the complaints against the judgment appealed against and the issues likely to arise on appeal. So long as that has been done, the courts will not, in the interest of justice, strike out an inelegantly drafted notice of appeal. Even if the grounds of appeal are considered to be verbose and inelegant, once they communicate the complaints of the appellant, they cannot by such reasons be ignored or struck out. Justice Party v. INEC (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt. 886) 140 referred to.] (P. 23, paras. A-C).
OBAJE V. N.A.M.A. (2024) 6 NWLR (PT. 1933) 119
ON MEANING OF OMNIBUS GROUND OF APPEAL
When an appellant complains that a judgment is against the weight of evidence, he means that when the evidence adduced by him is balanced against that adduced by the respondent, the judgment given in favour of the respondent is against the weight which should have been given to the totality of the evidence. Such an appellant is simply saying that the evidence adduced by him is weightier than that adduced by the respondent but the trial court nevertheless rendered its judgment in favour of the respondent. When a complaint is against the weight of evidence, the complaint is only concerned with the appraisal and evaluation of all the evidence and not the weight to be attached to any particular piece of evidence. In the instant case, the appellant’s complaint was that, based on the evidence adduced before the trial court, the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeal were wrongly delivered in favour of the respondent. The appellant’s contention that the decision of the trial court was against the weight of evidence was groundless. Based on the oral evidence led by the appellant and the documents tendered by him and shorn of the evidence of the respondent’s sole witness, the imaginary scale of justice tilted against the appellant as the documents revealed that the respondent complied with the provisions of exhibit 9 in dismissing him. [Mogaji v. Odofin (1978) 4 SC91; Awusa v. Nigerian Army (2018) 12 NWLR (Pt.1634) 421; Abisi v. Ekwealor (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt.302) 643; Osolu v. Osolu (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt. 832)608; Nasiru v. State (2022) 4 NWLR (Pt.1819) 165.referred to.] (Pp. 142, paras. B-E; 148-149, paras.H-A
BARDE v. INEC (2024) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1932) 561
ON TIME LIMIT FOR FILING APPEAL FROM DECISION IN PRE-ELECTION MATTER
Section 285(11) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) requires an appeal from a decision in a pre-election matter to be filed within fourteen days from the date of delivery of the judgment appealed against. (P. 594, paras. C-D).
OSHO V. ADELEYE [2024] 8 NWLR (1941) 431 SC
ON RULES GOVERNING FRAMING ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION BY RESPONDENT IN AN APPEAL
A respondent who did not file a cross-appeal in an appeal cannot validly frame an issue for determination outside the grounds contained in the appellant’s notice of appeal. In the instant case, the issue submitted by the 3rd respondent regarding the jurisdiction of the trial court did not derive and was not derivable from any of the grounds of appeal. [Nzekwu v. Nzekwu (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt.104) 373; Kuusu v. Udom (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 127)421; Ojegbe v. Omatsone (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 608)591; Eke v. Ogbonda (2006) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1012)506; Ossai v. Wakwah (2006) 4 NWLR (Pt. 969) 208; Halilco Nig. Ltd. v. Equity Bank (Nig.) Ltd. (2013) 12NWLR (Pt. 1367) 1 referred to.] (P. 447, paras. C-F).
DANGOTE CEMENT PLC V. AGER [2024]10 NWLR (PT. 1945) 1 SC
ON BINDING EFFECT OF FINDING OF COURT NOT APPEALED AGAINST
The failure of a party to appeal against a decision or finding of a lower court means that he can no longer be heard to question that finding, which he is deemed to have accepted as binding, and has in fact, become binding on him. In other words, where a party fails to appeal against a finding of the trial court or the Court of Appeal, he cannot be heard to question the finding on appeal to the Supreme Court. The effect of failure to appeal against such a finding is that the decision remains binding and conclusive between the parties.
REGD. TRUSTEES, MISSION HOUSE V. A.S.T.B. PLC [2024]10 NWLR (PT. 1947) 565
ON EFFECT WHERE APPEAL ENTERED IN SUPREME COURT
An appeal is entered in the Supreme Court once the record of appeal is transmitted thereto from the Court of Appeal. Once the record of appeal is transmitted thereby signifying the entering of the appeal in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal automatically becomes functus officio, thus devoid of the fundamental jurisdictional competence to hear and determine any application or question pertaining to the appeal in question. At that crucial stage, the court lacks jurisdictional competence to make any order regarding the res in the appeal. Once the lower court transmits the record of appeal to the court that would hear the appeal and the appellate court in fact receives the same, the appeal is said to be duly entered. What flows automatically from the appeal being entered is that the appellate court which received the record of appeal is said to be seised of the whole of the proceedings in the sense that the res in the appeal also automatically passes into the custody of the appellate court of the whole proceedings. [Ezeokafor v. Ezeilo (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt.619) 513; Dakan v. Asalu (2015) 13 NWLR (Pt.1475)47; Dingyadi v. I.N.E.C. (No. 2) (2010) 18 NWLR(Pt. 1224) 154; Nnaji v. Chukwu (1988) 3 NWLR(Pt.81) 184; Bestman v. Whyte (2020) 6 NWLR (Pt.1719) 136; Odom v. P.D.P. (2015) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1456)527; Ezomo v. A.-G., Bendel State (1986) 4 NWLR(Pt. 36) 448; Ogunremi v. Dada (1962) 2 SCNLR 417; Adewoyin v. Adeyeye (1962) 1 SCNLR 91referred to.] (Pp. 589, paras. A-D; 590-591, paras.G-A).
MADUEKWE V. ANAMBRA STATE GOVT. (2024) 11 NWLR (PT. 1949) 381
ON WHETHER LEGISLATION MUST BE PROVED BY EVIDENCE AND WHETHER MUST BE INCLUDED IN RECORD OF APPEAL
Laws are facts the court must take judicial notice of. Therefore, they need not be proved by evidence. The courts must rely on legislations relevant to the issues raised or arising for determination in cases before them, without requiring the legislations to be proved by evidence. Not being part of the evidence in a case, they need not be included as part of the relevant proceedings and processes compiled and transmitted as part of the record of the appeal arising from the proceedings of a court. An appellate court is also bound to rely on them when they are relevant to the issues raised for
determination in the appeal without requiring them to be part of the record of the appeal before it. In the instant case, the fact that the Local Government Law of Anambra State, 1999, Autonomous Communities (Recognition) Law of Anambra State, 2002 and Autonomous Communities (Recognition) Repeal Law of Anambra State, 2004 were severally referred to in the proceedings at the trial court and the Court of Appeal and were not included as part of the record of the appeal in the Court of Appeal or in the Supreme Court could not be ground to adduce them as evidence in the appeal at the Supreme Court. (P. 401, paras. D-G).
OPENE V. N.J.C. (2024) 15 NWLR (PT. 1960) 101
ON NEED FOR GROUND OF APPEAL TO RELATE TO AND CHALLENGE RATIO OF DECISION APPEALED AGAINST
The fact that an appeal ought to be a rehearing of the case or appeal of the case below, as the case may be, validates the preposition of law to the effect that the grounds of appeal and the issues from which they are distilled or derived must, as of necessity, be a direct grouse or complaint against the decision of the lower court. For grounds of appeal to be valid and competent, they must be related to the decision being appealed against and should constitute a challenge to the ratio of the decision on appeal. Where a ground of appeal as formulated does not arise from the judgment and purports to raise and attack an issue not decided by the judgment appealed against, it is incompetent and liable to be struck out. [C.C. Plc. v. Ekperi (2007) 3NWLR (Pt.1022) 493; Okafor v. Abumofuani (2016) 12NW LR (Pt. 1525) 385 referred to.] (P. 129, paras. E-H).
OPENE V. N.J.C. (2024) 15 NWLR (PT. 1960) 101
ON NEED FOR ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION TO BE FORMULATED FROM GROUNDS OF APPEAL DERIVED FROM RATIO DECIDENDI OF DECISION APPEALED AGAINST
Issues for determination of an appeal must be formulated from grounds of appeal which in turn must also be derived from ratio decidendi of the judgment appealed against. In other words, grounds of appeal and issues which are alien to the judgment appealed against are incompetent and ought to be struck out. In the instant case, none of the three issues placed before the Court of Appeal for determination arose from the decision or ratio
decidendi of the trial court. The issue adopted by the Court of Appeal did not arise from the judgment of the trial court. The Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to determine the appeal on issues not arising from the judgment. The appeal at the Court of Appeal and the judgment arising therefrom were liable to be set aside. Also, the appeal at the Court of Appeal being struck out, the appeal at the Supreme Court was liable to be struck out. [Eyigebe v. Iyaji (2013) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1365) 407; Awuse v.Odili (2004) 8 NWLR (Pt. 874) 876) 494; Odife v. Aniemeka (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt. 251) 25; Ibigbami v. Mil. Gov., Ekiti State (2004) 4 NWLR (Pt. 863) 243referred to.] (P. 121, paras. C-H).
OPENE V. N.J.C. (2024) 15 NWLR (PT. 1960) 101
ON WHETHER APPELLATE COURT CAN DETERMINE APPEAL ON INCOMPLETE RECORD OF APPEAL
No court, not even the apex court, is cloaked with jurisdictional competence to determine a matter or appeal based on an incomplete record as transmitted thereto in the course of the proceedings before it. An appellant ought to present his case diligently. In that regard, he is obliged to place before the court all the relevant materials on the issue he has called upon the court to consider and determine upon and that is more so in matters of appeal. [Nwana v. F.C.D.A. (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1044) 59 referred to.] (P. 135, paras. F-H).
OPENE V. N.J.C. (2024) 15 NWLR (PT. 1960) 101
ON TREATMENT OF DECISION OF COURT NOT APPEALED AGAINST
A decision of court not appealed against by an appellant is deemed accepted as correct, conclusive and binding upon him. In the instant case, the decision of the trial court that the appellant did not place before it the 1st respondent’s report on which the recommendation of his dismissal was based was not appealed against. The appellant thereby accepted it as correct, conclusive and binding upon him. (P. 138, paras. B-C).
SONUGA V. BRANCH MANAGER, U.B.N. PLC (2024) 16 NWLR (PT. 1964) 323
ON TREATMENT OF GROUND OF APPEAL WHERE VAGUE, GENERAL IN TERMS OR DISCLOSES NO REASONABLE GROUND
A ground of appeal which is vague or general in terms or which discloses no reasonable ground of appeal shall not be permitted, save the general ground that the judgment is against the weight of evidence. A ground of appeal which is found to be incompetent may be struck out by the court of its own motion or on application by the respondent. A ground of appeal can only be competent if the particulars and the nature of the alleged misdirection or error are clearly stated. The grounds must not be argumentative, vague or general in terms. It must disclose reasonable complaint against a ratio decidendi in the decision as opposed to an obiter dictum. A ground of appeal must be directed at the decision of the court.
SONUGA V. BRANCH MANAGER, U.B.N. PLC (2024) 16 NWLR (PT. 1964) 323
ON NEED FOR GROUND OF APPEAL TO CHALLENGE RATIODECIDENDI OF DECISION APPEALED AGAINST
For a ground of appeal to be competent, it must challenge the ratio decidendi which is the principle of law and findings of the court which the case was decided on and not what ought to have been. (P.342, paras. G-H).
SONUGA V. BRANCH MANAGER, U.B.N. PLC (2024) 16 NWLR (PT. 1964) 323
ON CRITERIA FOR VALID GROUND OF APPEAL
A valid ground of appeal should be premised on any or all of the following grounds:
- that the court wrongly misapplied a principle of law, which consequently has affected the outcome of the judgment; or
- that the court misdirected or misconstrued a set of facts which has led to a miscarriage of justice; or
- that the court failed to evaluate evidence or material issues in the judgment which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice; or
- the omnibus ground.
SONUGA V. BRANCH MANAGER, U.B.N. PLC (2024) 16 NWLR (PT. 1964) 323
ON WHETHER GROUND OF APPEAL CAN ALLEGE BOTH ERROR OF LAW AND ERROR OF FACT
A ground of appeal is the allegation of error of law or fact made by an appellant as the defect in the judgment appealed against and which is relied upon to set the judgment aside. Therefore, a ground of appeal must be founded either on law or fact but not both in one ground of appeal. In other words, the error constituting a ground of appeal is either error of law or error of fact but never law and fact. The court is not equipped to split a single ground of appeal complaining of error in law and error in fact to divine what part is founded on law and what part is based on fact.
SONUGA V. BRANCH MANAGER, U.B.N. PLC (2024) 16 NWLR (PT. 1964) 323
ON NEED FOR GROUND OF APPEAL TO BE CLEAR, CONCISE, AND ADDRESS ISSUES ARISING FROM JUDGMENT OF TRIAL COURT
An appellant’s counsel owes his client and the court a duty to ensure that his grounds of appeal are clear, concise and address squarely issues that have arisen from the judgment of the trial court. It is not the duty of the appellate court to embark on a wild goose chase to begin to piece together facts that will help to make sense of a ground of appeal. (P. 344, paras. F-G).
SONUGA V. BRANCH MANAGER, U.B.N. PLC (2024) 16 NWLR (PT. 1964) 323
ON NEED FOR GROUND OF APPEAL TO SHOW COMPLAINT AGAINST DECISION APPEALED AGAINST
Grounds of appeal ought to embody the dissatisfaction of an appellant against the decision being challenged. Hence, a ground must be in the form of a complaint against the decision of the lower court. In the instant appeal, the grounds of appeal raised by the appellant at the Court of Appeal against the decision of the trial court did not reveal any discernible grievance against the judgment of the trial court. The grounds together with their particulars were argument by the appellant about what the decision of the trial court should have been. [Ngere v. Okuruket XIV (2023) 14 NWLR (Pt.
1904) 361; Garga v. State (2022) 14 NWLR (Pt.1850) 383; Ifaramoye v. Stat e (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt.1568) 457; Ehinlanwo v. Oke (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt.1113) 357 referred to.] (Pp. 346-347, paras. F-A).
SONUGA V. BRANCH MANAGER, U.B.N. PLC (2024) 16 NWLR (PT. 1964) 323
ON TREATMENT OF GROUND OF APPEAL WITH CLUMSY PHRASEOLOGY
Where a ground of appeal discloses a legally recognised complaint or triable issue but has clumsy phraseology, it cannot be described as vague. It is valid for consideration in spite of the sloppy phraseology. A ground of appeal can only qualify as a vague one where the complaint it makes is uncertain or unclear or indefinite. (P. 347, paras.G-H).
SEMBCORP ENG. PTE LTD. V. IPCO (WA) HOLDINGS LTD. (2024) 17 NWLR (PT. 1968) 531
ON WHETHER FAILURE TO FILE RESPONDENT’S BRIEF OFARGUMENT GUARANTEES SUCCESS OF AN APPEAL
The fact that only the appellants brief is considered in determining an appeal does not automatically entitle the appellant to succeed in the appeal. Even where a respondent has refused to file a brief of argument, the appellant still has to convince the court by the arguments contained in his brief of argument that his appeal ought to be allowed.
ABINDE V. SALAKO (2025) 3 NWLR (PT. 1978) 159
ON WHEN APPEAL DEEMED ENTERED
An appeal is entered when the record of appeal is received and entered in the cause list. The giving of notice does not constitute the entering of appeal. An appeal is not an alternative remedy to any proceeding in a court of law. Between the time an appeal is filed at the trial court but before the record is transmitted to the appellate court, the trial court can entertain some interlocutory applications but cannot re-open the case. In effect, when the record of proceedings has been transmitted to the appellate court whereby the court is seised of the matter, the trial court lacks vires to take any proceedings, interlocutory or otherwise. In other words, an appeal is said to
be entered once the lower court transmits the record of appeal to the appellate court and until that is done the appellate court cannot be said to be seised of the matter.
ABINDE V. SALAKO (2025) 3 NWLR (PT. 1978) 159
ON WHEN APPEAL DEEMED ENTERED
An appeal is entered when the record of appeal is received and entered in the cause list. The giving of notice does not constitute the entering of appeal. An appeal is not an alternative remedy to any proceeding in a court of law. Between the time an appeal is filed at the trial court but before the record is transmitted to the appellate court, the trial court can entertain some interlocutory applications but cannot re-open the case. In effect, when the record of proceedings has been transmitted to the appellate court whereby the court is seised of the matter, the trial court lacks vires to take any proceedings, interlocutory or otherwise. In other words, an appeal is said to be entered once the lower court transmits the record of appeal to the appellate court and until that is done the appellate court cannot be said to be seised of the matter.
ETSAKO WEST LOCAL GOVT. V. CHRISTOPHER (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 585
ON NATURE OF GROUND OF APPEAL AGAINST DISMISSAL OF APPEAL FOR WANT OF DILIGENT PROSECUTION DESPITE PENDING OPPOSED RESPONDENT’S MOTION CHALLENGING COMPETENCE OF APPEAL
A ground of appeal that the Court of Appeal erred in dismissing an appeal before it for want of diligent prosecution at a time when there was a pending motion by the respondent challenging the competence of the notice of appeal is a ground of law. This is so because the issue of whether a notice of appeal is competent or not is a question of law; and because the Court of Appeal being a superior court of record ought to be bound by its own record. In this case, ground 1 of the appellant’s notice of appeal raised a question of law. So, the notice of appeal is competent. Accordingly, the respondent’s preliminary objection ought to be discountenanced and dismissed for being devoid of merits. (Pp. 604-605, paras. A-A; 605, paras. F-H).
AKINGBOLA V. INTERCONTINENTAL BANK PLC (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 343
ON WHAT IS ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION IN APPEAL
An issue for determination in an appeal is a combination of facts and circumstances including the law applicable thereto which is so crucial that if it is decided one way or the other will affect the fate of the appeal. It is a point which is so critical that if it is decided in favour of a party, such a party is entitled to win the appeal. [Okoye v. N.C. & F. Co.Ltd. (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 199) 501; G. Chitex Ind. Ltd.v. Oceanic Bank Int. (Nig.) Ltd. (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt.945) 392; Ali v. Osakwe (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1245)68; Nadabo v. Dabai (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1245) 155referred to.] (P. 403, paras. A-C).
AKINGBOLA V. INTERCONTINENTAL BANK PLC (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 343
ON EFFECT WHERE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION TO AN APPEAL IS UPHELD
It is the practice by the Supreme Court after upholding the preliminary objection of a respondent to automatically terminate the appeal. With the resolution of the preliminary objection, the need for the court to proceed further in the appeal to consider the merits of the appeal of the appellant becomes obviated. [Aliyu v. A.P.C. (2023) 6NWLR (Pt. 1879) 151; Polaris Bank Ltd. v. Forte Oil Plc (2023) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1876) 17; Regd. Trustees, Mission House v. A.S.T.B. Plc (2024) 10 NWLR (Pt.1947) 565; Ugba v. Suswan (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt.1427) 264 referred to.] (P. 423, paras. B-D).