C.B.N. V. OCHIFE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 1
ON WHAT SUPREME COURT DECIDED IN C.B.N. V. INTERSTELLA COMMUNICATIONS LTD (2018) 7 NWLR (PT. 1618) 294 AND RATIONALE THEREFOR
The conclusions of the Supreme Court in C.B.N. v. Interstella Communications Ltd (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 294 are that:
(a) Where the office of the Attorney General of the Federation had been involved in arriving at a consent judgment between the parties, the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation is taken as given to garnishee proceedings.
(b) Where the Attorney General of the Federation or of a State is the judgment debtor, then the requirement that the judgment creditor should seek the consent of its debtor cannot be in consonant with the rule of law.
(c) Where the Attorney General of the Federation is merely a neutral/nominal party in the transactions and proceedings giving rise to the application for garnishee order nisi, and he not being the debtor, the case comes within the purview of section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act.
(d) Where the cause of action is a judgment debt for which a garnishee order is being sought, and the Central Bank of Nigeria is a party to the garnishee proceedings, the Central Bank of Nigeria merely stands as a banker to the Federal Government funds with respect to the government funds in its custody and not as a public officer in such a situation.
(e) The Central Bank of Nigeria is ordinarily a “public officer”. But within the context of section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, it may not be regarded as a public officer if the relationship between the Central Bank of Nigeria and the judgment debtor is nothing more than a banker/customer relationship.
In other words, the decision did not change the meaning of a “public officer” as interpreted in Ibrahim v. J.S.C. (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1.
(f) There was no need to seek the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation in the peculiar circumstances of the case.
The Supreme Court specially explained severally that the facts of the case was the basis of its judgment.
The decision of the Supreme Court was shaped by the peculiar circumstances of the case and the need to enforce the enthronement of substantial justice to ensure that the State did not renege on its obligations voluntarily entered into by hiding behind section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act.
In effect, neither party in this case could claim victory based on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case.
(Pp. 107-111, paras B-E)
CHIEF (HON.) NKWO NNABUCHI & ORS V. I.G.P. & ORS (2025) 8 NWLR (PT. 1993) 495
ON DEFINITION OF RATIO DECIDENDI
Ratio decidendi is defined as the enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided. In other words, it is the general reasons given for the decision or the general grounds on which it is based, detached or abstracted from the specific peculiarities of the particular case which gives rise to the decision. It means what was decided. It is not something which a party imagines or thinks was decided. [Onah v .Schlumberger (Nig) Ltd. (2018) 17 NWLR (Pt.1647)84; Ugwu v. State (2020) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1746)1; Opene v. National Judicial Council (2024) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1960) 101 referred to.] (Pp. 508-509,paras. H-B)
CHIEF (HON.) NKWO NNABUCHI & ORS V. I.G.P. & ORS (2025) 8 NWLR (PT. 1993) 495
ON DISTINCTION BETWEEN RATIO DECIDENDI AND OBITER DICTUM
The concept of ratio decidendi and obiter dictum was developed under the doctrine of judicial precedent to distinguish the portion of the judgment of a higher court that is binding on a lower court from the portion of the judgment that is not binding. The ratio decidendi in a case represents the legal reasoning or principle or ground upon which a case is decided. An appeal can only lie against the ratio decidendi. On the other hand, an obiter dictum means the opinion of the court which does not embody the resolution of the court. An obiter dictum cannot be the basis for a reversal of a decision, and any appeal or ground of appeal predicated thereon would be liable to be struck out. [Okpeji v. Minister of Agriculture (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt. 522) 693, University Press Ltd. v. I. K. Martins (Nig.) Ltd. (2000) 4 NWLR(Pt. 654) 584, Ibrahim v. Fulani (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt.1222) 241; Odunukwe v. Ofomata (2010) 18 NWLR(Pt. 1225) 404; Ogbaru L.G. v. Ifeachor (2023) 15NWLR (Pt. 1906) 99; Amadi v. Wopara (20 22) 1NWLR (Pt. 1811) 359; Buhari v. Obasanjo (2003)17 NWLR (Pt. 850) 587; Orugbo v. Una (2002) 16NWLR (Pt.792) 175 referred to.] (Pp. 508, paras.F-G; 512, paras. E-G; 513, paras. A-B)OPENE V. N.J.C. (2024) 15 NWLR (PT. 1960) 101
ON MEANING OF RATIO DECIDENDI
Ratio decidendi represents the reasoning or principle or ground upon which a case is decided. It means what was decided. It is not something which a party imagines or thinks was decided. The ratio decidendi of a case lays down the principle of law that has the binding force of precedent. It makes good sense that such peripheral expressions, i.e. obiter dicta, should not be allowed to becloud the substance of a court’s judgment. That is to say, what a court has not decided should not be the basis of an appeal against the decision of a court. [A.I.C. Ltd. v. N.N.P.C. (2005)11 NWLR (Pt. 937) 563; UTC v. Pometei; University Press Ltd v. I. K. Martins (Nig.) Ltd. (2000) 4 NWLR (Pt. 654) 584; Adesokan v. Adetunji (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 346) 540; Amobi v. Nzeugwu (2014) 2 NWLR (Pt.1392) 510 referred to.] (Pp. 120-121, paras. H-B).
OPENE V. N.J.C. (2024) 15 NWLR (PT. 1960) 101
ON MEANING OF RATIO DECIDENDI
The Latin term “ratio decidendi” literally denotes the reason for the decision (deciding). Basically, a ratio decidendi is a doctrine or principle of law upon which the decision of a court is founded. The phrase “the ratio decidendi” of a case is slightly ambiguous. It may mean either the rule that the court which decided the case intended to lay down and apply to the facts or the rule that a later court concedes to it to have had the power to lay down. There are two steps involved in the ascertainment of the ratio decidendi. First, it is necessary to determine all the facts of the case as seen by the court. Secondly, it is necessary to discover which of those facts were treated as material by the trial court. In the instant case, the actual ratio decidendi of the trial court was duly captured in the vexed judgment of the court. The very ratio decidendi of the trial court was to the effect that the appellant failed to place all material facts in proof of his case before the court and that he failed to prove his case on its own strength. The whole essence of the trial court’s decision, the ratio decidendi, was predicated upon the non-production or non-transmission of the 1st respondent’s report whether in it recommended for the dismissal of the appellant. Thus, any other finding relating to breach or otherwise of the appellant’s right to fair hearing was peripheral and was tantamount to a mere obiter dictum. (Pp. 130, paras. A-E;135, paras. A-C).
OPENE V. N.J.C. (2024) 15 NWLR (PT. 1960) 101
ON NEED FOR GROUND OF APPEAL TO RELATE TO AND CHALLENGE RATIO OF DECISION APPEALED AGAINST
The fact that an appeal ought to be a rehearing of the case or appeal of the case below, as the case may be, validates the preposition of law to the effect that the grounds of appeal and the issues from which they are distilled or derived must, as of necessity, be a direct grouse or complaint against the decision of the lower court. For grounds of appeal to be valid and competent, they must be related to the decision being appealed against and should constitute a challenge to the ratio of the decision on appeal. Where a ground of appeal as formulated does not arise from the judgment and purports to raise and attack an issue not decided by the judgment appealed against, it is incompetent and liable to be struck out. [C.C. Plc. v. Ekperi (2007) 3 NWLR (Pt.1022) 493; Okafor v. Abumofuani (2016) 12NW LR (Pt. 1525) 385 referred to.] (P. 129, paras. E-H).
SONUGA V. BRANCH MANAGER, U.B.N. PLC (2024) 16 NWLR (PT. 1964) 323
ON NEED FOR GROUND OF APPEAL TO CHALLENGE RATIO DECIDENDI OF DECISION APPEALED AGAINST
For a ground of appeal to be competent, it must challenge the ratio decidendi which is the principle of law and findings of the court which the case was decided on and not what ought to have been. (P.342, paras. G-H).
SONUGA V. BRANCH MANAGER, U.B.N. PLC (2024) 16 NWLR (PT. 1964) 323
ON WHAT IS RATIO DECIDENDI OF CASE
The ratio decidendi of a case is the principle of law upon which the case was decided. It is this principle that is binding on the parties and capable of being the subject of an appeal. The ratio decidendi constitutes the authority on which the case stands. [P.D.P. v. Sylva (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1557) 74 referred to.] (P.342, paras. F-G).