STATE V. ARDO (2025) 13 NWLR (Pt. 2002) 303
ON WHAT IS JOINT TRIAL AND DUTY ON PROSECUTION THEREIN
When more than one accused persons are charged for the same offence and arraigned together, it is known as a joint trial.
The prosecution is duty bound to establish the ingredients of the offences charged against each accused person separately.
In other words, the prosecution must prove by credible evidence the part played by each accused person that constituted the offence jointly charged.
Thus, the fact that an accused is jointly charged with others for a crime, does not mean the evidence must also be joined.
The extent of the liability of each person, the extent of his or her intention and knowledge in the commission of the crime must be proved, otherwise, that accused must be acquitted.
(P. 324, paras. D-F)
STATE V. ARDO (2025) 13 NWLR (Pt. 2002) 303
ON LIABILITY OF AN ACCUSED IN A JOINT TRIAL
Each of the accused in a joint criminal trial must be held liable only to the extent of his or her knowledge or intention.
This means that the trial Judge is duty bound to evaluate the evidence led in a joint criminal trial against each and every accused person separately as directed by the Supreme Court while giving guidance to trial courts on evaluation of evidence in joint trial.
(P. 324, paras. F-G)
STATE V. ARDO (2025) 13 NWLR (Pt. 2002) 303
ON DUTY ON TRIAL COURT WHERE THERE ARE MORE THAN ONE ACCUSED PERSON
Where there are more than one accused person, the trial court should consider the evidence against each of the accused persons separately following this procedure;
(a) the court must identify the nature and quantum of evidence against each accused person;
(b) it must determine whether such evidence having regards to its source was legally receivable against each of the accused persons;
(c) it must determine whether or not evidence receivable are credible;
(d) it must determine whether the evidence was sufficient and of character that can be relied upon to justify the pronouncement of guilty verdict on the accused person.
[State v. Azeez (2008) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1108) 493 referred to]
(Pp. 324-325, paras. G-B)
IREGU V. STATE (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 189
ON PRIMARY DUTY OF TRIAL COURT IN RESPECT OF EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE AND ASCRIPTION OF PROBATIVE VALUE TO EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASE
In a criminal trial, the evaluation of evidence and the ascription of probative value to such evidence is the primary function of the trial court.
(P. 249, para. B)
IREGU V. STATE (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 189
ON WHEN CONTRADICTION IN EVIDENCE FATAL TO PROSECUTION’S CASE
For a contradiction to be fatal to the prosecution’s case, it must be material and touch on an essential ingredient of the offence charged.
Therefore, contradiction in the evidence of the prosecution can only avail the accused where it is found to be material, substantial and affects the essential issues to be tried in the case.
Minor and inconsequential contradictions which have no effect on the evidence in proof of the essential elements of the offence charged cannot be fatal to the prosecution’s case.
In the instant case, the trial court and the Court of Appeal were right that the contradictions alleged were not material as to affect the substance of the case against the appellant.
[Maiyaki v. State (2008) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1109) 173; Friday v. State (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1538) 205; Ochemaje v. State (2008) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1109) 57; State v. Ahmed (2020) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1743) 1; Lalapu v. C.O.P. (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1699) 476 referred to.]
(P. 243, paras. A–C)
IREGU V. STATE (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 189
ON WHEN PIECE OF EVIDENCE CONTRADICTORY TO ANOTHER PIECE OF EVIDENCE
Two pieces of evidence will be said to contradict each other when they do not agree with each other. In other words, a piece of evidence is contradictory to another when it asserts or affirms the opposite of what the other has asserted.
Therefore, two pieces of evidence are said to contradict one another when they are inconsistent with each other.
[Egwumi v. State (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1372) 525; Gabriel v. State (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 122) 457; Nwankwoala v. F.R.N. (2018) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1631) 397 referred to.]
(P. 242, paras. F–H)
IREGU V. STATE (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 189
ON WHAT PROOF OF EVIDENCE MUST CONTAIN
The prosecution is obliged to put all the evidence adduced during investigation in the proof of evidence. Where an accused person claims that he made a statement that was in his favour which was not tendered in evidence, it is the duty of the defence counsel to demand for it if it was not contained in the proof of evidence.
(P. 251, para. C)
IREGU V. STATE (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 189
ON PROBATIVE VALUE OF CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT
A confessional statement is the best evidence of the commission of a crime where there is evidence that it was made voluntarily.
Even where the confession has been retracted, so long as it meets the credibility test, it will be properly evaluated and credibility given to it.
In the instant case, the confessional statements of the appellant and the other accused persons at trial showed the motive for the murder of the deceased.
[Asimi v. State (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1527) 414; Akibu v. State (2019) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1684) 433; Ekum v. State (2022) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1847) 241 referred to.]
(P. 250, paras. F–G)
IREGU V. STATE (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 189
ON WHETHER CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT REQUIRES CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE TO GROUND CONVICTION WHERE RETRACTED
Where a confession is retracted, it is always desirable that before the court proceeds to convict on such retracted confession, there should be some corroborative evidence outside the confession which would make it probable that the confession is true.
In other words, the truthfulness of the confession should be established by some other evidence, no matter how slight. However, it is not the law that a court cannot convict on a confessional statement alone without corroboration.
The requirement of corroborative evidence is not required as a matter of law but practice, for once the confession is direct, positive and unequivocal, the court can convict on it alone so long as it is satisfied of the truth of the confession.
[State v. Saidu (2019) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1680) 308; Blessing v. F.R.N. (2015) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1475) 1; Samaila v. State (2021) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1767) 528; Achabua v. State (1976) 12 SC 63; Igbinowaya v. State (2019) LPELR-46958; Odeh v. F.R.N. (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1103) 1; Fabiyi v. State (2015) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1490) 80; Ikpasa v. State (1981) 9 SC 7 referred to.]
(P. 240, paras. A–D)
IREGU V. STATE (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 189
ON WHETHER CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT OF ACCUSED ADMISSIBLE OR RELEVANT AGAINST CO-ACCUSED
Admissibility is governed by the Evidence Act and other legislations validly in force in Nigeria. So, when it comes to relevance of confessional statements of more than one persons jointly charged with the same offence, the appropriate provision is section 29(4) of the Evidence Act, 2011.
The section stipulates that where more persons than one is charged jointly with an offence and a confession made by one of such persons in the presence of one or more of the other persons so charged is given in evidence, the court shall not take such statement into consideration as against any of such other persons in whose presence it was made unless he adopted the statement by words or conduct.
By the operation of the provision, a statement made by an accused person to the police is binding or remains evidence against the maker only. It is not admissible or relevant against a co-accused.
It is only binding against the co-accused in the same trial when the statement was made in the presence of the co-accused and the co-accused adopts same.
In the instant case, there was no evidence on record to show that the statements of the appellant were recorded in the presence of the 2nd and 3rd accused persons or that the statements of any of the 2nd and 3rd accused persons were made in the presence of the appellant.
[Ozaki v. State (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 124) 92 referred to.]
(Pp. 236–237, paras. G–D)
Per TSAMMANI, J.S.C. at page 237, paras. E–A:
“In the instant case, a careful reading of the confessional statements of the appellant and those of the co-accused will reveal clearly that they agreed with each other. Though there is no evidence on the record to show that the statements were shown to each other, their contents are very similar save for minor differences.
The court below then found that in the circumstances, there is an inference that the appellant and the co-accused adopted the statements of each other. For clarity, the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal held at page 222 of the record of appeal as follows:
‘Appellant made a confessional statement exhibit B. The co-accused persons made confessional statements on the same facts. By inference each adopted the contents of the confessional statements. In exhibit B, the appellant said they planned and killed the deceased because she was the one disturbing them not to progress and he was the one who killed him and Ejima’s father and Okareyi’s mother with her witchcraft. The learned trial Judge conducted a trial-within-trial and found the statement was made voluntarily before admitting it as exhibit B.’”
IREGU V. STATE (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 189
ON WHEN NECESSARY TO CONDUCT TRIAL-WITHIN-TRIAL
A trial court is not required in law to hold a trial-within-trial unless the voluntariness of a confessional statement is clearly raised. Where an accused resiles his statement on the ground that he did not make the statement confessing to the crime charged, it is a question of fact that the trial court must decide; it does not make the statement inadmissible.
Trial-within-trial is necessary when an extra-judicial confessional statement of an accused is objected to on the ground that it was not made voluntarily. When a statement of an accused is not confessional but contains names of persons who later become co-accused as suspects, it does not fall within the ambit of sections 27 and 28 of the Evidence Act from which the trial court is to conduct a trial-within-trial.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeal was right in holding that exhibit “A” was not a confessional statement and, therefore, a trial-within-trial was not necessary to determine its admissibility.
(P. 231, paras. E–G)
IREGU V. STATE (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 189
ON WHEN NECESSARY TO CONDUCT TRIAL-WITHIN-TRIAL
Trial-within-trial is only used to test the voluntariness of a confessional statement, not what value or weight to attach to evidence. In other words, a trial-within-trial is embarked upon to determine the issue of voluntariness of a confessional statement.
In essence, the issue of voluntariness is kept distinct from the issue of guilt, and this is done by insulating the enquiry into voluntariness in a compartment that is separate from the main trial. In other words, the accused has the right to have the question of the admissibility of his confession tried as a separate and distinct issue.
Therefore, before the trial court decides to adopt the procedure, it must ensure that the statement is confessional of the crime charged and the accused has contested its admissibility on the ground that it was not made voluntarily.
[Idagu v. State (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1641) 127 referred to.]
(Pp. 232–233, paras. E–A)
IREGU V. STATE (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 189
ON WHEN NECESSARY TO CONDUCT TRIAL-WITHIN-TRIAL
The process of receiving a statement found to be confessional must have been objected to by the accused person on the ground that same was not made voluntarily before a trial court can embark upon the procedure of a trial-within-trial. The sole aim is to find out if indeed the confessional statement was voluntarily received without any threat, deceit, coercion, use of force or inducement.
Therefore, for a trial-within-trial to be adopted in the proceedings, the prosecution must have tendered the statement of the accused, which is found to be confessional, and the accused had objected to its admissibility on the ground that he did not make same voluntarily.
[Sale v. State (2020) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1705) 205; Eke v. State (2011) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1235) 589; Kamila v. State (2018) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1621) 252; Saliu v. State (2014) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1420) 65; Ibeme v. State (2013) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1362) 333; Ifaramoye v. State (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1568) 457 referred to.]
(P. 232, paras. B–E)
IREGU V. STATE (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 189
ON WHETHER FAILURE TO CALL SUPERIOR POLICE OFFICER BEFORE WHOM ACCUSED WAS TAKEN RENDERS HIS CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT INADMISSIBLE
It is section 29 of the Evidence Act, 2011 that the court should look to when it comes to the admissibility or otherwise of a confessional statement. By section 29(2)(a) and (b) and (5) of the Act, any confessional statement made as a result of torture, threat of violence or inhuman/degrading treatment is inadmissible.
Therefore, where there is cogent and credible evidence that the accused person made the statement voluntarily, the fact that the prosecution is unable to call the superior police officer before whom the accused and the statement were taken will not affect its admissibility.
(P. 228, paras. E–G)
Per TSAMMANI, J.S.C. at pages 226–228, paras. H–D:
“In the instant case, the contention of the appellant is that, since he was taken before a superior officer by PW2 who recorded the statement for confirmation whether or not the statement was indeed voluntarily made, the failure of the prosecution to call the said superior police officer to testify is vital to the admissibility of such statement (Exh. B).
In essence, the appellant seeks that Exh. B be expunged and excluded in the determination of the guilt or otherwise of the appellant. Learned counsel relied for that submission on the case of Auta v. The State (supra).
I have read the above-cited case. That case did not decide that failure to call the superior police officer before whom the accused was taken makes the confessional statement inadmissible. Indeed, the Supreme Court merely decided at page 169 of the Report that such failure has a bearing on the weight to attach to the statement.
However, the Supreme Court did not specifically declare the said confessional statement inadmissible. The court however observed that the irregularity in the admissibility of the confessional statement were weighty enough as to have weighed in the mind of the trial court in convicting the appellant solely on the basis of the confessional statement.”
IREGU V. STATE (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 189
ON WHAT GOVERNS ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
Admissibility or otherwise of evidence is governed by the provisions of the Evidence Act, 2011. In other words, admissibility of evidence in judicial proceedings before a court in Nigeria is governed by the provisions of the Act.
It means that a court is bound to admit and act on evidence which is admissible in law where such evidence has satisfied the requirements for its admissibility under the Act. Thus, section 3 of the Act stipulates that nothing in the Act shall prejudice the admissibility of any evidence that is made admissible by any other legislation validly in force in Nigeria.
It means that a piece of evidence that is admissible by the provisions of the Act or any other legislation in force in Nigeria shall not be excluded by any other law except where it is so stipulated by the Act itself. Section 2 of the Act also stipulates that, for the avoidance of doubt, all evidence given in accordance with section 1 shall, unless excluded in accordance with the Act or any other Act or any regulation validly in force in Nigeria, be admissible in judicial proceedings to which the Act applies.
Provided that admissibility of such evidence shall be subject to all such conditions as may be specified in each case by or under the Act. Therefore, once a piece of evidence is relevant to the proceedings and admissible under the provisions of the Act, it cannot be excluded except by the provisions of the Act itself.
[Haruna v. A.-G., Fed. (2012) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1306) 419; Nwabuoku v. Onwordi (2006) 5 SC (Pt. II) 103; Udoro v. Gov., Akwa Ibom State (2010) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1205) 322 referred to.]
(P. 226, paras. A–G)
MUSA V. STATE (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 207
ON EFFECT OF CONTRADICTIONS IN EVIDENCE OF PROSECUTION
Where there are contradictions and inconsistencies in the evidence of the prosecution, the accused is entitled to be given the benefit of the doubt created by the contradictions/inconsistencies. However, not every contradiction or inconsistency in the prosecution’s evidence is fatal.
The law recognizes that contradictions are only fatal on material issues, not on minor, inconsequential, flimsy, or irrelevant matters. Minor contradictions that do not touch on any of the ingredients of the offence charged are disregarded.
Whether a contradiction is material depends on its effect on proving the ingredients of the offence. In the instant case, the alleged contradiction in PW9’s evidence did not cast doubt on the fact that the death of the deceased was caused by the act of the appellant. PW9 confirmed: there was no sign of life in the deceased; the death of the deceased; and that the deceased was brought in dead.
Despite the alleged inconsistency between PW9 and other witnesses as to the cause of death, the evidence regarding the death, the act of the appellant, and the intention/knowledge to cause death or inflict bodily harm remained uncontroverted. Therefore, the alleged contradiction was not material to vitiate the conviction.
[Onubogu v. The State (1974) 9 SC. 1; Nwabueze v. State (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 86) 16; Yau v. State (2022) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1863) 601; Okereke v. State (No. 1) (2016) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1504) 107; Baalo v. FRN (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1530) 400; Jimmy v. State (2013) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1386) 229; Shuaibu v. State (2017) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1592) 396; Eze v. State (2018) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1630) 353 referred to.]
(Pp. 243–244, paras. H-H)
MUSA V. STATE (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 207
ON WHETHER RETRACTED CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT CAN GROUND CONVICTION
A confessional statement does not become inadmissible merely because the accused retracts it. A court can convict based on a retracted confession if:
• The confession was made under circumstances giving credibility to its contents; and
• There is corroborative evidence outside the confession making it probable that it is true.
The trial court must evaluate the retracted confession alongside other evidence to determine its truth before convicting.
[Friday v. State (2024) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1957) 121; Uzim v. State (2019) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1693) 419; Udo v. State (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1525) 1; Babale v. State (2024) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1964) 383; Isonguyo v. State (2023) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1872) 519; Okoh v. State (2014) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1410) 502; Asuquo v. State (2016) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1532) 309; Ifedayo v. State (2019) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1659) 265; Blessing v. F.R.N. (2015) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1475) 1; Isong v. State (2016) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1531) 96 referred to.]
(P. 257, paras. B-G)
Per GARBA, J.S.C.:
Exhibits C & C1 were a direct admission of the appellant’s guilt for criminal conspiracy, unlawful trial by ordeal, and culpable homicide.
Although retracted, the trial court considered the confession alongside other evidence.
PW4 and PW6’s evidence corroborated the confession regarding the trial by ordeal leading to death.
PW1 and PW5’s evidence corroborated the confession concerning the recovery of the deceased.
The trial court rightly convicted the appellant, even after retraction.
(Pp. 257–258, paras. G-B)
MUSA V. STATE (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 207
ON PROOF OF TRIAL BY ORDEAL
In order to secure a conviction for the offence of trial by ordeal, punishable with death under section 214(b) of the Penal Code, the prosecution is required to establish that:
(a) An unlawful trial by ordeal took place;
(b) The accused presided over or was present at the trial by ordeal;
(c) The trial by ordeal resulted in the death of the deceased.
(P. 246, paras. F-G)
Per GARBA, J.S.C. at page 253, paras. B-E:
“From a totality of the above evidence, it was proven that a trial by ordeal took place and the appellant presided over it, in her house. The appellant, in a bid to make the deceased, PW4 and PW6, confess to the allegation of witchcraft, subjected them to barbarous treatment, tied their hands and legs behind their backs, beat them up with tumpapiya sticks, denied them food and water for a period of two days, while forcing them to inhale smoke of some herbs and pepper in a bowl of burning charcoal, while covered up with a blanket.
The deceased even pleaded with the appellant to give him food and water, but the plea fell on deaf ears. The deceased died from injuries sustained in the course of the inhumane treatment meted out to him in the course of the trial by ordeal, while in the house of the appellant.
The evidence of the prosecution witnesses was credible, positive and unequivocal to the effect that the trial by ordeal presided over by the appellant led/caused the death of the deceased, and this evidence remains uncontroverted and the court is bound to act on it.”
MUSA V. STATE (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 207
ON PROOF OF CULPABLE HOMICIDE PUNISHABLE WITH DEATH
To succeed in a charge of culpable homicide punishable with death, the prosecution is required to prove the following ingredients of the offence:
(a) That the death of a human being has actually taken place;
(b) That the death was caused by the accused;
(c) That the act of the accused was done with the intention of causing death or that the accused knew that death would be the probable consequence of his act.
All the above three ingredients of the offence must necessarily co-exist and be proved beyond reasonable doubt; none must be lacking. Where one is missing or not established, the prosecution has failed to discharge the burden of proof.
[Galadima v. State (2018) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1636) 357; Asuquo v. State (2016) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1532) 309; Adamu v. State (2019) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1675) 478; Okereke v. State (No.2) (2016) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1504) 107; Aliyu v. State (2013) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1368) 403; Junaidu v. State (2022) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1820) 371; State v. Egwu (2022) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1832) 195; State v. Musa (2020) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1709) 499 referred to.]
(P. 247, paras. C-G)
Per GARBA, J.S.C. at pages 253-254, paras. F-C; D-F:
“With respect to the offence of culpable homicide punishable with death, from the above evidence, it has been proven that Musa Barde died. PW4, PW6, PW1, PW5, and the appellant all testified that Musa Barde died.
At the risk of repetition, the appellant tied up the hands and legs of the deceased, PW4 and PW6 behind their backs with ropes, beat them up with tumpapiya sticks, denied them food and water for a period of two days, while forcing them to inhale smoke of some herbs and pepper in a bowl of burning charcoal, while covered up with a blanket. The deceased was visibly old and begged for food and water but was denied.
While still being subjected to this inhumane treatment, the deceased died from injuries sustained, while PW4 and PW6 sustained serious bodily injuries. PW6 testified that he was admitted in the hospital for a week to receive treatment for swelling in his head and body as a result of the acts of the accused and co-accused persons.
There is no doubt that a person who subjects a perceptibly old man to the above inhuman treatment has full knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm would be the probable consequence of her action. The acts of the appellant were done with the knowledge that death would be the probable and not only likely consequence of her act or of any bodily injury that the act was intended to cause.
From the foregoing, by the direct and uncontroverted evidence of PW4 and PW6, who were eyewitnesses and participants in the trial by ordeal, the evidence of PW1 and PW5, as well as the appellant’s confessional statements, exhibit C and C1 (although retracted), the respondent proved beyond reasonable doubt that: there was an unlawful trial by ordeal which was presided over by the appellant; the deceased died; the death of the deceased resulted from the acts of the appellant; and the appellant caused the death of the deceased, with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was the probable consequence of her action. The evidence adduced sufficiently satisfied the standard necessary for a conviction for trial by ordeal and culpable homicide punishable with death.”
MUSA V. STATE (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 207
ON WHEN MEDICAL EVIDENCE IS NOT NECESSARY TO PROVE CAUSE OF DEATH
Medical evidence is not always necessary to prove cause of death. Where the cause of death is obvious, or where there is direct evidence of an eye witness as to the cause of death, or where the cause of death of the deceased has been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, medical evidence may be dispensed with by the court.
Medical evidence can be dispensed with when the cause of death may be established by other sufficient and conclusive evidence, showing beyond reasonable doubt that the death of the deceased resulted from the particular act of the accused person.
In the instant case, there is compelling and reliable evidence from the testimonies of eye witnesses (PW4 and PW6) and other prosecution witnesses who testified that the trial by ordeal which the appellant subjected the deceased to led to his death. Also, from exhibit E (picture of the corpse of the deceased), it can be seen that the deceased sustained injuries on his head and body as a result of the trial by ordeal.
[Womem v. State (2021) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1781) 295; Haruna v. A.-G., Fed. (2012) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1306) 419; Sansani v. State (2023) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1871) 259; Babuga v. State (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt. 460) 279; Onwumere v. State (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 186) 428 referred to.]
(P. 243, paras. D-G)
MUSA V. STATE (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 207
ON WHEN PIECES OF EVIDENCE ARE SAID TO BE CONTRADICTORY
Pieces of evidence are said to be contradictory if each asserts the direct opposite of, and is inconsistent with, the other such that the two versions cannot be true at the same time.
Such contradictory pieces of evidence would cancel each other on grounds of lack of credibility and truth for the purpose of proof when they relate to material issues or points of disputes that call for evidential and legal proof.
[Ahmed v. Nigerian Army (2016) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1540) 34; Jimmy v. State (2013) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1386) 229; Dibie v. State (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt. 893) 257; Ikemson v. State (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 110) 455; Nwankwoala v. FRN (2018) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1631) 397 referred to.]
(P. 241, paras. E-G)
MUSA V. STATE (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 207
ON NATURE OF CONTRADICTION THAT WILL AFFECT THE PROSECUTION’S CASE
Material contradictions or inconsistencies in the evidence adduced by the prosecution in proof of any essential element or ingredient of an offence, which must be proved together or conjunctively, would lead to failure of proof beyond reasonable doubt, since a reasonable doubt would arise from the failure.
[Ogidi v. State (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 918) 286; Shehu v. State (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1195) 112; Galadima v. State (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1333) 610; Zubairu v. State (2015) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1486) 504; Botu v. State (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1607) 410; Darlington v. F.R.N. (2018) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1629) 152 referred to.]
(P. 35, paras. C-E)
MUSA V. STATE (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 207
ON PROOF OF CULPABLE HOMICIDE PUNISHABLE WITH DEATH
For the prosecution to discharge the burden of proof of the offence of culpable homicide punishable with death under section 221(a) of the Penal Code, it must prove the following ingredients/components of the offence, conjunctively:
(a) That the deceased died;
(b) That the death of the deceased had resulted from the acts of the accused person;
(c) That the acts or omission of the accused person which caused the death of the deceased was intentional, with the knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence.
[Ogboka v. State (2021) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1804) 139; Maiyaki v. State (2008) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1109) 173; Shande v. State (2005) 12 NWLR (Pt. 939) 301; Haruna v. State (2022) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1855) 1; Mahmuda v. State (2023) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1902) 587; Ayinde v. State (2023) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1884) 493; Muhammed v. State (2023) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1866) 507 referred to.]
(Pp. 240-241, paras. D-A)
OPDC PROPERTIES LTD. V. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 277
ON NATURE OF ISSUE OF COMPETENCE TO INSTITUTE A CRIMINAL ACTION IN A COURT OF LAW
The issue of competence to institute a criminal action in a court of law is fundamental. Thus, where it’s established that the authority or person is devoid of competence to institute a criminal action, the entire trial or proceeding embarked upon by the court is rendered a nullity, void and of no effect whatsoever.
In the instant case, the issue of whether or not a prima facie case had been made out could not rightly be said to have arisen. Undoubtedly, the doctrine has equally been settled that an accused person should not be indicted to face trial which, from the outset, he should not.
[Onwuka v. State (1970) ANLR 164; James v. Nigerian Airforce (2000) 13 NWLR (Pt. 684) 406; Anyebe v. State (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 14) 39; Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341; Abacha v. State (2002) 11 NWLR (Pt. 779) 437; Ikomi v. State (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 28) 340; Egbe v. State (1980) 1 NCR 341; Okoli v. Ojiakor (1997) NWLR (Pt. 479) 48; F.R.N. v. Wabara (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1347) 331 referred to.]
(Pp. 306–307, paras. F–A)
OPDC PROPERTIES LTD. V. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 277
ON RAISING OF OBJECTION TO SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE DISCLOSED IN PROOF OF EVIDENCE ATTACHED TO INFORMATION
By section 260 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law of Lagos State, 2007, an objection to the sufficiency of evidence disclosed in the proof of evidence attached to the information, shall not be raised before the close of the prosecution’s case.
(P. 314, paras. G–H)
AMEH V. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 559
ON BURDEN OF PROOF ON PROSECUTION IN CRIMINAL CASE
The burden to prove every ingredient of an offence charged beyond reasonable doubt squarely rests on the prosecution. In the instant case, the appellant and his co-accused person were initially charged with conspiracy to commit armed robbery and armed robbery. However, upon examination of the evidence after the trial, the trial court came to the conclusion that the evidence only disclosed the kindred and lesser offences of conspiracy to commit robbery and robbery against the accused persons. (P. 579, paras. B-D)
AMEH V. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 559
ON WAYS OF PROVING COMMISSION OF CRIME
In criminal trials, the guilt of an accused person or the fact of his participation in the commission of the offence charged can be established in any or all the following ways:
(a) the confessional statement of the accused person wherein he or she admits the commission of the offence and which has been duly tested, proved and is unequivocal and admitted in evidence;
(b) circumstantial evidence which is complete, cogent and unequivocal and which leads to the irresistible conclusion that the accused committed the offence; and
(c) evidence of an eye witness who saw the accused person committing the offence charged.
Any one of the methods is sufficient. [Hamza v. State (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1699) 418; Alao v. State (2019) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1702) 501; Itodo v. State (2020) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1704) 1; Iorapuu v. State (2020) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1706) 391; Mohammed v. State (2024) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1941) 385 referred to.] (P. 586, paras. B-E)
AMEH V. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 559
ON WHETHER AND WHEN CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT ALONE CAN GROUND CONVICTION
Confessional statement alone, if it is voluntary, cogent and direct can ground a conviction. It is only desirable to have corroborative evidence outside the confession. In the instant case, the appellant’s confessional statement alone was unequivocal and cogent enough to ground his conviction. Thus, once the court is satisfied with the voluntariness of the statement and it unequivocally admits the commission of the crime charged, it can freely convict. This is moreso when the statement was admitted without objection. The fact that the accused person retracted the statement at the trial will not deter the court from convicting him on his admission, so long as the court is satisfied that the confession is true.
[Stephen v. State (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 46) 978; Yahaya v. State (1986) 12 SC 282; Oseni v. State (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1293) 351; Oladipupo v. State (2013) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1334) 68; Abdullahi v. State (2013) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1366) 435; Idoko v. State (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1614) 117; State v. Ahmed (2020) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1743) 1; Effiom v. State (2024) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1946) 313; Olanrewaju v. State (2024) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1950) 493; Musa v. State (2024) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1935) 537 referred to.] (Pp. 581, para. B; 582, paras. A-D; 587, paras. D-G)
AMEH V. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 559
ON EFFECT OF FAILURE OF ACCUSED TO OBJECT TO ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT
An accused person who refrains from objecting to the tendering of his confessional statement in evidence not only admits that the statement was made voluntarily, he is equally conceding to the truth and accuracy of such confessional statement and the role he played in the crime as contained in the confession. In the instant case, the evidence presented by the respondent against the appellant consisted of the appellant’s confessional statement, tendered without objection and admitted in evidence as exhibits “E”–“E1”, the eyewitness testimony of PW1 as well as the evidence of the investigating police officers who testified as PW2 and PW3. The failure of the appellant and/or of his counsel to challenge the evidence of the prosecution witness under cross-examination on the making of the confessional statement by the appellant was tantamount to an admission by the appellant of his making of the confessional statement and of the truth of its contents.
[Umaru v. State (2025) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1975) 95; Onuorah v. People of Lagos State (2025) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1977) 575; State v. Oray (2020) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1722) 130; Igwe v. People of Lagos State (2021) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1776) 425; Dondos v. State (2021) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1780) 24; Timothy v. People of Lagos State (2021) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1787) 251; Smart v. State (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1518) 447; Musa v. State (2018) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1636) 307; Olugbemi v. State (2023) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1895) 359; Yelli v. State (2023) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1867) 39; Lucky v. State (2024) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1944) 461 referred to.] (Pp. 582, paras. F-H; 586–587, paras. H-D)
AMEH V. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 559
ON COURSE OPEN TO COURT WHERE ACCUSED DENIES MAKING CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT
When an accused person denies making an extra-judicial statement attributed to it, the trial court will admit it and apply the six-way test laid down in R v. Sykes (1913) 8 CAR 233 to determine the weight to be attached to the statement at the point of giving judgment. In the instant case, the trial court found the eyewitness account of PW1 and PW2 sufficient corroborative evidence outside exhibits “E”–“E1”. [Ogudo v. State (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1278) 1 referred to.] (P. 581, paras. F-H)
AMEH V. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 559
ON TREATMENT OF UNCHALLENGED EVIDENCE
A court is obliged to treat unchallenged evidence on a material fact as true, cogent and credible and to act on it unless the evidence is patently incredible.
In the instant case, the victim of the offence, PW1, gave lucid and credible evidence of the robbery incident, positively identified the appellant as one of the three persons who attacked her and stated in details the exact position of the appellant in the vehicle when she boarded same and before she was attacked and the specific acts carried out by the appellant in the course of the robbery incident.
The evidence of the witness was not challenged, countermanded or disparaged under cross-examination.
[Olude v. State (2018) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1627) 292; Lanre v. State (2019) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1660) 506; Onyiorah v. Onyiorah (2019) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1695) 227; Daniel v. Ayala (2019) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1703) 25; Ifediora v. Okafor (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1698) 322 referred to.] (Pp. 587-588, paras. G-C)
AMEH V. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 559
ON WHEN CONTRADICTION IN EVIDENCE WILL AFFECT PROSECUTION’S CASE
It is not every contradiction that affects the case of the prosecution. For a contradiction to affect the case of the prosecution, it must be such that goes to one of the elements of the offence charged.
It is only material contradictions affecting a substantial point in the case or an element of the offence charged that can cast some doubt on the case presented by the prosecution.
Where the contradiction or inconsistency complained about is immaterial or trivial, an accused person cannot take benefit thereof.
In the instant case, the appellant contended that the evidence of PW1 that she called her phone after the robbery incident contradicted the evidence of PW2 that it was PW1’s father that called the phone and that the contradiction raised doubt in the prosecution’s case which ought to be resolved in favour of the appellant.
However, the alleged contradiction was not a material one that detracted from the probative value of the evidence given by the two witnesses. The nature of the supposed contradiction complained about here was no more than an inconsistency that was so trifling and infinitesimal that it had no bearing on the substance of the charge, the elements of the offence charged or the case presented by the respondent.
[Attah v. State (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1201) 190; Ibrahim v. State (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 186) 399 referred to.] (Pp. 580-581, paras. F-B; 583, paras. B-F)
YAKUBU V. STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 233
ON WHEN TO RAISE OBJECTION TO ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT
Generally, the appropriate time to object to the admissibility of a confessional statement is when the statement is sought to be tendered.
Where there was no objection to the admissibility of the confessional statement, it is too late to raise such an issue on appeal.
In the instant case, objection to the admissibility of exhibit “A”, the appellant’s confessional statement, was never an issue at all in the trial.
If exhibit “A” was inadmissible because it was not translated or interpreted as alleged into Hausa or English language, the objection should have been immediate and timeous at the time it was sought to be tendered.
[Muhammad v. State (2017) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1583) 386 referred to.]
(Pp. 249–259, paras. H-C)
USMAN V. STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 261
ON BURDEN OF PROOF ON PROSECUTION IN CRIMINAL CASE
The burden of proving the guilt of a defendant for the offences he was charged with beyond reasonable doubt is discharged when the prosecution proves by evidence the ingredients or elements of the offences charged.
[Kolawole v. State (2021) 17 NWLR (Pt.1804) 177 referred to.]
(Pp. 284-285, paras. H-A)
USMAN V. STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 261
ON BURDEN OF PROOF ON PROSECUTION IN CRIMINAL CASE
In a criminal trial, the burden of proof placed on the prosecution is proof beyond reasonable doubt and not beyond every shadow of doubt.
[Umaru v. State (2025) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1975) 95; Hassan v. State (2025) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1973) 217; Effiom v. State (2024) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1946) 313 referred to.]
(P. 294, paras. A-B)
USMAN V. STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 261
ON WAYS OF PROVING CRIME
The guilt of a defendant in a criminal trial can either be proved by direct evidence of witnesses, circumstantial evidence or by admission and confession of the defendant.
[Okashetu v. State (2016) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1534) 126 referred to.]
(P. 285, paras. A-B)
USMAN V. STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 261
ON WHETHER CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT CAN SOLELY GROUND CONVICTION
An accused person can be convicted solely on his confessional statement. If a court of law comes to the conclusion that a statement made by an accused person satisfies all the legal requirements of a confessional statement, then the charge against the accused must of necessity have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The reason is that the court can and does convict an accused person solely on his confessional statement.
[Tope v. State (2019) LPELR-47837 referred to.]
(P. 285, paras. B-C)
USMAN V. STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 261
ON EFFECT OF DENIAL OR RETRACTION OF CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT
The denial or retraction of a confessional statement does not render it inadmissible or weightless.
(P. 292, paras. E-F)
USMAN V. STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 261
ON PROOF OF CONSPIRACY
It is a near impossible task for the prosecution to prove conspiracy with hard evidence and mathematical accuracy as to the time and place the conspirators met and agreed to carry out an offence.
In the circumstance, the court must rely largely on circumstantial evidence and the confession or admission, if any, made by the conspirators to arrive at its decision.
What is important for the prosecution to prove in order to secure a conviction for the offence of conspiracy is that those involved in the conspiracy knew of the plan and intended to break the law.
Thus, the offence of conspiracy can always be inferred from the circumstances of each case and overt acts done by the conspirator to achieve whatever crime underlies that agreement.
In the instant case, there were sufficient facts from exhibits “E”, “E1”, “H” and “H1”, the appellant’s confessional statements, wherein he admitted that he and the co-defendants contrived the plan to rob the deceased, to infer conspiracy as charged.
The trial court based its findings on the inference drawn from the appellant’s confessional statements and that of the other co-defendants to find the appellant guilty of the commission of the offence of conspiracy.
The appellant’s counsel did not provide the court with any credible factor evidence to discountenance the inference made by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeal.
(Pp. 294–295, paras. B-E; paras. H-A)
USMAN V. STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 261
ON EFFECT OF EVIDENCE OF COMMON INTENTION IN CHARGE OF CONSPIRACY
In a charge of conspiracy, evidence of common intention renders all the defendants culpable in the commission of the crime.
Once there is credible evidence of common intention of confederates in conspiracy, it becomes immaterial who did what in the actual carrying out of the common intention of the confederates.
The conspirators will each and collectively be held accountable and liable for the carrying out of or accomplishment of the common intention.
[Michael v. State (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1104) 361 referred to.]
(P. 294, paras. E-F)
USMAN V. STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 261
ON PROBATIVE VALUE OF EVIDENCE OF EYEWITNESS
The best form of evidence is where the eyewitness account is direct and his evidence gives an on-the-spot narration of the event as it happened.
Eyewitness evidence is always reliable evidence provided the witness is telling the truth and is evidence on what the witness saw.
It is almost impossible to dislodge such evidence.
In the instant case, there was an eyewitness who saw the appellant and the co-defendants stab the deceased with a knife.
PW1 succinctly gave an account of how she and the deceased were attacked by the appellant and the co-defendants and how the deceased was stabbed with a knife which led to his death, and the cause of death was ascertained by a certified medical report.
The testimony of PW1 and her evidence were in tandem with the confessional statements of the appellant and the other co-defendants.[Owolabi v. State (2023) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1869) 469; Udo v. State (2018) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1622) 462 referred to.]
(P. 296, paras. A-D)
USMAN V. STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 261
ON DUTY OF TRIAL COURT IN RESPECT OF EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE AND ASCRIPTION OF PROBATIVE VALUE THERETO
The evaluation of the evidence at trial and ascribing probative value to each piece of evidence to determine the guilt of a defendant is the primary duty of the trial court.
[Mohammed v. State (2021) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1771) 123 referred to.]
(P. 297, paras. B-C
USMAN V. STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 261
ON PROBATIVE VALUE OF CONFESSION
Under Nigerian criminal jurisprudence, confession is classified as the best and strongest evidence, stronger than that of an eye witness.
By his confession, a defendant surrenders himself to the law and becomes his own accuser.
[Adebayo v. State (2014) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1422) 613; Musa v. State (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 214; Kushimo v. State (2021) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1801) 147; Olarewaju v. State (2024) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1950) 493 referred to.]
(P. 292, paras. C-D)
USMAN V. STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 261
ON NEED TO RECORD EXTRA-JUDICIAL STATEMENT OF ACCUSED IN LANGUAGE HE SPEAKS
The requirement of the law with regard to the recording of the statement of the accused is that the statement should be, whenever practicable,
be recorded in the language spoken by the accused person. It is a practical wisdom directed to avoid technical arguments which could be raised. It is
not an invariable practice but one to ensure the correctness and accuracy of the statement made by the accused person.
[Hamza v. State (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1699) 418 referred to.]
(P. 289, paras. A-C)
USMAN V. STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 261
ON WHETHER POLICE CAN RECORD STATEMENT OF ACCUSED AND INTERPRET TO HIM
It is the practice and procedure of the police to record the statement of the accused person and interpret same so long as the officer follows the laid down procedure in obtaining the statement of the accused person, the statement is recorded in the language he understands and it is interpreted
to him. (P. 289, paras. C-D)
USMAN V. STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 261
ON WHETHER EXTRA-JUDICIAL STATEMENT INADMISSIBLE WHERE RECORDED AND INTERPRETED BY SAME PERSON
The fact that a statement was recorded and interpreted by one and the same person does not automatically render the statement or confessional statement inadmissible, especially where the accused person was represented by a counsel who raised no objection to the admissibility of such document.
In criminal litigation, once it is shown that the contents of a document was read and interpreted to the accused and he understood it, such document is admissible, especially where the accused is represented by a counsel who raises no objection to the admission of such document.
It is not undesirable for a police officer who took the statement to interprete same. The interpreter must be called to give evidence on oath at trial.
Where the recorder and the interpreter of a statement are the same, so long as the person confirms on oath before the court the circumstances of the taking and recording of the statement, the statement would be admissible.
In the instant case, the requirement of the law was complied with as the police officers, PW5 and PW7, who recorded the appellant’s statements were in court and testified during the trial. They were bound by solemn affirmation to state
the truth and there was no form of objection at trial that exhibits “E”, “E1”, “H” and “H1” so admitted, being the confessional statements, were wrongly interpreted.
KEHINDE ISMAILA V. THE STATE (2025) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1995) 153
ON FAILURE TO TENDER WEAPON OF CRIME
Failure to tender the weapon used is not fatal to the prosecution if evidence is sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [Alayande v. State (2025); Iliyasu v. State (2025); Jato v. State (2019); Saleh v. State (2019); Ogu v. C.O.P. (2018); Chukwunyere v. State (2018); Musa v. State (2017)] (Pp. 176-177, paras. D-A)
KEHINDE ISMAILA V. THE STATE (2025) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1995) 153
ON NATURE AND PURPOSE OF IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE
Identification evidence is for ascertaining whether the accused committed the offence. Positive identification may make an identification parade unnecessary. In this case, the accused was arrested at the scene and his identity was undisputed. [Ahuchaogu v. State (2024); Adesoye v. State (2005)] (P. 175, paras. B-D)
KEHINDE ISMAILA V. THE STATE (2025) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1995) 153
ON WHEN APPELLATE COURT WILL INTERFERE WITH EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE BY TRIAL COURT
Evaluation of evidence is primarily for the trial court, which sees and hears witnesses firsthand. The appellate court intervenes only if the trial court fails to properly evaluate evidence. [Ogunleye v. Oni (1990); Fashanu v. Adekoya (1974); Mohammed v. State (2023); Okere v. I.G.P. (2024)] (P. 177, paras. B-E)
AMEYI SHAYE. V. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (2025) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1995) 113.
On Effect of contradictions in evidence of a witness
Where a party puts forward a case consisting of two inconsistent and contradictory versions of evidence and he does not explain the inconsistency or contradiction, his case must be rejected by the court. A vacillating witness is not worthy of any credit. In the instant case, an accused cannot rely on both situations in impeaching his extra-judicial statement to the Police because they are mutually exclusive. Where an accused person puts forward both situations, his case will be inconsistent and contradictory. The two lower courts were thus on firm ground when they rejected the case of the appellant on the confessional statement.
[Ojo v. F.R.N. (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 10w O (2010) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1217) 490; Popoola v. State (2018) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1628) 485; Awosika v. State (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1643) 446; Nwankwoala v. State (2018) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1631) 397; Orisa v. State (2018) 11 NWLR (Pt 1631) 453; Anka v. Lokoja (2001) 4 NWLR (Pt. 702) 178; Yusuf v. Obasanjo (2005) 18 NWLR (Pt. 956) 96; Zubairu v. Joseph (2015) LPELR 40751 referred to.] (P. 147, paras. A-E)
IKENNA OBI. V. THE STATE (2025) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1995) 69
On Whether document frontloaded with criminal charge or information but not tendered in evidence during trial can be relied on as evidence
Documents or statements accompanying a charge or an information filed in court do not constitute evidence which the court can rely on if not tendered and admitted in evidence at the trial. In the instant case, the appellant’s arguments that the prosecution withheld the “Police Investigation Report” are unhelpful to him. This is so because the said “Police Investigation Report” was frontloaded as a part of the information which was filed against the appellant and his co-accused persons. If the alleged Police Investigation Report was tendered in evidence, it would not have been unfavourable to the prosecution. Therefore, section 167(d) of the Evidence Act, 2011 is inapplicable to this case. [C.O.P. v. Abdullahi (2024) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1940) 227 referred to.] (Pp. 84-85, paras. C-B)
IKENNA OBI. V. THE STATE (2025) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1995) 69
On Whether conviction can be based on evidence of a sole witness
The success or otherwise of a criminal trial is not dependent on the number of witnesses fielded by the prosecution but on the quality of evidence led at the trial. One single witness can establish a case beyond reasonable doubt. [Akalezi v. State (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt. 273) 1; Adaje v. State (1979) 6 – 9 SC 18; Okonofua v. State (1981) 6 – 7 SC 1; Olayinka v. State (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1040) 561; Ofordike v. State (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1666) 395 referred to.] (P. 81, paras. E-G)
IKENNA OBI. V. THE STATE (2025) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1995) 69
On Whether conviction can be based on evidence of a sole witness
The evidence required to achieve proof beyond reasonable doubt is a matter of quality rather than quantity. The prosecution need not call a village of witnesses for a charge to be proved. Thus, except when the law requires corroboration, a court can convict an accused person on the evidence of a single credible witness. In the instant case, PW2 who intervened after the appellant and his co-accused persons were caught by the villagers and prevented them from being lynched, gave strong circumstantial evidence which corroborated the evidence presented by PW1. [Samuel v. State (2021) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1761) 451; Lase v. State (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1607) 502; Ighalo v. State (2016) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1540) 1; Adisa v. State (2015) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1450) 475 referred to.] (P. 86, paras. E-G)
IKENNA OBI. V. THE STATE (2025) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1995) 69
On Whether address of counsel can substitute for evidence
An address of counsel, no matter how alluring it may be, is not evidence in court and cannot be a substitute for evidence to be relied upon. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, the issue of withholding evidence or failure to call a particular witness does not arise, especially bearing in mind the concrete and formidable concurrent findings of the two lower courts which the appellant has not been able to fault as being erroneous, perverse, unfounded or unreasonable. [Sunday v. State (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1600) 251; Ekpemegbere v. State (2024) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1928) 203 referred to.] (P. 85, paras. B-D)
AMEYI SHAYE. V. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (2025) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1995) 113.
On Scope of duty of prosecution to provide all material proof of evidence to the accused person
While it is desirable for the prosecution to tender all evidence obtained in the course of investigation at the trial, the duty on the prosecution to tender at trial all extra-judicial statements made by an accused person in the course of investigation will only escalate to amount to withholding evidence and raise presumptions in favour of the accused person, where there is clear evidence that the accused person made a demand of the prosecution, by a subpoena or otherwise, for the production of the extra-judicial statement and that the demand was turned down or refused by the prosecution.
In the instant case, the records of appeal showed that after rejecting the case presented by the appellant against the confessional statement, the lower courts found substantial corroborative evidence for the contents of the confessional statement in the evidence of the first prosecution witness, the evidence of the second and third prosecution witnesses and in the photographs of the corpses and the two machetes tendered in evidence. The two lower courts were thus on very firm grounds when they placed reliance on the confessional statement in making a finding of guilt against the appellant.
There was nothing on the record of the court showing that the appellant and/or his counsel demanded the respondent to produce the alleged extra-judicial statement made by the appellant upon his arrest at the first Police Station and that the respondent turned down the request. The submission of counsel to the appellant that the failure of the respondent to tender the alleged statement in the lower court was fatal to the case against the appellant was baseless, in the circumstances.
[Aremu v. State (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt. 201) 1; Busari v. State (2015) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1452) 343; Egwuche v. State (2018) LPELR 43975; Okere v. I.G.P. (2018) LPELR 44178; Robert v. I.G.P. (2018) LPELR 44176; Ewugba v. State (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 262; Adekoya v. State (2012) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1306) 539 referred to.] (Pp. 147-148, paras. E-H)
AMEYI SHAYE. V. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (2025) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1995) 113.
On Presumption of regularity of record of court
The law presumes the regularity of the record of the court until the contrary is proved. In the instant case, the record of appeal showed that there was an interpreter steadily for the respondent all through the proceedings of the trial court.
[Ogwe v. I.G.P. (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1459) 505 referred to.] (P. 135-138, paras. C-D)IBRAHIM JUJI V. STATE (2025) 8 NWLR (PT. 1993) 535
ON WHEN PRINCIPLE OF WITHHOLDING EVIDENCE APPLIES
The principle of withholding evidence applies where a party to the proceeding fails to tender relevant evidence. It applies and operates against a person (in this case the prosecution) who seeks to succeed on the basis of a piece of evidence but fails to produce or tender such evidence. It also equates to refusal to produce or tender a particular piece of evidence. Thus, the presumption applies generally to failure to lead evidence on pleaded facts in a case, and not failure to call a particular witness or tender a particular piece of documentary evidence. In any case for the presumption to apply, there must be evidence that the piece of evidence exists, it could be tendered but was not and the piece of evidence must be relevant to the proceeding. The circumstance of this case does not support the invocation of section 167(d) of the Evidence Act, 2011. There is no evidence that any previous statement of the appellant aside from exhibits 1 and 2 existed at the material time and in the possession or custody of the prosecution. If the defence strongly believed that such statement existed at the material time,and could be material or relevant for his defence, the prosecution should have been subpoenaed to produce same. [Smart v. State (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt.1518) 447; A.-G., Adamawa State v. Ware (2006)4 NWLR (Pt.970) 399; Maigoro v. Bashir (2000)11 NWLR (Pt. 679) 453; Umar v. State (2014) 13NWLR (Pt.1425) 497 referred to.] (Pp. 565, paras.B-E; 566, paras. G-H)
IBRAHIM JUJI V. STATE (2025) 8 NWLR (PT. 1993) 535
ON PRESUMPTION OF WITHHOLDING OF EVIDENCE
By virtue of section 167 of the Evidence Act,2011, the court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case, and in particular the court may presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. The appellant has argued that the prosecution withheld the initial statements of the appellants, failed to produce in evidence the stick recovered by PW2 as the weapon used to kill the deceased and also failed to call the vigilante group which they claimed saw the appellant beating the deceased to death. The appellant and his counsel had ample time and opportunity to raise this issue at the trial court but they did not. When the appellant had the opportunity to cross-examine the Prosecution witness, the issue of the other statements made was never raised. When his confessional statement was tendered, the appellant merely denied making the statements and did not say that the ones he made were not tendered. There is nothing to show that the said statements exist apart from when the appellant mentioned it during his cross-examination at the trial court. In the circumstance, section 167(d) of the Evidence Act can not be successfully invoked in this case. [State v. Labbo (2023) 14 NWLR (Pt.1903) 31 referred to.](Pp. 576, D-F; 577, paras. D-F)
IBRAHIM JUJI V. STATE (2025) 8 NWLR (PT. 1993) 535
ON WHETHER PRESUMPTION OF WITHHOLDING EVIDENCE SAME AS FAILURE TO CALL A PARTICULAR WITNESS
The presumption of withholding evidence is not the same as failure to call a particular witness. Presumption of withholding evidence is a principle against failure to call relevant evidence, and not failure to call a particular witness. This is because, the prosecution are not bound to call a particular witness if they are able to prove their case otherwise, therefore, the argument on the prosecution not calling all or any of the members of the Vigilante group to testify would not avail the appellant as such act did not amount to withholding evidence by virtue of section 167(d) of the Evidence Act, 2011. In the circumstances of this case, the inability of the prosecution to call the members of the vigilante group did not amount to withholding evidence.[Nigerian Airforce v. Obiosa (2003) 4 NWLR (Pt.810)223; Smart v. State (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt.1518) 447;Musa v. Yerima (1997) 7 NWLR (Pt.511) 27; High-grade Maritime Services Ltd. v. F.B.N. Ltd. (1991)1 NWLR (Pt.167) 290 referred to.] (P. 568, paras.A-D)
IBRAHIM JUJI V. STATE (2025) 8 NWLR (PT. 1993) 535
ON WHETHER FAILURE TO PRODUCE AND TENDER THE WEAPON OF CRIME IN EVIDENCE FATAL TO PROSECUTION’S CASE
Failure to produce and tender the weapon of crime in evidence is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. There is no rule that the weapon used in the commission of an offence must be tendered. Whether or not they are material depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In the instant case, it was not fatal to the prosecution’s case. This is because PW1 testified that she saw the appellant with a stick, hitting the deceased. PW2 also testified that upon the arrest of the appellant, he was found with a stick. These two testimonies corroborate each other that indeed a stick was the weapon used.[Esene v. State (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt.1568) 337; Adamu v. State (2019) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1675) 478 referred to.](Pp. 577-578, paras. G-B)
BAWA DADA & ORS V TANKO YANDAYI & ANOR (2025) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1993) 517
ON PRIMARY DUTY OF TRIAL COURT TO EVALUATE EVIDENCE AND WHEN APPELLATE COURT WILL NOT INTERFERE THEREWITH
The primary duty of evaluating and ascribing probative value to evidence adduced at the trial, lies at the doorstep of the trial court. The duty of the appellate court is only to see whether, from the totality of the evidence on record, the trial court correctly carried out that function. Thus, where the trial court has dutifully executed that duty, the appellate court will not interfere. In the instant case, the appellant was unable to impeach the succinct decision of the trial court. In the premises, the Court of Appeal’s affirmation of its decision was in total alignment with the letter and spirit of our criminal jurisprudence. In the circumstances, there is no justification in law to disturb the decision. (P.572, paras. A-C)
BAWA DADA & ORS V TANKO YANDAYI & ANOR (2025) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1993) 517
ON ATTITUDE OF THE SUPREME COURT TO CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AND COURT OF APPEAL
Where evidence have been led before the trial court which had the singular benefit of seeing and hearing the witnesses, the duty of that court is to evaluate the evidence so as to see whether all the essential elements of the offence charged have been made out as required by law. The duty of the appellate court, in this case the Court of Appeal, is to examine the judgment of the trial court the evidence adduced at the trial as depicted on the record, so as to see whether the trial court dutifully and properly carried out its duty in evaluating the evidence. Where the Court of Appeal finds out that the trial court has dutifully and correctly evaluated the evidence, it has no power to substitute the findings of the trial court with its own. Thus, where the trial court and the Court of Appeal agreed on their findings of facts based on the evidence on record, the Supreme Court will be very slow to disturb such findings. That is why the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that it will not disturb or interfere with the findings of the two courts below on facts except where such findings are shown to be perverse. In other words, the Supreme Court is loath to interfere with concurrent findings of a lower court on facts where the findings are reasonably justified and supported by the evidence, particularly where no special circumstance has been shown why it should interfere. The concurrent findings of the two lower courts are deemed to be correct, thus the appellant who disputes such findings, has the burden to demonstrate why from the evidence on the record concurrent findings of the lower courts should be set aside. The appellant can only succeed where he is able to show that the concurrent findings are perverse in that it led to a miscarriage of justice or violation of some principles of law or procedure. In the instant case, the appellant challenged the findings of fact of the courts below on the ground, the prosecution withheld evidence when it failed to tender two extra-judicial statements made by the appellant at Unik Police Outpost and Auyo Divisional Police Station. That those statements were relevant to the defence of the appellant and not having been tendered, the prosecution withheld evidence and thereby caught by section 149(d)(now section 167(d) of the Evidence Act, 2011. Adedeji v. Obajimi (2018) 16 NWLR (Pt.1644) 146; Abdulmumini v. F.R.N. (2018) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1635)106; Ogoejeofo v. Ogoejeofo (2006) 3 NWLR (Pt.966) 205 referred to.] (Pp. 563-564, paras.
HABIBU V. STATE (2024) 6 NWLR (PT. 1935) 483
ON HOW TO PROVE OFFENCE OF RAPE AND WHETHER MEDICAL EVIDENCE IS MANDATORY
Medical evidence in rape cases is not sine qua non for the conviction an accused person. Even in murder or homicide cases, the tendering or calling of medical evidence is not compulsory. What is required is for the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt through eyewitness testimony, confessional statement and/or circumstantial evidence. As long as that is done, the accused person cannot complain because it does not lie in the accused person’s mouth to dictate to the prosecution how to conduct its case. Moreover, medical report is usually necessary where the accused person denies raping the prosecutrix, but even when the commission of the offence is denied, the absence of a medical report does not spell doom for the case of the prosecution as each case must be considered within its peculiar circumstances.
HABIBU V. STATE (2024) 6 NWLR (PT. 1935) 483
ON MEANING OF “HEARSAY”
Section 37 of the Evidence Act defines hearsay as a statement:
(a) oral or written made otherwise than by a witness in a proceeding; or
(b) contained or recorded in a book, document or any record whatever, proof of which is not admissible under any provision of this Act, which is tendered in evidence for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter stated in it. [Offor v. State (2021) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1807) 31; Sarakiv. F.R.N. (2018) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1646) 405; Onovo v. Mba (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1427) 391 referred.] (P.528, paras. B-D).
HABIBU V. STATE (2024) 6 NWLR (PT. 1935) 483
ON INADMISSIBILITY OF HEARSAY AND WHEN EVIDENCE IS HEARSAY AND WHEN IT IS NOT
Hearsay evidence is inadmissible under Nigerian evidence law. Notwithstanding, evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. Conversely, it is not hearsay and admissible when it is proposed to establish by evidence not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made.
SAMAILA V. STATE [2024] 2 NWLR (PT. 1923) 465
ON WHETHER CERTAIN A NUMBER OF WITNESSES REQUIRED FOR PROOF OF FACT IN ISSUE
A court of law needs not take into account the number of witnesses for each side to a dispute as a relevant factor in deciding which side to succeed. No particular number of witnesses is required for the proof of any fact in issue and a person may be convicted of an offence on the evidence on oath of a single adult witness where no corroboration is prescribed. What is primarily relevant is the quality of the evidence adduced before the court. Where the quality of evidence led is conclusive and final, the quantity of it does not matter anymore. In the instant case, to insist on calling the doctor or others to testify when the prosecution had been able to prove and establish its case was to exacerbate the matter. [Oguonzee v. State (1998) 5 NWLR Pt. 551521 referred to.] (P. 489, paras. A-C).
C.O.P. V. ABDULLAHI (2024) 8 NWLR (PT. 1940) 227 SC
ON WHETHER WITNESS STATEMENT IN PROOF OF EVIDENCE IN A CRIMINAL CASE IS IPSO FACTO EVIDENCE WITHOUT BEING TENDERED AND ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE DURING TRIAL
A witness statement or any statement that forms part of the summary or proofs of evidence forming part of the process of the information that commenced a criminal case cannot be relied on as evidence in the case to determine the case, simply because it is in the record of the court as part of the information that commenced the case. Its use ends with informing the accused person adequately about the prosecution’s case to give the accused person adequate facilities to prepare a defence. Beyond that, it cannot be used as evidence in the case. Any party who desires that it be relied on as evidence in the case must have it admitted as evidence in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act.
C.O.P. V. ABDULLAHI (2024) 8 NWLR (PT. 1940) 227 SC
ON TREATMENT OF EXTRA JUDICIAL CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT AND ORAL TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED PERSON WHERE BOTH ARE IN CONFLICT
Where the extra judicial statement of a witness conflicts with his testimony in open court, a court cannot choose which to believe or disbelieve between the extra judicial statement and his testimony in open court. The two conflicting versions of his evidence are unreliable and must be disbelieved by the court.
OSHO V. ADELEYE [2024] 8 NWLR (1941) 431 SC
ON STANDARD OF PROOF OF ALLEGATION OF CRIME
By virtue of section 135(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011, an allegation of crime has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the last of the allegations made by the appellant against the 1st respondent was that the 1st respondent lacked the academic qualification required to contest or hold office as a member of the Ogun State House of Assembly. The clear import and purport of the appellant’s allegation involved the criminal offences of parading fake/or forged certificates, lying on oath, giving false information and falsification of certificates against the 1st respondent. The appellant did not prove the allegations beyond reasonable doubt. [UAC Ltd. v. Taylor (1936) 2WACA 70; Usenfowokan v. Idowu (1969) NMLR77; Nwobodo v. Onoh (1984) 1 SCNLR 1 referred to.] (P. 463, paras. A-C).
EFFIOM V. STATE [2024]10 NWLR (1946) 313 (SC)
ON WAYS OF PROVING CRIME
The burden is primarily on the prosecution to prove the guilt of an accused person. The burden can be discharged in three ways, namely:
(a) by confessional statement of the defendant; or
(b) by circumstantial evidence which must be cogent, positive and conclusive; or
(c) by evidence of eye-witnesses otherwise called direct evidence.
EFFIOM V. STATE [2024]10 NWLR (1946) 313 (SC)
ON NATURE OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO GROUND CONVICTION
Circumstantial evidence sufficient without more to ground a conviction must be evidence of surrounding circumstances which by undersigned coincidence is capable of proving a preposition with the accuracy of mathematics. It must be cogent, complete, unequivocal and positive to the point of being so compelling that it must lead to the irresistible conclusion that the defendant and no one else has both the motive and the opportunity to commit the crime. The facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the defendant and incapable of any other reasonable hypothesis of his guilt. Thus, circumstantial evidence is proof of facts by inference from facts proved from unbroken chain of evidence. In the instant case, the circumstantial evidence and the thoroughness and professionalism of the police in investigating the crime led to no conclusion other than that the appellant conspired to kill and rob the deceased. [Yusuf v. Kano State (2023) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1891) 23; Mbang v. State (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt.1172) 140 referred to.] (Pp. 370-371, paras. G-D.
EFFIOM V. STATE [2024]10 NWLR (1946) 313 (SC)
ON WHEN MEDICAL EVIDENCE NECESSARY IN ALL CASES TO PROVE CAUSE OF DEATH IN MURDER CASE
Medical evidence is not always a desideratum in murder cases except where necessary to prove death and cause of death. Furthermore, to call the maker of the report is a matter of choice given by the law. A court would properly infer from circumstantial evidence that the death of the deceased was caused by the act of the accused without hearing medical evidence. The fact that a medical report was not produced does not diminish the fact that the deceased died. By the provisions of the Evidence Act, it is not mandatory for a medical officer who performed an autopsy on a deceased to be present in court in order to give evidence during the trial. Production by either party of a certificate signed by the medical officer may be taken as sufficient evidence of the facts. [Adamu v. Kano Native Authority (1956) SCNLR 65; Bakuri v. State (1965) NMLR 163; Uyo v. A.-G., Bendel State (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 17) 418; Oforlete v. State (2000)12 NWLR (Pt. 681) 415; Oladapo v. State (2020) 7NWLR (Pt. 1723) 238; referred to.] (Pp. 356, paras.D-G; 357, paras. E-G).
EFFIOM V. STATE [2024]10 NWLR (1946) 313 (SC)
ON DISTINCTION BETWEEN STANDARD OF PROOF IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES
By section 135(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended), a fundamental distinction between the standard of proof in civil and criminal matters is that whereas in civil matters, decisions are reached based on the weight of preponderance of evidence, in criminal matters, it is proof beyond reasonable doubt. (P. 342, paras. A – B).
F.R.N. V. NNAJIOFOR [2024] 10 NWLR (1947) 44 (SC)
ON BURDEN AND ONUS ON PROSECUTION IN PROVING GUILT OF ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
The legal and primary burden on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt includes the proof that a confession by the accused while under arrest and in their custody was made freely and voluntarily. Therefore, if there is any reasonable doubt that the confession was involuntary, then the prosecution has failed to prove that it is voluntary. (P. 483, paras. D-F).
ENEJI V. STATE (2024) 11 NWLR (PT. 1948) 1
ON NATURE OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT ADMISSIBLE
By sections 89(e) and 90 of the Evidence Act 2011, where a document is a public document within the meaning of section 102 of the Act, if the original or primary evidence of the document is not tendered, the secondary form that is admissible in evidence is the certified true copy of the document. (Pp. 23-24, paras. H-A).
ENEJI V. STATE (2024) 11 NWLR (PT. 1948) 1
ON WHAT CONSTITUTES PRIMARY EVIDENCE OF DOCUMENT
By virtue of section 86 of the Evidence Act, 2011, primary evidence means the document itself produced for the inspection of the court. Where a document has been executed in several parts, each part shall be primary evidence of the document. Where a document has been executed in counterpart, each counterpart being executed by one or some of the parties only, each counterpart shall be primary evidence as against the parties executing it. Where a number of documents have all been made by one uniform process, as in the case of printing, lithography, photography, computer or other electronic or mechanical process, each shall be primary evidence of the contents of the rest. But where they are all copies of a common original, they shall not be primary evidence of the contents of the original. In the instant case, the evidence of PW4 showed that what was admitted as exhibit was the counterpart or duplicate of the police medical report. The Court of Appeal was right in holding that, being a counterpart of the original copy, it was not a secondary evidence but a primary evidence of the original form which required no certification to be admissible in evidence. (Pp. 24-25, paras. F-E).
ENEJI V. STATE (2024) 11 NWLR (PT. 1948) 1
ON TREATMENT OF EVIDENCE OF RELATIVE OF VICTIM OF CRIME
A trial court ought to receive the evidence of relatives of victim of an offence with caution. If after cautioning or warning itself in respect of the evidence, the court is of the opinion that the witness is telling the truth, there is no reason not to rely on such evidence. Such evidence requires no corroboration as it is not in the class of evidence which in law requires corroboration. A witness who is a relative of the victim of a crime is not ipso facto a tainted witness or a person having some purpose of his own to serve. In considering whether to admit and rely on the evidence of a relative of a victim of crime, the circumstances and the evidence before the court have to be considered.
ENEJI V. STATE (2024) 11 NWLR (PT. 1948) 1
ON EFFECT WHERE TWO OR MORE ACCUSED PERSONS CHARGED TOGETHER FOR OFFENCE ON SAME EVIDENCE
Where two or more accused persons are charged together for an offence on the same evidence, the same verdict must be returned in respect of each of the accused persons. [Adie v. State (2023) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1887) 591; Ebenezer v. State (2023) 6 NWLR (Pt.1879) 119 referred to.] (Pp. 36-37, paras. H-B).
AKPUTA V. STATE (2024) 13 NWLR (PT. 1956) 429
ON PRESUMPTION OF LITERACY AND HOW REBUTTED BY PARTY PLEADING ILLITERACY
As a general rule, there is a rebuttable presumption of literacy, which must be rebutted with evidence by the party pleading illiteracy. In the instant case, even if English Language is not the mother tongue of the appellant or even if the appellant downplayed his knowledge of and his ability to communicate in English Language, the onus was on him to prove the assertion by empirical evidence. [Anaeze v. Anyaso (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt.291) 1; Otitoju v. Gov., Ondo State (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt. 340) 518 referred to.] (P. 447, paras. D-F).
AKPUTA V. STATE (2024) 13 NWLR (PT. 1956) 429
ON IMPLICATION OF FAILURE TO CROSS-EXAMINE A WITNESS ON A POINT OF SUBSTANCE
Failure to cross-examine a witness on a point of substance supports an inference that the opposing party accepts the evidence. [Oforlete v. State (2000)12 NWLR (Pt. 681) 415; Esene v. State (2017) 8NWLR (Pt. 1568) 337; Aliyu v. State (2013) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1368) 403; Suleiman v. State (2023) 6 NWLR (Pt.1880) 201 referred to.] (P. 453, paras. B-C).
OKERE V. I.G.P. (2024) 15 NWLR (PT. 1961) 341
ON PROBATIVE VALUE OF DIRECT EVIDENCE OF EYE WITNESS
The prosecution can establish the commission of a crime through the direct evidence of eye witnesses. However, for the court to accept such evidence as capable of proving the commission of an offence beyond reasonable doubt, it must be credible. For a piece of evidence to be credible, it must emanate from a credible source. Credible evidence is one that is worthy of belief. It, therefore, means that credible evidence must be clear, cogent and uncontradicted by other evidence. Accordingly, evidence that is contradictory either in itself or through cross-examination is not credible. It follows, therefore, that evidence that is contradictory or has been contradicted is not credible and therefore unworthy of any evidential value. [Agbi v. Ogbeh (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 990)65; Emeka v. Chuba-Ikpeazu (2012) 15 NWLR(Pt.1589) 345; Dim v. Enemuo (2009) 10 NWLR(Pt.1149) 353; A.I. Inv. Ltd. v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 380 referred to.] (P.366, paras. D-H).
OKERE V. I.G.P. (2024) 15 NWLR (PT. 1961) 341
ON WHEN PRESUMPTION OF WITHHOLDING OF EVIDENCE WILL NOT BE INVOKED
The prosecution’s duty in a criminal prosecution is to adduce such evidence it considers necessary for the proof of its case. Therefore, the prosecution has no obligation to produce a particular evidence or call a particular witness except where such evidence or witness is vital and material. All that is required of the prosecution is to tender such evidence that will establish the essential ingredients of the offence charged. Once the prosecution has adduced evidence, it has done its part and it will be left for the court to evaluate such evidence so as to see whether it has proved all the essential ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. For failure of the prosecution to call particular evidence such as to attract the sanction of section167 of the Evidence Act, 2011, it must be shown that the evidence existed and that the decision of the court must have been different if such evidence had been tendered.
ONUORAH V. PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2025) 2 NWLR (PT. 1977) 575
ON PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF JUDGMENT APPEALED AGAINST
By section 168(1) of the Evidence Act, a judgment appealed against enjoys a rebuttable presumption of regularity. Where the appellant fails to satisfactorily establish the error in the judgment appealed against, the respondent is entitled to a judgment affirming the judgment. There is a presumption that, on facts, the decision of a trial court is right and that for the appellant to succeed, he must displace the findings of fact against him. Once an appellate court finds nothing perverse or capable of occasioning miscarriage of justice to the appellant in the judgment of the trial court on facts, it has nothing else to do than to affirm the judgment. [Amadi v. A.-G., Imo State (2017) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1575) 92; Oyedele v. State (2019) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1667) 74 referred to.] (P. 609, paras. B-E).
OSUJI V. STATE (2025) 2 NWLR (PT. 1977) 527
ON PROBATIVE VALUE OF EVIDENCE OF EYE WITNESS
The best form of evidence is where the eye witness is direct and his evidence gives an on-the-spot narration of the event as it happened. Eyewitness evidence is always reliable evidence provided the witness is telling the truth. Such evidence is on what the witness saw. It is almost impossible to dislodge such evidence. Thus, where there are credible, direct, consistent and cogent evidence led during a trial and they are so overwhelming to warrant the conviction of the defendant even without relying on any confessional statement, involuntary or voluntary, such evidence should not be disregarded.
OSUJI V. STATE (2025) 2 NWLR (PT. 1977) 527
ON WHETHER EVIDENCE OF ONE EYE WITNESS CAN GROUND CONVICTION
An accused person can be convicted on the cogent and credible evidence of one eye witness and it does not require an avalanche of witnesses or of evidence. [Oketaolegun v. State (2015) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1477) 538; Adegbola v. State (2023) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1902) 415 referred to.] (P. 567, paras. B-C).
JOHN V. STATE (2025) 1 NWLR (PT. 1972) 181
ON DUTY ON PROSECUTION ONCE ACCUSED ADDUCED EVIDENCE OF AN ALIBI
Once an accused discharges the evidential burden of adducing evidence of an alibi, the onus is on the prosecution to disprove it. Once the defence of alibi is properly raised by the accused person during investigation showing that he was “elsewhere” at the time of the commission of the crime, it is the duty of the police to investigate it. In the instant case, the prosecution had no onus either to investigate or disprove any alibi since it was neither properly raised by the appellant, as a suspect before the police, nor did he tender any evidence in court of his purported alibi. [Okoduwa v. State (1988) Okoduwa v. State (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 76) 333 referred to.] (P.203, paras. E-G).
JOHN V. STATE (2025) 1 NWLR (PT. 1972) 181
ON HOW THE DEATH OF A DECEASED MAY BE PROVED
The death of a deceased may be proved by production of a post-mortem report or evidence of witnesses who state that they knew the deceased and attended the burial and/or saw the dead body. Conviction for culpable homicide punishable with death or murder can be made without the recovery of the dead body if there is positive evidence that the deceased has been killed.
JOHN V. STATE (2025) 1 NWLR (PT. 1972) 181
ON PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF JUDGMENT APPEALED AGAINST AND EFFECT WHERE APPELLANT FAILS TO SATISFACTORILY ESTABLISH AN ERROR IN THE JUDGMENT
By Section 168(1) of the Evidence Act, a judgment appealed against enjoys presumption of regularity which is rebuttable. Once the appellant fails to satisfactorily establish the error in the judgment appealed against the respondent is entitled to a judgment affirming the judgment. [Amadi v. A.-G.,Imo State (2017) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1575) 92; Oyedele v. State (2019) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1667) 74 referred to.] (Pp.215-216, paras. H-A).
AUWALU V. KANO STATE (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 459
ON WHAT CONSTITUTES HEARSAY EVIDENCE
If a witness testifies on what he heard some other person say, the evidence is hearsay. Such evidence is to inform the court of what he heard the other person say e.g. in case of slander. If on the other hand the testimony is to establish the truth of an event in question or to establish the truth of the contents of a statement, it is hearsay and inadmissible evidence. Hearsay evidence is secondary evidence of an oral statement best described as second-hand evidence. What a witness says he heard from another person is unreliable for many reasons. For example, he may not have understood the informant/interpreters or he may say things that were never said. Such evidence remains hearsay evidence because it cannot be subject to cross-examination in the absence of the informant/interpreter. Ifaramoye v.State (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1568) 457 referred to.] (Pp. 485-486, paras. F-A).
AUWALU V. KANO STATE (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 459
ON EFFECT OF CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT OBTAINED FROM ACCUSED THROUGH INTERPRETER WHERE THE INTERPRETER IS NOT CALLED AS WITNESS
Where a conviction is based solely on a confessional statement and the person who acted as interpreter when it was obtained did not testify, the confessional statement is hearsay evidence and the accused person is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal. When the purpose for tendering a statement is to establish the truth of its contents, the interpreter, which includes translator and the person who recorded it in another language must give evidence at the trial. The statement is hearsay and therefore inadmissible because it cannot be subject to cross-examination in the absence of the recorder and translator of the statement. [Ifaramoye v. State (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt.1568) 457 referred to.] (Pp. 486-487, paras. F-G;490, paras. E-G).
AUWALU V. KANO STATE (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 459
ON NECESSITY FOR INTERPRETER TO GIVE EVIDENCE RELATING TO DOCUMENT INTERPRETED BY HIM
Thus, the interpreter or translator must be called to give evidence, in the course of which he will be expected to state the qualification, which makes him a competent interpreter or translator and he will be examined, cross-examined and re-examined by the parties in order to ensure that he has done a good job of the translation. A Judge cannot, therefore engage in the translation or interpretation of such documents since he cannot perform the role of a witness and a Judge at the same time. To interpret means to translate orally and the interpreter provides oral translation between speakers who speak different languages. The translator is also a person who translates written messages from one language to another. So, one translates orally and the other one translates in writing. There is no difference between them in the eyes of the law and the translator falls under the same hammer as the interpreter. Ifaramoye v. State (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt.1568) 457 referred to.] (P. 488, paras. C-G).