OSUJI V. STATE (2025) 2 NWLR (PT. 1977) 527
ON MEANING OF PROVOCATION
Generally, provocation has been described to mean some act or series of acts done by the deceased to the accused which would cause in a reasonable man and did cause in the accused a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make him or her for the moment not master of his mind. It is a partial defence to murder in cases where the act or omission causing death was provoked by some conduct of the deceased. It reduces a charge of murder to manslaughter and the idea behind the defence is basically the recognition of human frailty and the tendency to overreact. [State v. Datu (2022) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1834) 59 referred to.] (P. 565, paras. E-G).
OSUJI V. STATE (2025) 2 NWLR (PT. 1977) 527
ON NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF PROVOCATION
Provocation, which is not at large and which will reduce what would otherwise amount to murder to manslaughter, is a legal concept which is made up of a number of elements which must co-exist within a reasonable time. They are that:
(a) the act of provocation was done in the heat of passion;
(b) the loss of self-control, both actual and reasonable, occurred before there was time for cooling down; and
(c) the retaliation is proportionate to the provocation.
[Uraku v. State (1976) 6 SC 195; Nwede v. State (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt. 13) 444; Edoho v. State (2010)14 NWLR (Pt. 1214) 651; Olorunsola v. State (2022)16 NWLR (Pt. 1855) 67; Musa v. State (2022) 18NWLR (Pt. 1863) 551; Abdu v. State (2023) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1865) 339 referred to.] (Pp. 565-566, paras. G-A).
OSUJI V. STATE (2025) 2 NWLR (PT. 1977) 527
ON IMPLICATION OF DEFENCE OF PROVOCATION WHEN RAISED
The defence of provocation when raised by an accused person presupposes and amounts to an admission by the accused that the death of the deceased was as a result of his act. In other words, the starting point for the operation of the defence of provocation is that the accused person must of necessity admit the commission of the offence before going on to explain the circumstances in which it was committed and then contend that due to the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence of murder, the offence be reduced from murder to manslaughter. Where an accused person denies the commission of the offence, the defence of provocation cannot arise. In the instant case, the appellant’s testimony put paid to the invocation of the defence of provocation in his favour. The Court of Appeal was correct that the defence of provocation was not opened to the appellant in the circumstances of the case. [Agu v. State (2017) 10 NWLR (Pt.1573) 171; Njoku v. State (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1360) 417 referred to.] (P. 566, paras. C-G).
OSUJI V. STATE (2025) 2 NWLR (PT. 1977) 527
ON WHEN DEFENCE OF PROVOCATION WILL NOT AVAIL ACCUSED
In criminal jurisprudence, the defence of provocation is not available to a defendant who had time for his temper to cool after a fight or altercation before attacking the victim. The standard used is the standard of the reasonable common man, not the standard of a hot-tempered man. The law presumes that a man intends the natural and probable consequences of his action and the test to be applied in the circumstances is the objective test, namely, the test of what a reasonable man would contemplate as the probable result of his actions. In the instant case, the appellant knew that death will occur when he charged towards the deceased with a sharp broken bottle and stabbed the deceased several times. (Pp. 571-572, paras. G-A).