STANBIC IBTC BANK PLC V. L.G.C. LTD. (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 361
ON WHEN PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST CAN BE CLAIMED
A plaintiff may claim pre-judgment interest as a matter of right when it is expressly stated in an agreement, implied by the conduct of the parties, established by mercantile custom or grounded in equitable principles, such as when a breach of fiduciary duty is involved.
In such cases, the plaintiff is entitled to an equitable remedy. Therefore, to successfully claim pre-judgment interest, a party must not only assert his right to such interest but also clearly state the basis of this entitlement — whether it arises from statute, contract, mercantile custom or equitable principles such as a breach of fiduciary relationship.
It is not for the court to speculate or objectify or assume the facts pleaded. Under the rules of court, there is provision for pre-judgment interest.
Pre-judgment is a judgment reached before evidence is available. If the claim is for money, the claimant may claim interest up until the date of judgment is given and that is pre-judgment interest.
[Skymit Motors Ltd. v. U.B.A. Plc (2021) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1768) 123 referred to.]
(P. 408, paras. A-E)
EGWU V. ANUMENE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 329
ON NATURE OF COUNTER CLAIM
A counter-claim is a distinct claim and stands on its own as a claim.
Thus, where there is a counter-claim, the defendant who has counterclaimed stands as a plaintiff while the plaintiff in the original claim becomes a defendant in respect of the counter-claim.
That being so, a defendant/counter-claimant in an action for declaration of title to land must, just like the original plaintiff, establish the identity of the land which he counter-claims.
(P. 362, paras. E-F)
MUHAMMAD V. UMARU (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 301
ON OATH PROCEDURE IN PROOF OF CLAIM UNDER ISLAMIC LAW
In the Maliki School, a nuanced approach is adopted. If the defendant refuses the oath, the Judge turns the oath back to the plaintiff who may then swear, and the judgment is delivered based on this refusal and coupled with the plaintiff’s oath. This principle is rooted in the timeless principles of fairness and equity, ensuring that the refusal of the defendant does not hinder the pursuit of justice. In the instant appeal, the Upper Sharia Court of Wurno, guided by this established rule, held that the defendant’s refusal to take an oath necessitated a return of the oath to the plaintiff who then swore in court.
The Sharia Court of Appeal upheld this decision, recognizing the Judge’s adherence to established legal principles. However, the Court of Appeal overturned this judgment on the grounds that the respondent was not adequately informed of the consequences of his refusal to swear an oath. Thus, that judgment brought the matter before the Supreme Court.
(P. 320, Paras. C-G)
MAHAMMAD V. UMARU (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 301
ON OATH PROCEDURE IN PROOF OF CLAIM UNDER ISLAMIC LAW
The jurists of the Maliki School, the applicable legal framework in this region, have deliberated on whether the defendant must be informed of the consequences of refusing the oath. There exist two distinct views – one asserts that such a notification is recommended, but not obligatory, while the other maintains that the failure to inform the defendant does not invalidate the judgment. The first view asserts that it is appropriate for the Judge to explain the ruling on the refusal of an oath by saying to the defendant, ‘If you refuse to take the oath, you will forfeit the claim made against you.’
And this, and Allah knows best, is recommended for someone who fears ignorance of the ruling on the refusal of the oath.
If the refusal is completed by either verbally stating it or abstaining from taking the oath, as mentioned previously, then if afterward the person says, ‘I am willing to swear,’ it will not be accepted from him, nor will it bind his opponent unless the opponent agrees. This is similar to a situation where a witness testifies in favour of someone with a right, and the person refuses to swear with the witness and denies the oath for the claim.
Then if he changes his mind and desires to swear, he is not allowed to do so.
The Judge should clarify the ruling. It is appropriate for the Judge to present the oath to the defendant and explain the ruling on refusing (nukul).
What becomes apparent from the foregoing is that some of the jurists of the Maliki School, as expressed in their esteemed works, regard informing the respondent of the consequences of his refusal to swear an oath as a recommended practice, though not mandatory. Failure to do so does not, in their view, invalidate the judgment rendered by the Judge.
However, a contrasting view is found within other scholarly texts where some jurists elevate the informing of the respondent about the consequences of his refusal to take the oath to a condition precedent for the admissibility of the returned oath to the plaintiff.
The Judge must clarify to the defendant the consequence of refusal to take an oath; he should inform the defendant, in an investigative matter that:
“If you refuse to take an oath, the plaintiff shall swear and be entitled to what he claims.”
In the case of an accusation: “If you refuse, the plaintiff shall be entitled to what he accuses you of simply due to your refusal.”
This clarification is a condition for the validity of the judgment, just as the warning is a condition in its proper context. In the instant case, the Supreme Court was of the view that, the Maliki school of thought, which forms the applicable Islamic law in Nigeria, does not establish a definitive or binding position on this matter.
Consequently, the Supreme Court was inclined to hold that the determination is best left to the discretion of the presiding Judge. If the Judge is firmly convinced that the defendant is unaware of the implications of refusing to take an oath (nukul), it becomes incumbent upon the Judge, in such circumstances, to inform the defendant of the consequences of refusing to take an oath (nukul). However, in the absence of such a belief, it is not obligatory for the Judge to provide this information.
In the circumstances, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that the learned trial Judge had used his discretion not to warn the respondent on the implication of not taking an oath, therefore, this discretion should not be interfered with by the Supreme Court.
(Pp. 320-323, paras. H-E)
AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC v. N.D.I.C. (2025) 12 NWLR (Pt. 2000) 453
ON WHEN A CLAIM IS DEEMED PERSONAL
A claim is only deemed personal when it directly challenges actions of the company itself.
In the instant case, the appellants’ action could not be categorized as personal or representative because it was not initiated by members of the 1st appellant seeking to restrain or prevent the 1st appellant from undertaking certain actions.
(P. 477, paras. F-G)
MR. FEMI ANIBABA V. DANA AIRLINES LIMITED & ANOR (2025) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1994).
On the Burden on the plaintiff to prove his entitlement to claim
Claims that rest on conjecture or speculation cannot be entertained by a court of law. A plaintiff must prove his entitlement to his claim with a reasonable degree of certainty. A party asserting a claim bears the burden of proving it. In the instant case, the claims for future dependence on the earnings, income, pension and services, as well as claims for future healthcare costs and the pre-death pain and suffering, were speculative. The legitimate considerations negated the plausibility of such claims, as they were not supported by any concrete or compelling evidence. Also, the appellant failed to produce credible evidence in support of his claims for funeral expenses, personal belongings, and past dependency on the service. Consequently, the Court of Appeal was right in dismissing them. [Nigerian Bottling Co. Ltd.v. Ngonadi (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 739 referred to.](P. 423, paras. D-G)