PRECISION ASSO. LTD. V. FED. MIN., FINANCE (2025) 14 NWLR (PT.
2004) 175
ON MEANING AND IMPORT OF “ADMINISTRATION OR MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL” IN SECTION 251(1)(P) OF 1999 CONSTITUTION (AS AMENDED)
In ordinary English, the word “administration” means the management of the affairs of a business or organization; the word “management” means the organizing and controlling of the affairs of a business or a particular sector of a business; and the word “control” means to exercise power or authority over something, such as a business.
Therefore, the term “administration or management and control” in section 251(1)(p) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) means the direction, oversight, and regulation of the Federal Government or any of its agencies, thereby granting the Federal High Court exclusive jurisdiction over causes or matters relating to the internal management and operations of the Federal Government and its agencies.
In this case, the appellants’ claims, which were granted by the trial court, do not fall within causes or matters related to the internal management and/or operations of the respondents, which are agencies of the Federal Government of Nigeria.
Therefore, section 251(1)(p) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) does not apply to the case, so as to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory to entertain the appellant’s case or suit.
(Pp. 195-196, paras. H-D)
PRECISION ASSO. LTD. V. FED. MIN., FINANCE (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 175
ON DETERMINANTS OF EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL HIGH COURT (SUBJECT MATTER)
The exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, as conferred by section 251(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), is generally determined not only by the parties to an action but also by the subject matter of the action.
In other words, the mere fact that the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party to an action does not automatically vest jurisdiction on the Federal High Court. For the court to assume jurisdiction under section 251(1) of the Constitution, the subject matter of the action must fall within section 251(1)(a)–(p). For an action under section 251(1)(p), in addition to the Federal Government or any of its agencies being a party, the subject matter must be the administration or the management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies.
In this case, though the respondents are agencies of the Federal Government, the subject matter of the action was breach of contract and the appellant sought damages for the breach. Thus, the subject matter of the action has nothing to do with the administration or the management and control of the respondents.
[Olayemi v. F.H.A. (2023) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1872) 445; Ports & Cargo Handling Services Co. Ltd. v. Migfo (Nig.) Ltd. (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1333) 555; Ahmed v. Ahmed (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1377) 274; N.N.P.C. v. Fung Tai Engineering Co. Ltd. (2023) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1906) 117; Dec Oil & Gas Ltd. v. Shell Nig. Gas Ltd. (2019) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1692) 273; Socio-Political Research Development v. Ministry of F.C.T. (2019) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1653) 313; Ikpekpe v. Warri Refinery & Petrochemical Co. Ltd. (2018) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1648) 280 referred to.] (Pp. 202, paras. C-F; 204, paras. B-H)
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON WHEN APPEAL LIES AS OF RIGHT FROM DECISION OF GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION TRIBUNAL
By virtue of section 246(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), an appeal shall lie as of right from decisions of the Governorship Election Tribunals, on any question as to whether:
(i) any person has been validly elected as a member of the National Assembly or of a House of Assembly of a State under the Constitution;
(ii) any person has been validly elected to the office of Governor or Deputy Governor; or
(iii) the term of office of any person has ceased or the seat of any such person has become vacant.
Section 246 of the Constitution simply provides for an appeal to the Court of Appeal, as of right, from decisions of the Tribunals on any question as to whether any person has been validly elected to the office of a Governor or Deputy Governor. The provisions merely create the right of an appeal against a decision or decisions or judgments by a Governorship Election Tribunal on the issue or question of validity of the election of a person to the office of a Governor or Deputy Governor of a State in an election conducted as provided for in the Constitution and the Electoral Act.
Undoubtedly, a decision as to whether any person has been validly elected to the office of a Governor or Deputy Governor of a State in Nigeria can only be arrived at after a complete and final determination of the question as to the validity of such an election by the Tribunal in line with the Constitution and Electoral Act.
In the instant case, the decision on the validity of the election to the office of a Governor or Deputy Governor of a State by the Tribunal, in the final judgment delivered on the 27th May, 2024, was one in respect of which a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal was created by and under the provisions of section 246 of the Constitution.
However, what is discernable from the provisions is that, being the grund norm and foundation of all other laws and statutes in Nigeria, they just created and provided the right of appeal, but not the person or party entitled to the right or the manner or procedure to be used in the valid exercise of the right. For this reason, the provisions could not be relied on, on their own, for the validity of the procedure employed for the exercise of the right provided for therein.
Thus, there was nothing in the provisions of the section which confers two rights of appeal against determination of validity of the election of a person to the office of a Governor or Deputy Governor since the opening words of subsection 1 only created and gives the right to appeal.
[Dingyadi v. INEC (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1255) 347; Igbeke v. Okadigbo (2013) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1368) 225 referred to.] (Pp. 99, paras. F-A; 100-101, paras. E-D)
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON WHETHER APPLICATION OF SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS AMOUNTS TO TECHNICALITY
The application of substantive provisions of the Constitution or any statute is not and does not constitute or amount to technicality in judicial proceedings generally, and in election matters specifically.
[Inakoju v. Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 423; Drexel Energy & Natural Resources Ltd. v. Trans. International Bank Ltd. (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1119) 388 referred to.] (P. 110, paras. A-B)
C.B.N. V. OCHIFE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 1
ON WHETHER PRIOR CONSENT OF ANY AUTHORITY APART FROM COURTS IS REQUIRED UNDER 1999 CONSTITUTION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF DECISIONS OF COURTS
Section 287 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides that:
(a) The decisions of the Supreme Court shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons, and by courts with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Supreme Court.
(b) The decisions of the Court of Appeal shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons, and by courts with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Court of Appeal.
(c) The decisions of the Federal High Court, a High Court and of all other courts established by this Constitution shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons, and by other courts of law with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Federal High Court, a High Court and those other courts, respectively.
In effect, section 251(4) of the 1979 Constitution (as modified by Decree 107) was removed from the 1999 Constitution or was deliberately never inserted in section 287 of the 1999 Constitution, which is the corresponding provision to section 251 of the 1979 Constitution (as modified).
This is so because the legislators of the 1999 Constitution perceived that the provisions of the subsection of the 1979 Constitution (as modified) were a vestige of military rule and colonialism.
This means that the law is as it was before Decree No. 107 was promulgated.
(Pp. 124–125, paras. E–B)
NWIZI V. OKE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 589
ON RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING
The right to fair hearing is a very fundamental and an integral right in adjudication. Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, (as amended) provides that in the determination of his civil rights and obligations, including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality.
(P. 626, paras. B–D)
A.G. LAGOS STATE V. A.-G., FED. (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 43
ON CONCEPT AND NATURE OF FEDERALISM
In accordance with sections 2 and 3 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), Nigeria practices federalism, a system of governance in which power is constitutionally divided between a central Federal government, the various State governments and their various local government authorities. The structure allows each level of government to exercise authority over specific matters within its jurisdiction as outlined in the Constitution. The distribution aims to promote local governance, accommodate Nigeria’s diverse ethnic and cultural groups and ensure a balanced regional development. (P. 92, paras. D-F).
A.G. LAGOS STATE V. A.-G., FED. (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 43
ON OPERATION OF PRINCIPLE OF FEDERALISM
Nigeria is a federating entity consisting of the Federation, thirty-six States and a Federal Capital Territory. Thus, in order to satisfy the desire of the federating units to co-exist peacefully on the principle of freedom, equality and justice, the 1999 Constitution (as amended) has donated separate executive, legislative and judicial powers to the three organs of government. The powers are enshrined in sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Constitution. In order to avoid confusion in the system, the Constitution has classified the legislative powers of the Federation into exclusive, concurrent and residual, which is the remnant. (P. 115, paras. A-C).
A.G. LAGOS STATE V. A.-G., FED. (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 43
ON LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY OF A STATE
By virtue of section 4(6) and of the 1999Constitution (as amended), the legislative powers of a State of the Federation shall be vested in the House of Assembly of the State. The House of Assembly of a State shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the State or any part thereof with respect to the following matters:
- any matter not included in the Exclusive Legislative List set out in Part I of the Second Schedule to the Constitution;
- any matter included in the Concurrent Legislative List set out in the first column of Part II of the Second Schedule to the Constitution to the extent prescribed in the second column opposite thereto; and
- any other matter with respect to which itis empowered to make laws in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
(P. 95, paras. B-E).
A.G. LAGOS STATE V. A.-G., FED. (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 43
ON WHETHER LOTTERY LISTED IN SECOND SCHEDULE, 1999 CONSTITUTION
In the Second Schedule to the 1999 Constitution, there is no express mention or inference of lottery. In the provisions of the Constitution relating to legislative powers, both in the Exclusive Legislative List and Concurrent Legislative List, there is nowhere lottery is listed in either of the legislative powers. (Pp. 98, para. C; 117, paras. C-G).
A.G. LAGOS STATE V. A.-G., FED. (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 43
ON WHETHER LOTTERY CONSTITUTE TRADE AND COMMERCE UNDER ITEM 62 (A), PART I, SECOND SCHEDULE, 1999 CONSTITUTION
Lottery does not constitute “trade and commerce” as envisaged under Item 62(a) of the Exclusive Legislative List as lottery is fundamentally a game of chance lacking the certainty, mutual exchange and reciprocity typically associated with trade and commerce. Unlike traditional commercial transactions involving a defined exchange of goods or services between parties, a lottery merely offers participants the prospect of winning without any assured return or specific value in exchange. Therefore, a lottery cannot be classified as “trade and commerce” under the relevant item in the Exclusive Legislative List, as it fails to meet the criteria of an economic transaction involving the definite transfer of goods or services. Lottery activities do not fall within the scope of commercial intercourse. [A.-G., Ogun State v. Aberuagba (1985) 1NWLR (Pt. 3) 395.referred to.] (P. 101, paras. B-D).
A.G. LAGOS STATE V. A.-G., FED. (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 43
ON WHETHER CONTROL OF ECONOMY WITHIN EXCLUSIVE POWER OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The control of the economy is not within the exclusive power of the Federation. Each Government, Federal, State and Local, has a share in the control. While the Constitution requires the Federation to control the national economy, it also empowers a State to participate in the development of the economy within its area of jurisdiction. Since States as federating units have been empowered by the Constitution to participate in the development of the economy, each State House of Assembly may make Laws that will enable the State to play that role within the polity. That is why the Constitution has provided under section 4(7) of the1999 Constitution that the House of Assembly of each State has the power to make laws for peace, order and good governance of the State or any part thereof. [A.-G., Ogun State v. Aberuagba (1985) 1NWLR (Pt. 3) 395.referred to.] (Pp. 118-119, paras. G-D).
A.G. LAGOS STATE V. A.-G., FED. (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 43
ON VALIDITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NATIONAL LOTTERY ACT, 2005
Where the Constitution has donated a particular item to the States, the National Assembly cannot usurp that power. The National Assembly has no power to legislate on an item not expressly specified in the Exclusive or Concurrent Legislative Lists. Lottery is not an item specified in items 62(a) – of the Exclusive List or the Concurrent Legislative List. The National Lottery Act is therefore ultra vires the legislative powers of the National Assembly. (P.119, paras. D-E).
A.G. LAGOS STATE V. A.-G., FED. (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 43
ON POWER OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO MAKE LAWS ON RESIDUAL MATTERS
The 1999 Constitution, like most Constitutions, does not provide for a residual list. And that is what makes the list residual. The expression emanates largely from the judiciary, that is, itis largely a coinage of the judiciary to enable it exercise its interpretative jurisdiction, as it relates to the Constitution. Etymologically, residual merely means that which remains. In legislative or parliamentary language, residual matters are those that are neither in the Exclusive or Concurrent Legislative Lists; that is, what remains or is not covered by the Exclusive and Concurrent Legislative Lists. By section 4 of the Constitution, the residual legislative powers of government were vested in the States. By residual legislative powers within the context of section 4 is meant what was left after the matters in the Exclusive and Concurrent Legislative Lists and those matters which the Constitution expressly empowers the Federal and States to legislate upon have been subtracted from the totality of the inherent and unlimited powers of a sovereign legislature. The Federation has no powers to make laws on the residual matters. By virtue of section 4(7)(a), residual matters are for the State to legislate upon. [A.-G., Abia State v. A.-G., Fed. (2006) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1005) 265 referred to.] (Pp. 111-112, paras. G-F).