DIKIO V. N.S.I.T.F. MGT. BOARD (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 129
ON BINDINGNESS OF FINDING OF COURT ON PARTIES WHERE NOT APPEALED AGAINST
A finding of court not contested on appeal cannot be an issue in the appeal. The finding is binding on the parties and the appellate court cannot interfere with it.
In the instant case, the trial court found that the 8th appellant was not a recognised tenant of the respondents but an illegal occupant of the house she occupied, and that she was not even extended the letter of expression of interest sent to the other appellants by reason thereof. The trial court found that the 8th appellant did not make out any case to justify the making of a finding of any kind in her favour and it dismissed her case.
The findings were not contested in the appeal at the Court of Appeal and were not touched upon by the court. Consequently, the findings could not be an issue in the appeal at the Supreme Court, were binding on the parties, and the Supreme Court could not tamper with them.
[P.N. Udoh Trading Co. Ltd. v. Abere (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 723) 114; Orianzi v. A.-G., Rivers State (2017) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1561) 224 referred to.] (P. 162, paras. D-F)
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON EFFECT OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH MANDATORY PROVISIONS OF STATUTES ON ELECTION MATTERS
Non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of statutes, including the Constitution, in election matters, which could otherwise be condoned or overlooked in ordinary proceedings, could and often results in fatal consequences.
[Buhari v. Obasanjo (2003) 17 NWLR (Pt. 850) 423; Magaji v. Bala (2004) 8 NWLR (Pt. 876) 449; ANPP v. R.E.C., Akwa Ibom State (2008) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1090) 453 referred to.] (P. 103, paras. D-E)
PRECISION ASSO. LTD. V. FED. MIN., FINANCE (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 175
ON WHEN ISSUE OF JURISDICTION OF COURT CAN BE RAISED
The issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage or time in the litigation process, with or without leave of court.
[Bronik Motors v. Wema Bank (1983) 1 SCNLR 296; A.N.N. Ltd. v. F.R.N. (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 6) 137; Obiuweubi v. C.B.N. (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1247) 465; Gaji v. Paye (2003) 8 NWLR (Pt. 823) 583; University of Ilorin v. Adesina (2014) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1414) 159 referred to.] (P. 194, paras. C-E)
PRECISION ASSO. LTD. V. FED. MIN., FINANCE (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 175
ON PROCESS COURT LOOKS AT IN DETERMINING ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
In determining whether or not a court has jurisdiction, it is the claimant’s statement of claim, and not the defendant’s statement of defence, that must be examined.
Where the suit is fought on pleadings, the court’s jurisdiction is determined by examining the claimant’s or plaintiff’s claims alone. In an action commenced by an originating motion or an originating summons, the reliefs and the affidavit in support thereof determine the jurisdiction of the court.
[Anya v. Iyayi (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 306) 290; Akinfolarin v. Akinnola (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 335) 659; Ifeajuna v. Ifeajuna (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt. 671) 107; Western Steel Works Ltd. v. Iron & Steel Workers Union (No. 2) (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 49) 284; Aremo II v. Adekanye (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 891) 572 referred to.] (P. 194, paras. E-H)
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON DOCUMENTS THAT MUST ACCOMPANY ELECTION PETITION
By virtue of paragraph 12(5) of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, an election petition shall be accompanied by:
- a list of witnesses that the petitioner intends to call in proof of the petition;
- written statements on oath of the witnesses; and
- copies or list of every document to be relied on at the hearing of the petition.
(P. 100, paras. B-C)
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON WHEN COURT MAY DETERMINE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OR ANY INTERLOCUTORY ISSUE RAISED IN ELECTION MATTER
By virtue of section 285 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), where a preliminary objection or any other interlocutory issue touching on the jurisdiction of the tribunal or court in any pre-election matter, or on the competence of the petition itself, is raised by a party, the tribunal or court shall suspend its ruling and deliver it at the stage of final judgment.
In other words, all preliminary objections or interlocutory issues raised during the hearing of a pre-election matter or an election petition shall be decided by the tribunal at the stage of final judgment in the matter along with the substantive matter.
The rationale for the provisions is to prevent situations in which a tribunal would be burdened in the course of a trial, hearing, or proceedings in a pre-election matter or an election petition, for which time has deliberately been made of very crucial essence by the Constitution itself, to rule on every and all preliminary issues, objections, or points raised and canvassed by parties at every stage they were raised as hitherto done prior to the alteration of the provisions of section 285 of the Constitution, which led to inordinate delays in the determination of the matters such that it resulted in the ridiculous and embarrassing situation of the expiration of the terms of offices in respect of which the matters were taken before they were eventually disposed of.
Section 285 is to remedy the situation and give the sui generis nature of pre-election matters and election petitions their due position in Nigerian judicial proceedings and jurisprudence. Under the provision, an Election Tribunal is commanded, by the use of the word “shall”, to suspend all rulings on all preliminary objections or interlocutory issues raised in the course of the trial or hearing in order to keep to the timelines prescribed, and deliver same at the stage of final judgment.
A tribunal is mandated to deliver a composite final judgment at the end or conclusion of the proceedings or hearing of the matter, comprising all the rulings on the preliminary or interlocutory issues or points raised by the parties as well as the merit of the substantive matter. This ensures that all issues or points or complaints, dissatisfaction or grievances, whether preliminary or interlocutory and on the merit of the substantive matter, are all fully, effectually, conclusively, and finally determined by the tribunal at the stage and in the final judgment to be delivered in the matter.
There is no and there cannot be any reasonable dispute about this position of the provision in section 285(8). Because of the acknowledged peculiar nature of the provisions in section 285 of the Constitution, their prescriptions are interpreted and applied strictly such that any non-compliance therewith, no matter how slight, might result in fatal consequences.
[Buhari v. Obasanjo (2003) 17 NWLR (Pt. 850) 423; Magaji v. Bala (2004) 8 NWLR (Pt. 876) 449; ANPP v. R.E.C., Akwa Ibom State (2008) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1090) 453; A.P.P. v. Obaseki (2022) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1846) 1 referred to.] (Pp. 103-105, paras. E-E; 125-126, paras. G-E)
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON DUTY ON RESPONDENT WHO HAS OBJECTION TO ELECTION PETITION
By virtue of the provision of Paragraph 12 of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2022, a respondent who has an objection to the hearing of the petition shall file his reply and state the objection in it, and the objection shall be heard along with the substantive petition.
The provisions complement and support the provisions of section 285 of the 1999 Constitution in exhorting an election tribunal to take, hear, consider, and determine a preliminary objection to the hearing of the petition by the respondent along with the substantive petition in order to avoid delays in the determination of the petition due to its sui generis nature.
[Ezenwo v. Festus (No.2) (2020) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1750) 276 referred to.] (Pp. 105-106, paras. E-A; 126, paras. A-E)
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON PROVISION OF COMPOSITE NOTICE OF APPEAL FOR INTERLOCUTORY AND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN ELECTION PETITION
Just like the composite single and final judgment to be delivered by a Tribunal comprising all decisions on interlocutory issues, points, or objections as well as on the merit of the substantive petition, in line with the provisions of section 285(8), section 246(1) provides for an appeal, the notice of which shall also be composite against all such decisions on the interlocutory issues, points, or objections as well as the merit of the petition.
The single Notice of Appeal shall contain grounds against both interlocutory decisions and the merit of the petition contained in the composite final judgment.
(P. 106, paras. E-G)
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON WHEN PARTY MAY FILE APPEAL ON INTERLOCUTORY DECISION SEPARATE FROM FINAL DECISION
By virtue of paragraph 6 of the Practice Directions of the Court of Appeal, an appellant shall file in the registry of the tribunal or court his notice of appeal within 14 days where the appeal is against an interlocutory decision and 21 days where the appeal is against a final decision.
These provisions allow the filing of appeals against both interlocutory decisions and final decisions of a tribunal in an election petition. However, they deal with situations in which separate interlocutory decisions were delivered by a tribunal in the course of the trial or hearing in respect of other issues or points not covered by the provisions in section 285 of the 1999 Constitution and Paragraph 12 of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, before the stage of final judgment in the petition.
Where separate decisions or rulings were delivered by an Election Tribunal on any interlocutory or preliminary issues in the course of or during the trial or hearing of an election petition and before the stage of final judgment, the provisions of paragraph 6 of the Practice Directions apply in respect of filing of the notice of appeal against such decisions within the fourteen days prescribed therein.
However, if the appeal is against a final decision in an election petition, which in line with the provisions in section 285 of the Constitution and Paragraph 12 of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, includes decisions on preliminary objections or any other interlocutory issue touching the jurisdiction of the tribunal or court or on the competence of the petition itself, the time for filing an appeal is 21 days.
Paragraph 6 regulates the time within which Notices of Appeal specifically provided for by statutes (including the Constitution), which are the only valid source of the right of an appeal in election matters, are to be filed. The paragraph neither creates nor vests the right of appeal but regulates the time within which the validly vested right can be exercised.
In the instant case, the right of appeal to the Court of Appeal from decisions of the Governorship Election Tribunals was created and given by section 246 of the Constitution, which overrides the provisions of subordinate legislation such as the Practice Directions. (P. 106-108, paras. H-A)
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON DUTY ON PARTY WISHING TO EXERCISE RIGHT OF APPEAL TO ACT IN CONFORMITY WITH PRESCRIBED PROCEDURE
The right of an appeal is not a common law right but is created and donated by specific statutory provisions. A party or person wishing to exercise the right must act strictly, in conformity with the provisions and procedure prescribed.
The exercise of the right of appeal donated by the Constitution can only be valid and competent if it complies with the procedure and the said provisions.
[Aroyewun v. Adebanji (1916) 11 SC (Reprint) 21; Emokpae v. Stanbic IBTC P.M. Ltd. (2021) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1776) 465; Itok v. Udoyo (2021) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1765) 49; Anyakorah v. P.D.P. (2022) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1843) 1; Oyegun v. Nzeribe (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1194) 577; Oredoyin v. Arowolo (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 114) 17; Ngige v. Obi (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 999) 1 referred to.] (P. 108, paras. B-D)
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON WHETHER APPLICATION OF SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS AMOUNTS TO TECHNICALITY
The application of substantive provisions of the Constitution or any statute is not and does not constitute or amount to technicality in judicial proceedings generally, and in election matters specifically.
[Inakoju v. Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 423; Drexel Energy & Natural Resources Ltd. v. Trans. International Bank Ltd. (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1119) 388 referred to.] (P. 110, paras. A-B)
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON COMPUTATION OF TIME IN ELECTION MATTERS
In the computation of time in an electoral action, including pre-election matters, in the light of the 4th Alteration to the 1999 Constitution and under section 4(1) of the Electoral Act, the computation includes the very date on which the results were declared.
This underscores the uniqueness and sui generis nature of electoral matters. Electoral matters, by their peculiarity, belong to an exclusive class of their own.
[Bello v. Yusuf (2019) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1695) 250; Poatson Graphics v. NDIC (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1672) 447 referred to.] (P. 122, paras. C-F)
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON HOW TO DETERMINE WHETHER A DECISION IS FINAL OR INTERLOCUTORY
The classification of a decision as final or interlocutory depends not on the stage of the proceedings but on the outcome of the decision. If, after the decision, there are still issues left for the court to consider, the decision is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
In the instant case, the ruling on interlocutory issues was deferred and delivered after the proceedings, on the same date as the judgment on substantive issues, in compliance with section 285(8) of the 1999 Constitution, thereby making the ruling final.
Even absent section 285(8), the ruling would have been final, as it resolved the contention that the appellants abandoned the petition, thereby terminating proceedings.
[Ebokam v. Ekwenibe & Sons Trading Co. Ltd. (1999) 10 NWLR (Pt. 622) 242; Gomez v. C and S.S (2009) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1149) 223; Ugo v. Ugo (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1597) 218; Alor v. Ngene (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1062) 163 referred to.] (Pp. 126-127, Paras. E-C)
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON NEED TO INCORPORATE COMPLAINT AGAINST INTERLOCUTORY DECISION IN GROUND OF APPEAL FROM FINAL JUDGMENT IN ELECTION PETITION
A ground of appeal from a final judgment in an election petition incorporating a complaint against an interlocutory decision given in the course of a trial is competent.
This approach saves time, as election petitions are time-sensitive. Proper procedure requires incorporating grounds of appeal against interlocutory decisions together with grounds against substantive decisions in a single Notice of Appeal, guarding against multiplicity of appeals.
Section 246 of the Constitution envisages only one appeal against the “decisions” of the trial tribunal. Filing multiple appeals constitutes an abuse of court process.
[Aondoakaa v. Ajo (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt. 602) 206; Onibu v. INEC (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt. 94) 323 at 355 referred to.] (Pp. 127-128, paras. C-B).
SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 63
ON TREATMENT OF APPEAL NOT SUPPORTED BY ELECTORAL ACT OR CONSTITUTION
An appeal in an election petition not supported by provisions in sections 246 and 285 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), as well as Paragraph 12 of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2022, or any other statutory provisions providing for the right of appeal from decisions of an election tribunal, amounts to an abuse of court process and is liable to be dismissed.
[A.G. Lagos State v. A.G. Federation (2014) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1412) 217; Ihedioha v. Nwosu (2020) 50 (Pt. 1717) 291; Ajibode v. Gbadamosi (2021) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1776) 475; A.P.P. v. Obaseki (2022) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1846) 1; Okorocha v. P.D.P. (2014) 7 (Pt. 1406) 213 referred to.] (P. 109, paras. E-H)
OMEH V UTYO (2025) 12 NWLR 1 SC
ON WHEN APPEAL LIES AS OF RIGHT FROM DECISIONS OF HIGH COURT OR FEDERAL HIGH COURT TO COURT OF APPEAL
By virtue of section 241(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), an appeal shall lie from decisions of the Federal High Court or a High court to the Court of Appeal as of right in the following cases:
(a) final decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings before the Federal High Court or a High, court sitting at first instance.
(b) where the ground of appeal involves questions of law alone, decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings. (P. 20, paras. B-D)
Per OGBUINYA, J.S.C. at page 25, paras. A-F:
“This oracular pronouncement, warehoused in these ex cathedra authorities, which wear the insignia of finality in virtue of the provision of section 235 of the Constitution (as amended), the fons et origo of our laws, emasculates and drowns the propriety of the lower court’s deployment of the provision of section 242(1) of the Constitution (as amended) in relation to the appellant’s appeal before it. Put differently, the lower court, with due reverence, misunderstood and misapplied the crystal clear provision of section 241(a) of the Constitution, as amended, which clothed the appellant with an appeal as of right against the trial court’s decision on the satisfaction of the twin conditions that are sine qua non for its invocation. In other words, since the judgment of the trial court was a final decision par excellence and it sat as a court of first instance, the requirement for leave to appeal against the decision became vaporised by the appeal as of right. The lower court, with due respect, fractured and treated the Constitutional Law with disdain and contempt when it stigmatised and crucified the appellant appeal on the undeserved altar of indelible incompetence and struck it out. It was a decision that was, highly, offensive to the law. It will smell of idolising judicial sacrilege to allow a decision which has disclosed a mountainous hostility to the letters and spirit of the law to stand. Per contra, it is a qualified candidate which deserves to be mowed down by the unbiased judicial sword of this court. This is the only way to pacify the law”
OMEH V UTYO (2025) 12 NWLR 1 SC
ON WHEN APPEAL LIES AS OF RIGHT FROM DECISIONS OF HIGH COURT OR FEDERAL HIGH COURT TO COURT OF APPEAL
An appeal from the final decision of a High Court; Federal, FCT and/or State, sitting as a court of first instance, to the Court of Appeal, is as of right, irrespective of the nature of the questions involved in the grounds of the appeal; i.e. whether they are of pure law, mixed law and facts or facts alone, by dint of the provisions of section 241(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as altered). In the instant case, the appeal of the appellant before the Court of Appeal was incontestably a final decision of the High Court of Justice, Benue State sitting at first instance. Such decisions are appealable as of right, irrespective of whether the grounds are of law alone, of mixed law and facts or of facts alone. Since the appeal is as of right, there is no requirement to seek for and obtain the prior leave of either the High Court or the Court of Appeal for the grounds of such an appeal to be legally valid and competent to be capable of properly invoking the requisite jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal over the appeal. The party desirous to appeal against such a decision has and enjoys the constitutional right, liberty and unfettered discretion to file his notice of appeal without the need for prior resort to either the High Court or the Court of Appeal for the positive nod, the go ahead, green-light, permission or leave to do so. The provisions in section 241(1)(a) of the Constitution is distinct, separate and independent of the later provisions in section 242(1) which deals with situations in which the right of appeal is not as fright, but which require, as a condition precedent, to the exercise of the right of appeal vested therein, the prior permission of either the High Court or the Court of Appeal, by way of leave to appeal. [A.N.P.P. v. Albishir (2010) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1198) 118; Nig. Laboratory Corp. v. P.M.B. Ltd. (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1324) 505; Organ v. NLNG (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1381) 506; F.R.N. v. Dairo (2015) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1454) 141; State v. Omoyele (2017) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1547) 341; Metuh v. F.R.N. (2018) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1628) 399; Ecobank (Nig.) Ltd. v. Honeywell Flour Mills Ple (2019) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1655) 55; Aqua Lid. v. Ondo State Sports Council (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 91) 622; Ezennaka v. C.O.P., Cross River State (2022) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1862) 369 referred to.] (P. 26, paras. B-H; 28, paras. A-D)
OMEH V UTYO (2025) 12 NWLR 1 SC
ON SIGNIFICANCE OF LEAVE AND EFFECT OF FAILURE TO SEEK AND OBTAIN WHERE REQUIRED
Leave signifies permission. Where leave of court, trial or appellate, is required before filing an action, a process or ground of appeal, but a party ignores seeking and obtaining the requisite leave before filing same, the action, process or ground is rendered incompetent which incompetence will impinge on the jurisdiction of the court to entertain it. [Ojemen v. Momodu II (1983) 1 SCNLR 188; Nwadike v. Ibekwe (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 181; Garuba v. Omokhodion (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt.1269) Eli 145; Otu v. A.C.B. Int’l Ltd. (2008) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1073) 179; U.B.A. Plc v. Songunro (2006) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1006) 504; Thor Ltd. v. F.C.M.B. Ltd. (2002) 4 NWLR (Pt. 757) 427; Ugboaja v. Akitoye-Sowemimo (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1113) 278; Akinyemi v. Odu’a Inv. Co. Ltd. (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 209; Okwuagbala v. Ikwueme (2010) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1226) 54; Nwaolisah v. Nwabufoh (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1268) 600; Njemanze v. Njemanze (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1356) 376; Imegwu v. Okolocha (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 347; Ugwu v. State (2013) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1374) 257; Ngere v. Okuruket ‘XIV’ (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1417) 147; Ekunola v. CBN (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1377) 224; Allanah v. Kpolokwu (2016) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1507) 1; Anaechebe v. Ijeoma (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt.1426) 168; B.B. Apugo & Sons Ltd. v. O.H.M.B. (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 206; Obasi v. Mikson Est. Ind. Ltd. (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1539) 335; Otti v. Ogah (2017) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1563) 1; Sogunro v. Yeku (2017) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1570) 290; Mato v. Hember (2018) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1612) 258; Fost Royal Homes Ltd. v. E.F.C.C. (2021) 8 NWLR (Pt.1778) 312 referred to.] (P. 21, paras. A-F)
AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC V. C.B.N. (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 255
ON EFFECT OF FAILURE TO FULFIL CONDITION PRECEDENT TO COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION
Once a condition precedent to the commencement of an action is not fulfilled, such action has not undergone due process and as such the jurisdiction of the court cannot be properly activated as the court would have been robbed of its requisite vires to entertain the matter.
[Metroline (Nig.) Ltd v. Dikko (2021) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1761) 422; Ugwuanyi v. NICON Insurance Plc (2013) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1366) 546; Nwora v. Nwabueze (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1379) 1 referred to.]
(P. 289, paras. C-D)
AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC V. C.B.N. (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 255
ON PURPORT OF NEED FOR LEAVE BY ORIGINATING SUMMONS TO COMMENCE DERIVATIVE ACTION
Invariably, the interests of the company and those in charge thereof will be affected by a derivative action. By making provision for leave to be sought via originating summons rather than by motion ex-parte, it is intended that those running the company will be given an opportunity to have their say before the court decides whether or not to grant leave.
(P. 297, paras. A-B)
STANBIC IBTC BANK PLC V. L.G.C. LTD. (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 361
ON WHEN SUPREME COURT WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF FACT BY TRIAL COURT AND COURT OF APPEAL
It is not in the character of the Supreme Court to interfere with the concurrent findings of the High Court and the Court of Appeal in absence of special circumstances, such as where such findings are perverse.
[Ahmed v. Reg. Trustees, Archdiocese of Kaduna of the Roman Catholic Church (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1655) 300 referred to.]
(P. 411, paras. E-G)
AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC V. C.B.N. (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 255
ON NEED FOR GROUNDS RELIED UPON IN RESPONDENT’S NOTICE TO BE APPARENT ON THE RECORD
The grounds relied upon in a respondent’s notice must be apparent on the record having regard to the facts of the case, the law applicable thereto and the judgment on appeal. In the instant case, the grounds relied upon by the appellants in their respondent’s notice at the Court of Appeal were neither canvassed nor did they form part of the judgment appealed against.
[Gwede v. INEC (2014) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1438) 56 referred to.]
(Pp. 294–295, paras. F-A)
AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC V. C.B.N. (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 255
ON EFFECT OF FAILURE TO OBTAIN LEAVE OF COURT WHERE REQUIRED
Where leave of court, trial or appellate, is required for filing an action or process and a party ignores seeking and obtaining the requisite leave before filing it, the action or process is rendered incompetent. In the instant case, the Court of Appeal was right in striking out the suit before the trial court for want of jurisdiction for failure to obtain the requisite leave.
[U.B.A. Plc v. Songunro (2006) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1006) 504; Akinyemi v. Odu’a M.V. Co. Ltd. (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 209; B.B. Apugo & Sons Ltd v. O.H.M.B. (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 206; Nikagabafe v. Opuye (2018) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1623) 85; Okolonwamu v. Okolonwamu (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1676) 1; Mamman v. State (2022) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1851) 459 referred to.]
(Pp. 292–293, paras. F-A; 297, paras. G-H)
AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC V. C.B.N. (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 255
ON DISTINCTION BETWEEN SEEKING LEAVE BY ORIGINATING SUMMONS AND SEEKING LEAVE BY MOTION EX-PARTE
There is a vital difference between seeking leave by originating summons and seeking leave by motion ex-parte. The vital difference is that the former is on notice to the potential defendant, while the latter is conducted without notice.
(P. 296, paras. G-H)
AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC V. C.B.N. (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 255
ON PURPOSE OF SERVICE OF COURT PROCESS
The purpose of service is for the other party to be aware of the proceedings and respond thereto if he so wishes.
(P. 296, para. H)
AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC V. C.B.N. (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 255
ON MODE OF MAKING APPLICATIONS TO COURT UNDER COMPANIES AND ALLIED MATTERS ACT
By virtue of rule 2 of the Companies Proceedings Rules made pursuant to section 635 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, Laws of the Federation, 2004, except in the case of the application mentioned in rules 5 and 6 of the Rules and applications made in proceedings relating to winding up of companies, every application under the Act shall be made by originating summons. The provision of Rule 2(1) employs the word “shall” to indicate a mandatory injunction. Every application under the Act shall be made by originating summons, except those specifically exempted.
The provision clearly applies to every application under the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004, except those under rules 5 and 6 of the Companies Proceedings Rules 1992 and those made in proceedings relating to winding up of companies. In the instant case, the appellants were wrong in their argument that rule 2(1) of the Companies Proceedings Rules 1992 applied only to substantive applications. There is nothing in the Rules that supports that assertion. The use of the all-encompassing adjective “every” dispelled the appellants’ argument.
[Agip (Nig.) Ltd. v. Agip Petroli Int’l (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1187) 348; Ugwuanyi v. NICON Insurance Plc (2013) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1366) 546; Adeosun v. Gov., Ekiti State (2012) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1291) 581; Corporate Ideal Ins. Ltd v. Ajaokuta Steel Co. Ltd. (2014) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1405) 165 referred to.]
(Pp. 290, paras. D-E; 292, paras. B-D; 296, paras. D-G)
AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC V. C.B.N. (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 255
ON NATURE OF APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO COMMENCE DERIVATIVE ACTION AND NEED TO ENSURE FAIR HEARING IN DETERMINATION THEREOF
An application for leave to commence a derivative action is not a mere formality. It is a process that requires the court to make an active determination with stated benchmark for reaching such determination. In making such a determination regarding the interest of the Directors, fair hearing demands that such Directors should be put on notice. An order which has the effect of stripping the Directors of their statutory right must be one in respect of which they should be given the right to be heard before it is made as their civil rights and obligations would be affected. Consequently, it is right to give them fair hearing as enshrined in section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution.
(Pp. 290, paras. F-H; 291, paras. E-G)
AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC V. C.B.N. (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 255
ON WHAT AMOUNTS TO DERIVATIVE ACTION AND WHEN CAN BE INITIATED
When a wrong is done to a company, it is only the company as represented by the Board of Directors of the company that can take steps to address the wrong either by way of filing an action in court or in any other way. However, there is an exception to this general rule which permits an individual shareholder or shareholders of the company to initiate an action on behalf and/or in the name of the company. Such an action is known as a derivative action. This is codified in section 303 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990, now section 346 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2020, which requires that a shareholder or shareholders of the company should obtain leave to commence a derivative action.
(P. 301, paras. A-D)
STANBIC IBTC BANK PLC V. L.G.C. LTD. (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 361
ON HOW TO CHALLENGE COMPETENCE OF GROUNDS OF APPEAL
It is the established rule of practice in Nigerian appellate jurisprudence that when a party is querying the competence of grounds of appeal, he can only do so through a motion on notice. It is never done by way of a preliminary objection or oral argument originated in a brief of argument as was done by the 1st to 4th respondents’ counsel in the instant case.
In that wise, the application was not properly before the court, so the jurisdiction of the court was not properly been activated to entertain their objection challenging the competence of the appellant’s grounds 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 which touched on the competence of the appeal.
(P. 385, paras. G-H)
AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC V. C.B.N. (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 255
ON RIGHT TO INSTITUTE ACTION ON BEHALF OF COMPANY OR TO INTERVENE IN ACTION IN WHICH COMPANY IS PARTY, AND PURPORT OF
By virtue of section 303 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 (as amended), subject to the provision of subsection of the section, an applicant may apply to the court for leave to bring an action in the name or on behalf of a company, or to intervene in an action to which the company is a party, for the purpose of prosecuting, defending or discontinuing the action on behalf of the company.
(Pp. 289–290, paras. H-A; 296, paras. A-C)
BAGUDU V BALKISU [2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 317 S.C
ON DUTY ON COURT TO GUARD AGAINST DISREGARD OF ITS PROCESS AND PROCEDURE
A court has a duty to jealously guard and protect its processes and procedure from being generally disregarded by a litigant. ITS Industries Ltd v. F.B.N. PLC (No. 1) (2012) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1320) 353; Council of Legal Baucation V. Dange (2024) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1955) 307 referred to.] (Pp. 355-356, paras. H-A)
BAGUDU V BALKISU [2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 317 S.C
ON WHEN SUPREME COURT WILL INTERFERE WITH CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF FACTS BY LOWER COURTS AND WHEN WILL NOT
The Supreme Court does not make it a habit of disturbing the concurrent findings of lower courts and would only do so if exceptional circumstances are shown; that is, the appellant must show there are substantial errors in law or procedure leading to a miscarriage of justice. In other words, concurrent findings of fact would, and should, only be interfered with by the appellate court for good reason shown on the pages of the printed record. This position also applies under Islamic law. In this case, the Sharia Court of Appeal and the Court of Appeal found that the appellant did not lead credible evidence as required by the Islamic law to sustain his claims before the Upper Sharia Court. The appellant did not show that the concurrent judgments of both the Sharia Court of Appeal and the Court of Appeal are perverse. So, the findings and conclusions of the Sharia Court of Appeal and the Court of Appeal cannot be tampered with by the Supreme Court. [Ohaegbu v. Regd. Trustees, Capuchin Friars Minor Nigeria (2022) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1839) 48; Oyeyemi v. State (2023) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1882) 181; Barde v. I.N.E.C. (2024) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1932) 561; Ahiwe v. IN.E.C. (2024) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1935) 437; Friday v. State (2024) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1940) 267; Antonio Oil Co. Ltd v. A.M.C.N. (2024) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1961) 215; Hada v. Malumfashi (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 303) 1; Kakale v. Noma (2021) LPELR 55093 referred.] (Pp. 359, paras. F-H; 360, paras. B-H)
BAGUDU V BALKISU [2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 317 S.C
ON DUTY ON RESPONDENT IN AN APPEAL AND HOW RESPONDENT’S BRIEF ATTACKING JUDGMENT APPEALED AGAINST IS TREATED
The duty of a respondent in an appeal is to urge the correctness of the judgment appealed against. Where a respondent desires to depart from that role, he must file either a notice of cross appeal or a respondent’s notice. Where a respondent who did not file a notice of cross appeal or a respondent’s notice, like the 11th respondent in this appeal, files a brief of argument that does not urge the correctness of the judgment appealed against, the brief of argument is useless and irrelevant in the appeal. Therefore, the 11th respondent’s brief of argument is of no use in this appeal and it would he discountenanced by the court. [Dahiru v. A.P.C. (2017) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1555) 218; Zakirai v. Muhammad 2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1594) 181; Bakari v. Ogundipe (2021) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1768) 1 referred to.] (Pp. 357-358, paras. F-A)
MENAKAYA V. EZIM (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 265 S.C
ON WHO CAN FILE PROCESSES IN COURT
Only a legal practitioner recognized by law whose name is on the roll can practice as a Barrister and Solicitor which will then give him the authority to file processes in the courts of this country. In the instant case, the claim of the respondent as filed on 6th July before the High Court of Enugu State Menakaya v. Ezim with Suit No. E/1830/2001 and all other processes filed by J.H.C. Okolo SAN & Co. who is not a legal practitioner recognised by law were all incompetent and this robbed the trial court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. [Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 521 referred to.] (Pp. 270-272, paras. H-A; 273-274, paras. H-B)
MENAKAYA V. EZIM (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 265 S.C
ON WHO CAN SIGN ORIGINATING PROCESS
An originating process not signed by a legal practitioner is incompetent. Thus, where processes are not signed by a person known to law, the name not being in the roll, and so the originating processes are signed contrary to sections 2 and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act, the said originating processes are defective and all proceedings that arose from the said defective processes are nullities. In the instant case, the respondent’s statement of claim signed by the legal firm, J. H. C. Okolo S.A.N & Co., was incompetent and the trial court, Court of Appeal as well as the Supreme Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. [Oyekan v. Aberuagba (2024) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1952) 189 referred to (Pp. 274-275, paras. F-B)
BAGUDU V. KYAUTA (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 379 S.C
ON WHETHER COURT OF APPEAL MUST DETERMINE AFRESH ISSUE DETERMINED IN SISTER APPEAL
Where an issue for determination arises in two sister appeals, predicated on the same or very similar facts, and the issue is resolved and determined in one of the appeals, there is no need for the appellate court to resolve and determine the issue again in the sister appeal. So, the Court of Appeal, though an intermediate appellate court, will be exempted from determining afresh an issue which it has determined in a sister appeal, involving the same parties/issues and arising from the same judgment of the trial court. Under such circumstances, such undetermined issue would be considered subsumed in the issues determined and disposed of in the sister appeal. The rationale for this position of the law is that the further consideration and resolution of the issue for determination in the sister appeal will only be superfluous as the court cannot come to a contrary or contradictory decision on the same issue for determination in the sister appeal. In this case, the core issue that arose for determination in the appellant’s appeal at the Court of Appeal was considered and unanimously determined against him on the merits by the Court of Appeal in its judgment in his other appeal against the judgment in the consolidated suit. [4.P.C. v. A.I.E.S.C. (2022) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1845) 411; Ayakpo v. Dickson (2023) LPELR 60023; P.D.P. v. Johnson (2023) LPELR 61390; Lar v. Zuma Steel West Africa Ltd. (2024) LPELR 62260; Emebo v. Zuma Steel West Africa Ltd. (2024) LPELR 62264; Madumere v. Gov., Imo State (2024) LPELR 62825 referred to.) (Pp. 399-400, paras. B-E)
BAGUDU V. KYAUTA (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 379 S.C
ON PROPER SUBSEQUENT DECISION BY COURT OF APPEAL IN SISTER APPEALS RAISING SAME ISSUES AFTER DECIDING ONE
Where issues for determination based on the same or very similar facts arise in sister appeals, as in this case, the proper step for the Court of Appeal after deciding one of the appeals, is to pronounce on the merits of the sister appeal by adopting and transporting therein its reasoning and conclusions reached on the issues for determination in the other appeal, and not to strike out the other appeal. In this case, the Court of Appeal should not have struck out the appellant’s appeal. (Pp. 399-401, paras. B-B)
BAGUDU V. KYAUTA (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 379 S.C
ON POWER OF SUPREME COURT TO MAKE ORDER COURT OF APPEAL SHOULD HAVE MADE
Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act, 1960 entitles the Supreme Court, in appropriate cases, to make an order which the Court of Appeal would have made. A pronouncement on the merits of the appellant’s appeal to the Court of Appeal on the strength of the reasoning and conclusions reached by the Court of Appeal in the sister appeal is one that the Supreme Court can make in the circumstances of this case under its powers in section 22 of the Supreme Court Act. In the circumstance, the order of the Court of Appeal striking out the appeal of the appellant is set aside and an order dismissing the appeal on the merits is made in its stead. [Nishizawa v. Jethwani (1984) 12 SC 234; Macaulay v. NAL Merchant Bank Ltd. (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 144) 283; Otogbolu v. Okeluwa (1981) 6-7 SC 99; A.-G., Oyo State v. Fairlakes Hotel Ltd. (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt. 92) 1; Jallco Ltd v. Owoniboys Technical Services Ltd. (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 391) 534; G & C Lines v. Hengrace (Nig.) Ltd. (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt. 711) 51 referred to.] (P. 401, paras. E-B)
BAGUDU V BALKISU [2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 317 S.C
ON ROLE OF APPELLATE COURTS UNDER ISLAMIC LAW AND PROCEDURE
The role of appellate courts in appeals based on Islamic law is different from the role of such courts under the common law system. Thus, under Islamic law, unlike the position under the common law system, the appellate courts are not restricted to the grounds or issues raised by the parties before them. At the appellate stage, the appeal court can re-hear or re-try the case in whole or in part. [Dauda v. Asabe (1998) 1 NWLR (Pt. 532) 102; Danja v. Danj (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt. 550) 467; Nasi v. Haruna (2002) 2 NWLR (Pt. 750) 240 referred to.] (P. 360, paras. G-H)
C.B.N. V. OCHIFE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 1
ON WHAT SUPREME COURT DECIDED IN C.B.N. V. INTERSTELLA COMMUNICATIONS LTD (2018) 7 NWLR (PT. 1618) 294 AND RATIONALE THEREFOR
The conclusions of the Supreme Court in C.B.N. v. Interstella Communications Ltd (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 294 are that:
(a) Where the office of the Attorney General of the Federation had been involved in arriving at a consent judgment between the parties, the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation is taken as given to garnishee proceedings.
(b) Where the Attorney General of the Federation or of a State is the judgment debtor, then the requirement that the judgment creditor should seek the consent of its debtor cannot be in consonant with the rule of law.
(c) Where the Attorney General of the Federation is merely a neutral/nominal party in the transactions and proceedings giving rise to the application for garnishee order nisi, and he not being the debtor, the case comes within the purview of section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act.
(d) Where the cause of action is a judgment debt for which a garnishee order is being sought, and the Central Bank of Nigeria is a party to the garnishee proceedings, the Central Bank of Nigeria merely stands as a banker to the Federal Government funds with respect to the government funds in its custody and not as a public officer in such a situation.
(e) The Central Bank of Nigeria is ordinarily a “public officer”. But within the context of section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, it may not be regarded as a public officer if the relationship between the Central Bank of Nigeria and the judgment debtor is nothing more than a banker/customer relationship.
In other words, the decision did not change the meaning of a “public officer” as interpreted in Ibrahim v. J.S.C. (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1.
(f) There was no need to seek the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation in the peculiar circumstances of the case.
The Supreme Court specially explained severally that the facts of the case was the basis of its judgment.
The decision of the Supreme Court was shaped by the peculiar circumstances of the case and the need to enforce the enthronement of substantial justice to ensure that the State did not renege on its obligations voluntarily entered into by hiding behind section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act.
In effect, neither party in this case could claim victory based on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case.
(Pp. 107-111, paras B-E)
C.B.N. V. OCHIFE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 1
ON NEED TO SEEK AND OBTAIN CONSENT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL BEFORE COMMENCING GARNISHEE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
It is a condition precedent that before a court can be conferred with jurisdiction to determine any garnishee proceedings against the government, the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation must first be sought and obtained before the said proceeding is initiated. [C.B.N. v. Jay Jay (2020) LPELR 52290; Fayose v. EFCC (2018) LPELR 4647; Ode v. A.-G., Benue State (2011) LPELR 4774; University of Calabar Teaching Hospital v. Lizikon Nig. Ltd. (2017) LPELR 42339; Onjewu v. K.D.M.C.I. (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt. 827) 40; C.B.N. v. Interstella Communications Ltd. (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 294 referred to.] (P. 114, paras. C-E)
C.B.N. V. OCHIFE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 1
ON WHETHER RESPONDENT’S NOTICE TO AFFIRM JUDGMENT ON OTHER GROUNDS CAN BE FILED AT SUPREME COURT
There is no provision for the filing of a respondent’s notice at the Supreme Court. Therefore, where a respondent supports the judgment of the Court of Appeal, but wants it affirmed on other grounds than those relied on by the Court of Appeal, the respondent can only file a cross appeal.
(P. 75, paras. E-F)
C.B.N. V. OCHIFE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 1
ON WHETHER PRIOR CONSENT OF ANY AUTHORITY APART FROM COURTS IS REQUIRED UNDER 1999 CONSTITUTION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF DECISIONS OF COURTS
Section 287 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides that:
(a) The decisions of the Supreme Court shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons, and by courts with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Supreme Court.
(b) The decisions of the Court of Appeal shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons, and by courts with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Court of Appeal.
(c) The decisions of the Federal High Court, a High Court and of all other courts established by this Constitution shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons, and by other courts of law with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Federal High Court, a High Court and those other courts, respectively.
In effect, section 251(4) of the 1979 Constitution (as modified by Decree 107) was removed from the 1999 Constitution or was deliberately never inserted in section 287 of the 1999 Constitution, which is the corresponding provision to section 251 of the 1979 Constitution (as modified).
This is so because the legislators of the 1999 Constitution perceived that the provisions of the subsection of the 1979 Constitution (as modified) were a vestige of military rule and colonialism.
This means that the law is as it was before Decree No. 107 was promulgated.
(Pp. 124–125, paras. E–B)
C.B.N. V. OCHIFE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 1
ON NEED FOR ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION TO BE FORMULATED FROM GROUNDS OF APPEAL AGAINST RATIO DECIDENDI OF LOWER COURT’S DECISION
An issue for determination in an appeal and the arguments canvassed under it must be predicated upon and be directed at the ratio decidendi of the decision of the court appealed against.
Where an issue for determination does not arise from and or is not directed at the ratio decidendi of the judgment appealed against, it is incompetent and liable to be struck out.
In this case, the Court of Appeal did not make a finding on the status of the appellant, whether it is a public officer or not, in resolving the issue of failure to obtain the fiat of the Attorney General of the Federation. Therefore, the first issue for determination formulated by the 1st respondent was not related to the findings made by the Court of Appeal in its judgment. The issue for determination was incompetent and deserved to be struck out along with the arguments canvassed on it.
[Archianga v. A.-G., Akwa Ibom State (2015) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1454) 1; Omoniyi v. Alabi (2015) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1456) 572; Olawoye v. State (2023) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1867) 1; Ironbar v. Federal Mortgage Finance Ltd. (2024) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1952) 275; Atanda v. Comm., Land and Housing, Kwara State (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1599) 32; Tabansi v. Tabansi (2018) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1651) 279; Ugwu v. State (2020) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1746) 1 referred to.] (Pp. 76-77, paras. G-D)
AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC v. N.D.I.C. (2025) 12 NWLR (Pt. 2000) 453
ON WHETHER COURT CAN ADDRESS SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES DURING INTERLOCUTORY OR PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS
Courts must not address substantive issues during interlocutory or preliminary proceedings. Since interlocutory applications are usually dealt with before the substantive suit, the law is that a court should not say anything at that stage of the proceedings that would jeopardize the just and proper determination of the suit after the trial.
In the instant case, at the time the respondents filed their objections, the trial court was concerned solely with the parties involved in the suit and the allegations made against them. The appellants contended that the actions of the respondents were ultra vires and void, and that the trial court was required to consider the following key factors:
(a) Who were the parties to the proceedings? (the appellants, the NDIC, AMCON, and Skye Bank).
(b) What was the complaint therein? (that the actions of the respondents, allegedly carried out without the authorization of CBN, were null and void).
The Supreme Court held that whether the authorization by the CBN was indeed required was a matter that goes to the merits of the case and could only be resolved after a full trial. Also, if the trial court had issued an order allowing the appellants to rely on the leave granted in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1286/2009, it would have, by implication, preemptively determined that the involvement of the CBN was mandatory in the respondents’ actions. Such a determination would effectively establish a privity between the CBN and the respondents. However, that was a substantive issue that the trial court could not validly adjudicate at the interlocutory stage. Any tacit resolution of that question at such an early stage would have been contrary to the principles governing preliminary and interlocutory proceedings.
[Agwu v. Julius Berger (Nig.) Plc (2019) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1682) 165 referred to.]
(Pp. 475-476, paras. F-C)
AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC v. N.D.I.C. (2025) 12 NWLR (Pt. 2000) 453
ON NEED FOR LEAVE TO BRING ACTION ON BEHALF OF A COMPANY
By virtue of section 303(1) of CAMA 2004, subject to subsection 2 of the section, an applicant may apply to the court for leave to bring an action in the name and on behalf of a company, or to intervene in an action to which the company is a party for the purpose of prosecuting, defending, or discontinuing the action on behalf of the company.
In the instant case, the appellants’ case was irredeemably incompetent by reason of failure to fulfil a condition precedent — that is, seeking and obtaining leave to commence a derivative action.
(Pp. 476, paras. F-G; 478, para. H)
AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC v. N.D.I.C. (2025) 12 NWLR (Pt. 2000) 453
ON PURPOSE OF REQUIRING LEAVE TO INSTITUTE AN ACTION
A critical purpose of requiring leave is to ensure that only reasonable and viable causes of action are permitted to proceed before the courts. If one instance of leave were to serve as an unrestricted license to initiate any and all subsequent claims, even the most frivolous and unfounded actions could exploit the earlier leave, thereby overwhelming the judicial system. Such an outcome is untenable and inconsistent with the principles of judicial economy and prudence.
Per NWOSU-IHEME, J.S.C. at page 477, paras. C-E:
“Regarding the appellants’ contention that they acquired a vested right through Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1286/2009, I must unequivocally reject this proposition. My preceding explanations regarding the limitations of the leave obtained in that suit suffice to negate any argument for the acquisition of vested rights. Even if the appellants did possess a vested right, it would pertain solely to the specific subject matter of Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1286/2009, which remains distinct and separate from the issues in the present suit.”
AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC v. N.D.I.C. (2025) 12 NWLR (Pt. 2000) 453
ON WHETHER LEAVE GRANTED IN A SUIT INVOLVING A PARTICULAR PARTY CAN BE EXTENDED TO OTHER DISTINCT INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN DISTINCT SUITS
The law does not extend leave granted in a suit involving a particular party to other distinct individuals involved in distinct suits, even if they are under the employ or control of that party. Such an approach would undermine the very purpose of requiring leave for derivative actions, leading to unintended consequences.
(P. 475, paras. D-E)
Per NWOSU-IHEME, J.S.C. at pages 474-475, paras. G-D:
“The claims, reliefs, and issues involved in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1286/2009 directly concerned the CBN and its alleged unlawful interference in the affairs of the 1st appellant. However, the current suit is directed at the NDIC, AMCON, and Skye Bank — the respondents.
While the actions of the CBN were challenged in the earlier suit, the present suit challenges the actions of the respondents. Although the appellants contend that their case indirectly involves the CBN as the express authorization of CBN is a condition precedent for the actions of the respondents, it is crucial to recognize that the controversy in this action does not directly challenge the involvement or actions of the CBN itself.
This distinction is critical in the determination of the central issue herein which requires careful analysis.
The appellants argue that due to the direct relationship between the validity of the respondents’ actions and their supposed authorization by the CBN, the issues posed in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1286/2009 must, by implication, extend to the present suit and carry over the leave granted in the earlier action.
While this argument may seem logical, it is important to appreciate that the invalidity of the respondents’ actions based on the absence of CBN authorization can only be established at the conclusion of a full trial on the merits.
If, after trial, it is determined that the respondents’ actions are not necessarily contingent upon CBN authorization, can the leave granted in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1286/2009 be considered validly transferred to the present suit? I strongly believe not.”
AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC v. N.D.I.C. (2025) 12 NWLR (Pt. 2000) 453
ON NEED FOR LEAVE AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT IN DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
Companies and Allied Matters Act clearly provides that derivative actions must be instituted with leave of court, and this makes the requirement of leave in derivative actions a condition precedent and therefore, a substantive matter of law that goes to the jurisdiction of the court.
The condition of leave in derivative actions being a legal provision and a condition precedent to instituting any derivative legal action does not merely affect the procedural jurisdiction of the court but its substantive jurisdiction.
It is one of the conditions bestowing jurisdiction on the court that the suit be brought by due process. A defect against the condition of the substantive legal provision which requires leave for derivative action is a defect against the substantive jurisdiction of the court, and has the effect of rendering the proceeding conducted therein incompetent because substantive jurisdiction cannot be waived.
[Adeogun-Phillips v. Gateway Portland Cement Ltd (2024) LPELR-62108 referred to.]
(P. 481, paras. A-H)
Per NWOSU-IHEME, J.S.C. at pages 481-482, paras. H-E:
“The appellants in the present appeal conceded that they did not apply for and/or obtain leave of court before commencing the present action, which they also agree is a derivative action.
Their contention was that the leave they obtained in earlier derivative action against the Central Bank of Nigeria in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1286/2009 should be transported and allowed to abide in the present action.
This is because, according to the counsel to the appellants, the leave of court they obtained in the earlier action conferred on them a vested right to maintain their present claims, given that the earlier suit remained unresolved.
Without engaging with the allusion to “vested right” to maintain an action made by the counsel to the appellants, it is commonsensical that whatever vested right claimed can and will only be in respect of the claims in the earlier action, Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1286/2009, and not in the present action.
The causes of action and the parties in the earlier action and in the present action are completely different and not similar in any material particular.
The earlier action challenged the right of the Central Bank of Nigeria to interfere in the operations and governance of the first appellant, while the present action questions the revocation of the operating banking license of the first appellant and the consequent takeover of its operations and management by the first and second respondents, preparatory to its liquidation.
The first and second respondents were not parties to the earlier action and the Central Bank of Nigeria is not a party to this present action. The contention of the counsel to the appellants on the transferring of the leave obtained in the earlier action to this present action is thus completely baseless.
The two lower courts were correct in their findings that the present action is incompetent.’’
C.B.N. V. ADANI MEGA SYSTEM LTD. (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 179
DETERMINING FORUM FOR ADJUDICATION OF DISPUTE ARISING FROM CONTRACT WITH STATUTORY FLAVOUR
Where there is a dispute arising from a contract regulated by statute, it is the statute itself that will determine the forum in which the aggrieved party will ventilate its grievance.
It is the law or statute that would be considered to determine the forum where such complaint could be filed.
In the instant case, having regard to the agreement of the parties that led to the execution of exhibit PL3 (build, operate and own agreement) for the provision of scanning services infrastructure required for pre-shipment inspection of all in-bound and out-bound cargo as prescribed by Nigerian law, the contract was not an ordinary simple contract, but one that had statutory flavour.
In other words, it was a contract regulated by statute — the provisions of Pre-shipment Inspection of Import Act and Pre-shipment Inspection of Export Act.
By virtue of section 20(3) of Pre-Shipment Inspection of Exports Act Cap. 25 Laws of the Federation, 2004 and section 9(2) of Pre-shipment Inspection of Imports Act Cap. 26 Laws of the Federation 2004, every proceeding under the Act shall, subject to the applicable procedure, be commenced at the Federal High Court and any reference in the Act to court shall be construed accordingly.
Thus, those Acts conferred jurisdiction on the Federal High Court to entertain the suit.
And, “every proceedings” in those Acts refer to any proceedings, whether civil or criminal.
(Pp. 208, paras. B-E; 210, paras. C-G)
C.B.N. V. ADANI MEGA SYSTEM LTD. (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 179
ON PROCEDURE FOR TAKING ORAL EVIDENCE AND TENDERING OF DOCUMENTS AT FEDERAL HIGH COURT
Under the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019, documents are pleaded and frontloaded.
Facts relating to documents are pleaded and evidence given in a written statement on oath.
Once it is adopted and tendered in court, it becomes the plaintiff’s evidence in chief.
After laying foundation for the admissibility of the documents in some cases, the witness is not allowed to give fresh evidence in chief with respect to those documents pleaded in the statement of claim, because the facts relating to these documents are already pleaded.
In this case, facts relating to the documents admitted in evidence as exhibits P1 to P19 were pleaded in the respondent’s amended statement of claim and evidence was led in the respondent’s witness written statement on oath.
Thus, the appellant’s complaint that the respondent’s witness dumped exhibits PL1 to PL19 on the trial court without relating them to its case was not correct as it was at liberty to cross-examine respondent’s witness and elicit evidence from him as regard the relevance of these documents in the case.
The appellant did cross-examine PW1 on those documents.
The Supreme Court decisions in A.C.N. v. Nyako (2015) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1491) 352; Audu v. INEC (2010) 13 NWLR (Pt.1212) 456; APGA v. Al-Makura (2016) 5 NWLR (Pt.1505) 316; Omisore v. Aregbesola (2015) 15 NWLR (Pt.1482) 205; ACN v. Lamido (2012) 8 NWLR (Pt.1303) 560; Jalingo v. Nyame (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt.231) 538; Ucha v. Elechi (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1317) 330 relied upon by the appellant were cited out of context because those decisions arose from election petitions that did not interpret the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019 that regulated proceedings at the Federal High Court.
However, in a criminal matter where documents are not frontloaded, a witness cannot dump documents on the trial court, but must speak to the documents in evidence.
(Pp. 221-222, paras. E-F)
C.B.N. V. OCHIFE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 1
ON WHEN PROPER FOR COURT OF APPEAL TO DECIDE ON MERIT OF CASE INSTEAD OF REMITTING IT TO TRIAL COURT
The Court of Appeal can rely on section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act and Order 20 Rule 11 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2016 to ensure that where it will not cause miscarriage of justice to any party and in suitable circumstances, the Court of Appeal acts quickly to decide the merit of the case between the parties because that is what enthrones justice.
In this case, the Court of Appeal rightly acted under the provisions of the Act and its Rules to decide the substantive garnishee application after it found that the trial court erred by holding that the affidavit to show cause was filed by the appellant out of time and that the appellant was not entitled to a hearing on the substantive application.
(Pp. 144-145, paras. E-F)
EGWU V. ANUMENE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 329
ON WHEN COURT CAN DECLARE TITLE TO LAND IN FAVOUR OF DEFENDANT
The court will not declare title in favour of the defendant except where he has filed a counter-claim. For a defendant to get title, he must prove it where the action of a plaintiff seeking declaration of title is dismissed.
Such dismissal, in the absence of a successful counter-claim by the defendant, does not amount to a declaration of any right to the defendant. Therefore, where a plaintiff claims title to land and the court dismisses his claim for failing to prove title, the defendant who has not counter-claimed for declaration of title to the same land does not automatically become entitled to the land.
[Owhonda v. Ekpechi (2003) 17 NWLR (Pt. 849) 326; Ayanru v. Mandilas Ltd. (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 462; Pada v. Galadima (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1607) 436 referred to.]
(Pp. 376–377, paras. G-B)
EGWU V. ANUMENE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 329
ON BINDINGNESS OF PLEADINGS ON PARTIES AND COURT
Civil cases are decided on the pleadings. Therefore, parties are bound by their pleadings.
Accordingly, any evidence led on facts not pleaded, will go to no issue. A claimant will rise or fall on the strength of his pleadings and evidence led in support thereof. Once pleadings are ordered, filed and exchanged, the parties and the courts are bound by the pleadings so filed. It therefore follows remorselessly that, evidence must be led in accordance with the pleadings. Evidence led not in conformity with the pleadings, and/or upon facts not pleaded, went to no issue.
[Airoe & C.E. Co. Ltd. v. University of Benin (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 2) 287; Chukuwumah v. Shell Petroleum (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512; Jiaza v. Bamigbose (1999) 7 NWLR (Pt. 610) 182; Nsirim v. Onuma Const. Co. (Nig.) Ltd. (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt.713) 742; Soyanya v. Onadeko (2005) 4 NWLR (Pt.926) 185; Eze v. Atasie (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 676) 470 referred to.]
(P. 380, paras. C-G)
MUHAMMAD V. UMARU (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 301
ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE AT TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS UNDER ISLAMIC LAW
Within the noble tradition of Islamic law, both the trial and appellate courts are not confined by the limitations of the grounds or issues presented by the parties. In their pursuit of justice, these courts are called upon to transcend the narrow boundaries of partisan arguments, guided instead by the immutable and universal principles that govern the case.
The court’s sacred duty is to weave the threads of justice into a fabric that reflects the truth of the matter regardless of whether every thread has been articulated by the parties.
The Judge is thus not a passive observer but an active agent of justice, endowed with the wisdom to apply the relevant law in its most complete and equitable form. This ensures that justice is not constricted by human limitations but is elevated to its highest ideal.
In this regard, the Islamic Law Court, especially the appellate court, is entrusted with the responsibility of examining the entire case, seeking the true essence of justice irrespective of any technicalities that may arise.
It is neither mandatory nor necessary for the court to rely solely on the notice and grounds of appeal at any stage, as long as there are sufficient materials upon which a just decision can be made. In the instant case, the Court of Appeal had clearly indicated that despite the error in the filing of the proper notice of appeal, both the appellant and the respondent proceeded to prepare their respective briefs of argument based on the ground of appeal and presented them to the court accordingly.
It was only fitting, then, to conclude that both parties before the Court of Appeal, were fully aware of the part of the judgment being contested and had addressed the court in line with that understanding.
What more could justice, the cardinal principle of Islamic law, require in such circumstances?
The Supreme Court was of the firm view that the Court of Appeal’s decision was well-founded.
(PP. 317-318, Paras. D-A)
MUHAMMAD V. UMARU (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 301
ON OATH PROCEDURE IN PROOF OF CLAIM UNDER ISLAMIC LAW
In the Maliki School, a nuanced approach is adopted. If the defendant refuses the oath, the Judge turns the oath back to the plaintiff who may then swear, and the judgment is delivered based on this refusal and coupled with the plaintiff’s oath. This principle is rooted in the timeless principles of fairness and equity, ensuring that the refusal of the defendant does not hinder the pursuit of justice. In the instant appeal, the Upper Sharia Court of Wurno, guided by this established rule, held that the defendant’s refusal to take an oath necessitated a return of the oath to the plaintiff who then swore in court.
The Sharia Court of Appeal upheld this decision, recognizing the Judge’s adherence to established legal principles.
However, the Court of Appeal overturned this judgment on the grounds that the respondent was not adequately informed of the consequences of his refusal to swear an oath.
Thus, that judgment brought the matter before the Supreme Court.
(P. 320, Paras. C-G)
MAHAMMAD V. UMARU (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 301
ON OATH PROCEDURE IN PROOF OF CLAIM UNDER ISLAMIC LAW
The jurists of the Maliki School, the applicable legal framework in this region, have deliberated on whether the defendant must be informed of the consequences of refusing the oath. There exist two distinct views – one asserts that such a notification is recommended, but not obligatory, while the other maintains that the failure to inform the defendant does not invalidate the judgment. The first view asserts that it is appropriate for the Judge to explain the ruling on the refusal of an oath by saying to the defendant, ‘If you refuse to take the oath, you will forfeit the claim made against you.’
And this, and Allah knows best, is recommended for someone who fears ignorance of the ruling on the refusal of the oath.
If the refusal is completed by either verbally stating it or abstaining from taking the oath, as mentioned previously, then if afterward the person says, ‘I am willing to swear,’ it will not be accepted from him, nor will it bind his opponent unless the opponent agrees. This is similar to a situation where a witness testifies in favour of someone with a right, and the person refuses to swear with the witness and denies the oath for the claim.
Then if he changes his mind and desires to swear, he is not allowed to do so.
The Judge should clarify the ruling. It is appropriate for the Judge to present the oath to the defendant and explain the ruling on refusing (nukul).
What becomes apparent from the foregoing is that some of the jurists of the Maliki School, as expressed in their esteemed works, regard informing the respondent of the consequences of his refusal to swear an oath as a recommended practice, though not mandatory. Failure to do so does not, in their view, invalidate the judgment rendered by the Judge.
However, a contrasting view is found within other scholarly texts where some jurists elevate the informing of the respondent about the consequences of his refusal to take the oath to a condition precedent for the admissibility of the returned oath to the plaintiff.
The Judge must clarify to the defendant the consequence of refusal to take an oath; he should inform the defendant, in an investigative matter that:
“If you refuse to take an oath, the plaintiff shall swear and be entitled to what he claims.”
In the case of an accusation: “If you refuse, the plaintiff shall be entitled to what he accuses you of simply due to your refusal.”
This clarification is a condition for the validity of the judgment, just as the warning is a condition in its proper context. In the instant case, the Supreme Court was of the view that, the Maliki school of thought, which forms the applicable Islamic law in Nigeria, does not establish a definitive or binding position on this matter.
Consequently, the Supreme Court was inclined to hold that the determination is best left to the discretion of the presiding Judge. If the Judge is firmly convinced that the defendant is unaware of the implications of refusing to take an oath (nukul), it becomes incumbent upon the Judge, in such circumstances, to inform the defendant of the consequences of refusing to take an oath (nukul). However, in the absence of such a belief, it is not obligatory for the Judge to provide this information.
In the circumstances, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that the learned trial Judge had used his discretion not to warn the respondent on the implication of not taking an oath, therefore, this discretion should not be interfered with by the Supreme Court.
(Pp. 320-323, paras. H-E)
MUHAMMAD V. UMARU (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 301
ON OATH PROCEDURE IN PROOF OF CLAIM UNDER ISLAMIC LAW
The condition precedent for administering oath under the majority views of the Maliki School of thought stated that notification of the consequences of refusing to take an oath is recommendable and not compulsory, as the Islamic law has given the Judge enormous discretion to deal with the circumstances of administering an oath of rebuttal as a form of evidence accordingly.
It was stated under the Islamic Legal Maxim that the onus of proving an allegation is upon the plaintiff and if the plaintiff fails to prove the allegation by calling credible witnesses, then the defendant will take the oath to rebut the claim against him.
Also, before an oath is administered a transaction between the contending parties must be established or where the witnesses could not be able to substantiate upon the subject matter but has presented a prima facie case linking the parties before the Court of a particular transaction (i.e Huldha).
In the instant case, the appellants could not discharge the burden to prove their claim by calling credible witnesses, the respondent in the instant appeal who denied the claim was informed if he could take the oath of rebuttal and he disagreed.
The oath was reverted to the appellants which they did and judgment was delivered in their favour. This principle was reaffirmed by the Islamic legal jurisprudence under the Maliki School of thought that if the defendant declined to swear to clear himself, the oath could be given to the plaintiff and if the plaintiff takes the oath, he gets judgment in his favour, but if he declines as did the defendant, his claim will be dismissed as his refusal confirms the position of the plaintiff.
[Soda v. Kwinga (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt. 261) 632 referred to.]
(Pp. 325-326, paras. D-C)
MUHAMMAD V. UMARU (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 301
ON PURPOSE OF NOTICE OF APPEAL AND EFFECT OF CHALLENGE TO COMPETENCE OF SAME
Any challenge to the competence of a notice of appeal is a challenge to the competence of that appeal. It is imperative to recognize that the purpose of the notice of appeal is to inform the parties of the specific aspect of the lower court’s judgment that will be contested.
Once the contested portion of the judgment becomes clear to all the parties involved, the notice of appeal may lose some of its perceived importance. The notice of appeal assumes its true significance as a reflective lens through which the court peers into the heart of the appeal. These grounds are not mere formalities but serve as an initial inquiry into the merits of the case, offering a preliminary glimpse into its potential trajectory.
While they do not solely determine the appeal’s outcome, they act as a beacon, guiding the court toward a deeper examination of the case.
(P. 315, paras. F-H)
MUHAMMAD V. UMARU (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 301
ON RULES GUIDING FORMULATION OF GROUNDS OF APPEAL
The rules of our appellate procedure relating to formulation of grounds of appeal are prima rily designed to ensure fairness to the other side. The application of such rules should not be reduced to a matter of mere technicality whereby the court will look at the form rather than the substance.
The prime purpose of the rules of appellate procedure, both Supreme Court and in the Court of Appeal, that the appellant shall file a notice of appeal which set forth concisely the grounds which he intends to rely upon on the appeal and that such grounds should not be vague or general in terms and must disclose a reasonable ground of appeal, is to give sufficient notice, an information to the other side of nature of the complaint of the appellant and consequently of the issues that are likely to arise on the appeal. Any ground of appeal that satisfies that purpose should not be struck out notwithstanding, that it did not conform to a particular form. Thus, while the drafting of the notice of appeal and the eloquence of the grounds is significant, they should not be allowed to diminish the appeal’s intrinsic competence. The true essence of the appeal, its merit, transcends the imperfections of the technicalities in the process.
The appeal must be assessed through the lens of judicial inquiry, guided by the spirit of justice. The court’s task is not merely to examine the technicalities of language but to delve into the substantive issues on hand, ensuring that the appeal is adjudicated on its true merit, unclouded by formalistic flaws.
[Achonu v. Okuwobi (2017) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1584) 142 referred to.]
(Pp. 316-317, paras. D-C)
NWIZI V. OKE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 589
ON TREATMENT OF DECISION OF COURT ON ISSUE RAISED SUO MOTU WITHOUT HEARING THE PARTIES
The failure to allow a party to address on an issue raised suo motu does not automatically necessitate a reversal of judgment unless it results in a miscarriage of justice. This perspective maintains that unless the appellant demonstrates how the denial affected the outcome, it should not invalidate the decision.
However, the importance of address of counsel cannot be undermined, especially where the document in question forms a crucial part of the judgment of the trial court.
[Effiom v. C.R.S.I.E.C. (2010) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1213) 106 referred to.]
(P. 618, paras. C–E)
NWIZI V. OKE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 589
ON WHEN APPELLATE COURT WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH FINDINGS OF FACTS OF A LOWER COURT
In the instant case, there was no justifiable basis to interfere with the factual determinations and evidentiary conclusions reached by the lower court. The decision was founded on a careful consideration of both the direct and circumstantial evidence. The testimonies provided by witnesses, including DW3, DW4, and the traditional ruler Eze Amadi, were rightly evaluated and balanced against the contradictory claims of the appellant. The appellant’s failure to convincingly demonstrate possession or ownership, coupled with the community’s adherence to customary practices, was fatal to the case of the appellant, and by extension, the instant appeal.
(P. 623, paras. A-C)
UDOH V. MIN., F.M.I.T. & INV. (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 419
ON TREATMENT OF UNCHALLENGED DEPOSITIONS IN AN AFFIDAVIT
In the instant case, the appellant did not join issues with the 2nd respondent by filing further or reply affidavit with respect to the depositions in paragraphs 15 and 17 of the 2nd respondent’s counter affidavit in opposition to the appellant’s amended originating summons to the effect that the Companies Regulation was meant to promote ease of doing business.
Therefore, the findings of the trial court that amendment of the Companies Regulation was meant to promote ease of doing business were supported by evidence before the trial court.
The trial court was enjoined to act on it because it was not challenged by the appellant.
Thus, the trial court did not act on any extraneous matter. The findings of the trial court were in line with the evidence adduced by parties before it. The counter affidavit of the 2nd respondent was not abandoned.
(P. 446, paras. C-H)
C.B.N. V. OCHIFE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 1
ON DUTY ON APPELLATE COURT TO SET ASIDE A PERVERSE DECISION OF LOWER COURT
An appellate court is enjoined and obligated to set aside a perverse decision of a lower court.
[Ekpenyong v. Nyong (1975) 2 SC 71; C. D. C. (Nig.) Ltd. v. SCOA (Nigeria) Ltd. (2007) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1030) 300; State v. Solomon (2021) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1793) 301 referred to.]
(P. 92, paras. C-D)
EGWU V. ANUMENE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 329
ON HOW CASES ARE DECIDED BY TRIAL COURT
Under the Nigerian adversarial system of jurisprudence, cases are decided on preponderance of evidence based on what the court regards as the credibility of each of the witnesses called by both sides. It is only the trial court who saw and watched the demeanour of the witnesses under the fire of cross examination that can determine their credibility. In the instant case, it appeared that the Court of Appeal usurped the duties of the trial court and set aside its judgment by reevaluating the evidence on record based on the credibility of witnesses which evaluation was detrimental to the case of the appellant. That amounted to a misdirection in law.
(Pp. 386-387, paras. H-B)
[2025] 12 NWLR 349
EGWU V. ANUMENE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 329
ON DUTY ON CLAIMANT FOR DECLARATION OF TITLE TO LAND TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF LAND IN DISPUTE
In every action for declaration of title to land, especially where there are two competing claims of title to the land in dispute, the issue of identity of the land becomes paramount.
Therefore, where the identity of the land is not ascertained, no declaration can be made as the court cannot make an order in vacuum. It is therefore the duty of the person who seeks the declaration to first prove the identity of the land with certainty and or exactitude.
The onus therefore lies on the party claiming title to satisfy the court that he is, on the evidence adduced by him, entitled to the declaration to the particular parcel or piece of land which he claims. In doing so, he must rely on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence.
[Owhonda v. Ekpechi (2003) 17 NWLR (Pt. 849) 326; Ofigo v. Ezeoke (2019) LPELR-46953; Gbadamosi v. Dairo (2007) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1021) 282; Ogedengbe v. Balogun (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1039) 380; Kolo v. Lawan (2018) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1637) 495 referred to.]
(Pp. 360–361, paras. F-A)
HERITAGE BANK LTD .v. MEENS NIGERIA LTD. (2025) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1994) 321 (SC)
ON WHEN SUPREME COURT WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF FACTS BY LOWER COURTS
The Supreme Court is loath to set aside concurrent findings of facts by the lower courts where they have not occasioned miscarriage of justice.
In this case, the concurrent findings of facts and conclusions of law by the trial court and the Court of Appeal are consistent, legally sound, and cannot be faulted. There is no perversity in them. Therefore, the Supreme Court will not interfere.
[Jime v. Hembe (2023) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1899) 463; Okoli v. Morecab Finance (Nig.) Ltd. (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1053) 37; Durosaro v. Ayorinde (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt. 927) 407; Ayeni v. Adesina (2007) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1033) 233 referred to.]
(Pp. 375-376, paras. G-B)
HERITAGE BANK LTD .v. MEENS NIGERIA LTD. (2025) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1994) 321 (SC)
ON WHO CAN SIGN COURT PROCESS AS A LEGAL PRACTITIONER IN NIGERIA AND WHETHER COURT PROCESS SIGNED IN THE NAME OF A LAW FIRM IS COMPETENT
The provisions of sections 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act have been construed to the effect that:
- A legal practitioner is one that is contemplated by the combined provisions of the sections.
- For a court process (especially an originating process) to be valid, it must be signed by the legal practitioner who franked it.
- A court process not signed by a legal practitioner, but signed by a firm of legal practitioners, is indelibly incompetent and liable to be struck out by the court.
This is so because the incompetence ousts the court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate over the action.
[Regd. Trustees, The Apostolic Church v. Akindele (1967) SCNLR 205; Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 52; Oketade v. Adewunmi (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1195) 63; SLB Consortium Ltd. v. N.N.P.C. (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1252) 317; Const. Res. (Nig.) Ltd. v. U.B.A. Plc (2011) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1274) 592; Okonkwo v. U.B.A. Plc (2011) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1274) 614; Bala v. Dikko (2013) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1343) 52; Braithwaite v. Skye Bank Plc (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1346) 1; F.B.N. Plc v. Maiwada (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1348) 444; Alawiye v. Ogunsanya (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1348) 570; Min., W & T., Adamawa State v. Yakubu (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1351) 481; Okarika v. Samuel (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1352) 19; Nigerian Army v. Samuel (2013) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1375) 466; Dankwambo v. Abubakar (2016) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1495) 157; S.P.D.C.N. Ltd. v. Sam Royal Hotel (Nig.) Ltd. (2016) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1514) 318; Tanimu v. Rabiu (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1610) 505; B.O.I. Ltd. v. Awojugbagbe Light Ind. Ltd. (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt 1615) 220; Heritage Bank Ltd. v. Bentworth Finance (Nig.) Ltd. (2018) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1625) 420; B.L.L.S. Co. Ltd. v. M.V. Western Star (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1678) 489; Yusuf v. Mobil Oil (Nig.) Plc (2019) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1689) 374; Salami v. Muse (2019) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1689) 301; Alikor v. Ogwo (2019) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1695) 331; Yusuf v. Mobil Oil (Nig.) Plc (2020) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1710) 1; JVCPP (UK) Ltd. v. Famiyide (2020) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1744) 334; Ajibode v. Gbadamosi (2021) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1776) 475; Solumade v. Kuti (2022) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1810) 31 referred to.]
(Pp. 359-360, paras. H-G)
HERITAGE BANK LTD .v. MEENS NIGERIA LTD. (2025) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1994) 321 (SC)
ON WHEN DECISION OF A SUPREME COURT CAN BE SET ASIDE
The Supreme Court has inherent jurisdiction to set aside its judgment in appropriate/specific circumstances:
(a) When the judgment is obtained by fraud or deceit.
(b) When the judgment is a nullity, such as when the court itself was not competent.
(c) When the court was misled into giving judgment under the mistaken belief that the parties had consented to it.
(d) When judgment was given without jurisdiction.
(e) When the procedure adopted was such as to deprive the decision or judgment of the character of a legitimate adjudication.
None of these conditions exist in this case, as to warrant the setting aside of the Supreme Court’s previous decision. Hence, the appellant’s invitation to the Supreme Court to depart from and set aside its previous judgment in Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 52 was refused.
[Aladegbemi v. Fasanmade (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 81) 129; Igwe v. Kalu (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt. 787) 435; Akaninwo v. Nsirim (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1093) 439; A.-G., Fed. v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt. 618) 187 referred to.]
(P. 365, paras. C-G)
HERITAGE BANK LTD .v. MEENS NIGERIA LTD. (2025) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1994) 321 (SC)
ON ATTITUDE OF SUPREME COURT TO INVITATION TO OVERRULE OR DEPART FROM ITS DECISION
The Supreme Court will not ordinarily overrule, reverse, or depart from its earlier decision unless it is shown that the previous decision was:
(a) clearly wrong;
(b) given per incuriam; or
(c) would perpetuate injustice.
The burden of proving the existence of these conditions is on the party urging the Supreme Court to depart from its earlier decision. In this case, the appellant did not discharge the burden of showing that the judgment in Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 52 fell within any of these categories.
Hence, the invitation to depart from that decision was declined.
[Odi v. Osafile (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1) 17; Rossek v. A.C.B. Ltd. (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 312) 382; Adegoke Motors Ltd. v. Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250 referred to.]
(P. 366, paras. A-D)
HERITAGE BANK LTD .v. MEENS NIGERIA LTD. (2025) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1994) 321 (SC)
ON NEED FOR FINALITY OF THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court, being the final court of the land, must strive to ensure certainty and finality in its decisions. The law cannot be uncertain. It is not in the interest of justice or public policy to have the Supreme Court’s decisions subjected to endless review or reversal.
Thus, the apex court guards its pronouncements jealously and departs from them only in the most exceptional circumstances, otherwise, the doctrine of stare decisis and the integrity of judicial precedent would be undermined.
In this case, there were no exceptional circumstances warranting a departure from the decision in Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 52.
(Pp. 366-367, paras. E-A)
NICON INSURANCE LIMITED .v. BRIGHTHOUSE ESTATE LIMITED (2025) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1993) 469
ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT
By Order 2 rule 31(1) of the Supreme Court Rules(as amended), the Supreme Court may enlarge the time provided by the Rules for the doing of anything to which the Rules apply, or may direct a departure from the Rules in any other way when that is required in the interest of justice. Provided that in any civil proceedings, such enlargement of time or departure from the Rules may be granted only in exceptional circumstances. Further, Order 2rule 31(2) of the Rules states that every application for an enlargement of time in which to appeal or in which to apply for leave to appeal shall be supported by an affidavit setting forth good and substantial reasons for the failure to appeal or to apply for leave to appeal within the prescribed period; and that there shall be exhibited or annexed to such affidavit:
a) a copy of the judgment from which it is intended to appeal;
b) a copy of other proceedings necessary to support the complaints against the judgment; and
c) grounds of appeal which prima facie shows good cause why the appeal should be heard.
And by virtue of Order 2 rule 31(3) of the Rules, when time is enlarged, a copy of the order granting such enlargement of time shall be annexed to the notice of appeal. In this case, the fact that the application relates to an arbitral award by an arbitration tribunal/arbitrator freely chosen by the parties to settle dispute(s) arising from their agreement/contract, makes the requirement for special circumstances provided for in Order 2 rule31(1) of the Supreme Court Rules (as amended)more imperative for the Supreme Court to be in a proper position to exercise its discretion judicially and judiciously as required by Law. (Pp. 484, paras.B-G; 492, paras. A-B)
NICON INSURANCE LIMITED .v. BRIGHTHOUSE ESTATE LIMITED (2025) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1993) 469
ON DISCRETIONARY NATURE OF POWER OF SUPREME COURT TO GRANT OR REFUSE EXTENSION OF TIME TO APPEAL
The Supreme Court’s grant or denial of an application for extension of time to appeal or apply for leave to appeal is subject to the judicious exercise of discretion by the court. [Amaechi v. Omehia (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1381) 417 referred to.](P. 484, para. G)
NICON INSURANCE LIMITED .v. BRIGHTHOUSE ESTATE LIMITED (2025) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1993) 469
ON CONDITIONS APPLICANT FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT MUST SATISFY TO SUCCEED
In order to succeed in an application for extension of time to appeal or apply for leave to appeal, the applicant has to show by his supporting affidavit that he has good and substantial reasons for failure to appeal or apply for leave to appeal within the prescribed period. Further, the proposed notice of appeal must have grounds of appeal that show good cause why the appeal should be heard. Therefore exceptional circumstances must be shown to warrant the grant of the application. However, the applicant is not required to show that the appeal would succeed if leave were granted. It is sufficient to show that there is an arguable appeal; that is, the grounds of appeal are not frivolous but substantial and show a clear case of either misdirection or non-direction in law or fact, or an erroneous conception of the case of the parties by the Judge, or an erroneous evaluation of evidence and erroneous findings of facts occasioning a miscarriage of justice to warrant the hearing of the appeal on those grounds. In other words, it is enough for the applicant to show a prima facie case that the court from whose decision leave to appeal is sought has committed an error of law, or has failed to exercise its discretion judicially, or has based the exercise of such discretion on wrong principles. In this case, the applicant’s grounds of appeal complained about lack of jurisdiction of the arbitrator. But it is neither apparent from the particulars of error of the grounds of appeal nor from the record of appeal that the grounds of appeal on jurisdiction are substantial. Grounds of jurisdiction should not be fanciful, but should arise from the judgment appealed against and the record of appeal. In the circumstances, the applicant’s claim of want of jurisdiction is baseless. Put in other words, the application of the applicant has neither shown any cogent materials nor coherent facts and circumstances upon which the discretion of the Supreme Court should be exercised in favour of the applicant. [Amaechi v. Omehia (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt.1381) 417; Holman Bros (Nig.) Ltd. v. Kigo (Nig.) Ltd.(1980) 8-11 SC 43 referred to.](Pp. 484-485, paras.H-F; 491, paras. B-F; 493-494, paras. H-A)
NICON INSURANCE LIMITED .v. BRIGHTHOUSE ESTATE LIMITED (2025) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1993) 469
ON DUTY ON PARTY SEEKING INTERFERENCE WITH CONCURRENT FINDINGS BY LOWER COURTS
An applicant seeking interference with concurrent findings by lower courts at the Supreme Court, must establish that the findings are perverse to warrant such an interference by the Supreme Court. In this case, the applicant did not do so. [Ude v. State (2016) 14 (Pt. 1531) 122; Kayili v. Yilbuk (2015) 7 NWLR (Pt.1457) 26; Amadi v. A.-G., Imo State (2017) 11 NWLR(Pt. 1575) 92 referred to.] (Pp. 493-494, paras. G-A
MR. FEMI ANIBABA V. DANA AIRLINES LIMITED & ANOR (2025) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1994).
On whether the respondent can challenge the decision of court appealed against without filing a cross-appeal respondent’s notice
It is improper for a respondent who is dissatisfied with the decision of a lower court to use his brief to challenge such a decision without filing a cross-appeal or a respondent’s notice. The practice is procedurally incorrect and also undermines the adversarial structure of appellate proceedings. The conventional duty of a respondent in appellate proceedings is to defend the judgment of the lower court, irrespective of personal dissatisfaction with the decision. A respondent aggrieved by the judgment of the lower court is not permitted to Challenge the judgment while maintaining the status of a respondent. [A.P.G.A. v. Oye (2024) LPELR 63986 referred to.] (P. 419, paras. B-G)
POLARIS BANK PLC (FORMERLY SKYE BANK PLC) V. MRS CAROLINE O. PINHEIRO (2025) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1994) 197
On Need for court to abstain from conjecture or speculation
The courts must abstain from mere conjecture or speculation in the determination of a case as courts of law are courts of facts and law. Thus, findings of the court must be predicated on concrete and real evidence.In the instant case, there was no such real, substantial or concrete evidence supporting the award of a weekly sum of N50,000 (Fifty Thousand Naira) to the respondent as the Court of Appeal’s award of same to the respondent was founded on speculation and thus liable to be set aside.(P. 220, paras. F-G)[2025] 9 NWLR 209
POLARIS BANK PLC (FORMERLY SKYE BANK PLC) V. MRS CAROLINE O. PINHEIRO (2025) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1994) 197
On Duty on appellate court to be cautious not to prejudice outcome of substantive matter still pending at trial court
An appellate court in its endeavor to administer justice in an appeal must be cautious not to overreach itself by prejudicing the outcome of a substantive matter still pending at the trial court.By delving into the issue of whether the respondent was entitled to the possession/control of the bulldozer, the Court of Appeal unwittingly delved into the realm of speculation which may possibly prejudice the other action still pending before another court as there was no evidence before the court on the stage of the matter.[F.R.N. v. Borisade (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1451) 155 referred to.](P. 223, paras. A-D)
MR. FEMI ANIBABA V. DANA AIRLINES LIMITED & ANOR (2025) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1994).
On When an appellate court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact by two lower courts
An appellate court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by a trial court and the Court of Appeal except where such findings are perverse or are not supported by evidence. Concurrent findings of fact are binding unless the appellant demonstrates exceptional circumstances to warrant a disturbance of the findings, such as where the findings cannot be supported by evidence or are perverse or where there is a miscarriage of justice or a violation of law or procedure. [Cameroon Airlines v. Otutuizu (2011)4 NWLR (Pt. 1238) 512 referred to.] (P. 424, paras.D-F)
MR. FEMI ANIBABA V. DANA AIRLINES LIMITED & ANOR (2025) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1994).
On When the appellate court will interfere with the award of general damages
An appellate court will only interfere with an award of general damages if the award is manifestly excessive or ridiculously low or if it is based on a misapprehension of the law or facts. In the instant case, the decision of the Court of Appeal to interfere with and increase the award made by the trial court was within its jurisdiction and could not be faulted. The sum awarded by the Court of Appeal was adequate and required no further upward review. [Cameroon Airlines v. Otutuizu (2011) 4 NWLR (Pt.1238) 512 referred to.] (Pp. 421, paras. A-C)
NNAJI V. NDUBUISI (2024) 5 NWLR (PT. 1930) 163
ON PROPRIETY OF RELIANCE ON INADVERTENCE OF COUNSEL AS EXCUSE FOR HIS INDOLENCE
Per ABUBAKAR, J.S.C. at page 205, paras. C-H:
“The appellants/applicants resorted to crafting reasons for their failure to obtain prior directive of this court to exceed the necessary number of pages and strayed into unimpressive inadvertence of counsel, which counsel generally flaunt to secure respite for their clients. In their affidavit in support, the learned counsel for the appellants chose to fling inadvertence of counsel, I am compelled to lend my unconditional support to the voice of my lord and learned brother OGUNWUMIJU JSC, that counsel habitually give reasons like inadvertence of counsel loosely translated as incompetence in Incorporated Trustees of Ladies of Saint Mulumba v. Ekhator (2022)LPELR- 57831 (SC); (2022) 15 NWLR (Pt.1852) 35.On my part, I dare say where counsel for whatever reason chooses to overlook his duties and dub so doing as inadvertence, the court will not endorse such flimsy brazen and unashamed admission of indolence and grant the counsel any indulgence. It is strange that learned counsel opted to rely on the 1999 Rules of this court when in his affidavit in support, he clearly admitted that the 2023 Practice Direction does not allow him more than 40pages. Learned counsel for the appellant knows that he filed no brief on behalf of his clients. The instant case is clearly that of omission on the part of counsel to do what is right and proper on behalf of his client. It is the sin of counsel which the client must of necessity bear the brunt. Counsel’s failure to obey and respect the
Practice Direction is a serious and unpardonable oversight, the Practice Directions have not been made just for fun, they must be obeyed.”
NNAJI V. NDUBUISI (2024) 5 NWLR (PT. 1930) 163
ON WHETHER ACCEPTANCE OF INVALID AND INCOMPETENT PROCESS BY REGISTRY OF COURT CAN CONFER VALIDITY OR COMPETENCE ON THE PROCESS
The mere receipt of an invalid and incompetent process by the registry of the court cannot confer validity, competence and legality on an otherwise barren, sterile, void and incompetent process. In the instant case, the applicants’ contention that the receipt of their contentious process by the registry of the Supreme Court made it an integral part of the valid records of the court was to no avail. (P.206, paras. F-H).
NNAJI V. NDUBUISI (2024) 5 NWLR (PT. 1930) 163
ON EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR DOING AN ACT
Where there is a particular provision commanding that an act be done in a particular way as a condition precedent, if the act is not satisfied, the act carried out without satisfying condition precedent will be invalid. Where a condition precedent is mandatory for doing an act, the failure to fulfil the pre-condition will render the act null and void. A failure to comply with condition precedent becomes more unpardonable where it is manifested in an election matter being time bound and sui generis. Where a party on his own decides to act in flagrant disregard to the provisions of the law, he cannot turn around and seek for endorsement of an illegal act by the court. Such a party will be left to his own device. (P. 205, paras. A-C).
BARDE v. INEC (2024) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1932) 561
ON ATTITUDE OF SUPREME COURT TO DUMPING OF DOCUMENTS
The consistent position of the Supreme Court against the dumping of documents has always been to protect and maintain the integrity of the court as an unbiased umpire. A court is not expected to engage in an investigation of documents/evidence tendered by a party in the recess of its chambers which have not been demonstrated in open court. To do so would
reduce the Judge from his lofty height above the fray to the dust of conflict below. (Pp. 607-608, paras. F-B).
BARDE v. INEC (2024) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1932) 561
ON WHEN PETITIONER ALLEGING NON-COMPLIANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF ELECTORAL ACT NEED NOT CALL ORAL EVIDENCE
By virtue of section 137 of the Electoral Act, 2022, it shall not be necessary for a party who alleges non-compliance with the provision of the Act for the conduct of elections to call oral evidence if originals or certified true copies manifestly disclose the non-compliance. The provision has not absolved a petitioner of the need to lead credible evidence to prove non-compliance. It states clearly that oral evidence may not be necessary if and only if originals or certified true copies manifestly disclose non- compliance. [Oyetola v. I.N.E.C. (2023) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1894) 125; Abubakar v. I.N.E.C. (2020) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1737) 37 referred to.] (P. 607, paras. D-F).
AHIWE V.I.N.E.C. (2024) 6 NWLR (PT. 1935) 437
ON WHEN APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH ELECTORAL ACT IS NECESSARY
The doctrine of substantial compliance is that its consideration will only arise where the petitioner has succeeded in establishing substantial non-compliance with the principles of the Electoral Act, etc. or, in the substantial effect on the election result of any infraction of the Electoral Act, etc. no matter how minuscule the transgression may be. In this case, there is no proof of substantial non-compliance to justify tampering with the judgment of the Court of Appeal. [Omisore v. Aregbesola (2015) 15 NWLR(Pt.1482) 205 referred to.] (Pp. 467-468, paras. G-A).
AMINU V. SUBAIR [2024] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1939) 99
ON WHETHER COURT PROCESS SIGNED IN NAME OF LAW FIRM IS COMPETENT
For any court process to be properly signed and validly issued for adjudication purpose on behalf of a litigant before a court of law or tribunal in Nigeria, it must be signed by a legal practitioner whose name is on the roll and duly titled to practice law under the provisions of sections 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act, Cap. 207, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990, as amended. A law firm is not competent to initiate and file processes in court. Thus, any process filed in the name of a law firm is in breach of sections 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act, and is deemed null, void and of no effect whatsoever.
AMINU V. SUBAIR [2024] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1939) 99
ON WHETHER STRIKING OUT SUIT COMMENCED WITH COURT PROCESSES SIGNED IN NAME OF LAW FIRM FOR BEING INCOMPETENT AMOUNTS TO INJUSTICE
The striking out of a suit commenced by court processes signed in name of law firm for being incompetent does not amount to injustice to the litigant as the order striking out the suit or process leaves the litigant’s legal practitioner whose name is on the roll with an opportunity to come back to court to file a proper process as the legal practitioner. [Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 521 referred to (Pp. 128-129, paras. D-D).
DIKE GEO MOTORS LTD. V. ALLIED SIGNAL INC (2024) 10 NWLR 201(SC)
ON WHAT AMOUNTS TO ABUSE OF COURT PROCESS
What constitutes an abuse of court process is not capable of definitive demonstration. It would depend on the facts of each case and is in fact of infinite variety. The term “abuse of court process” is generally applied to proceedings that are wanting in bona fides, frivolous, oppressive or vexatious. It may also mean the improper use of the court process which involves malice, deliberateness and desire to misuse or pervert the process of the court or system of administration of justice to the annoyance or embarrassment and irritation of an opponent. [Uwemedimo v. Mobil Prod. (Nig.) Unltd. (2022) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1813) 53; Sheriff v. P.D.P. (2017)14 NWLR (Pt. 1585) 212; Nwosu v. P.D.P. (2018) 14NWLR (Pt. 1640) 532; Ogboru v. Uduaghan (2013)13 NWLR (Pt. 1370) 33; Adesanoye v. Adewole (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt. 127) 671 referred to.] (Pp. 227-228, paras. H-C).
ADEYEMI V. A.P.C. (2024) 4 NWLR (PT. 1927) 63
ON RELEVANT CONSIDERATION IN DETERMINATION OF VALIDITY OF GROUND OF APPEAL
The relevant consideration in the determination of the competence or validity of a ground of appeal is whether it discloses a triable, arguable or reasonable complaint against the judgment appealed against. So that even if it is improperly or poorly or inelegantly couched, phrased or framed, if it discloses a triable or reasonable complaint, then it would be valid and how it is couched or framed would not matter. (P. 92, paras. E-G).
REGD. TRUSTEES, MISSION HOUSE V. A.S.T.B. PLC [2024]10 NWLR (PT. 1947) 565
ON COURSE OPEN TO COURT AND PARTY AFFECTED THEREBY WHERE ORDER OF COURT INVALID
A court and a party cannot presume the invalidity of a subsisting order of a court of competent jurisdiction. This is because an order of a court of competent jurisdiction subsists until set aside. Where an order of the court is invalid in the sense that it is so irregularly granted thereby rendered a nullity or void, the court suo motu has inherent jurisdiction to set aside such an order. Similarly, the party affected by such an order can take necessary steps by motion, and not necessarily by way of appeal, to set aside such order that is invalid on the ground that is a nullity. Whichever way is taken to set aside such an invalid order, the parties to the case or their legal representatives must be given a hearing to make an input, if they so wish, otherwise any pronouncement will infringe the fundamental principle of fair hearing and must itself be set aside.
TSY LTD. V. NWACHUKWU (2024) 13 NWLR (PT. 1954) 147
ON VISIT TO LOCUS IN QUO
After a visit to locus in quo undertaken by a trial court, in order to comply with the provision of section 127 of the Evidence Act in receiving evidence in respect thereof, a witness must be called to testify as to what transpired at the locus in quo. The trial court cannot rely on its observations and thereby make itself a witness in the case. (P. 176, paras. F-G).
MOHAMMED V. N.D.I.C. (2024) 14 NWLR (PT. 1957) 67
ON ENDORSEMENT REQUIRED ON WRIT OF SUMMONS FOR SERVICE OUTSIDE A STATE OR CAPITAL TERRITORY
Section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act states that every writ of summons for service under Part VII of the Act out of the State or the Capital Territory in which it was issued shall, in addition to any other endorsement or notice required by law of such State or the Capital Territory, have endorsed thereon a notice thus: “This summon (or as the case may be) is to be served out of the ………… State (or as the case may be) ……. and in the …… State (or as the case may be).” (P. 99, paras. C-E).
MOHAMMED V. N.D.I.C. (2024) 14 NWLR (PT. 1957) 67
ON WHETHER ENDORSEMENT REQUIRED ON WRIT OF SUMMONS FOR SERVICE OUTSIDE A STATE OR THE CAPITAL TERRITORY APPLIES TO ORIGINATING PROCESS ISSUED BY FEDERAL HIGH COURT
Similar to the Court of Appeal, the Federal High Court is a single court with several judicial divisions for administrative convenience. In effect, the issuance of an originating process out of one judicial division of the Federal High Court for service in another judicial division of the Federal High Court does not require the mandatory endorsement prescribed by section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. In this case, the originating writ of summons issued at the Federal High Court, Lagos and served on the appellant’s husband in Kaduna State without the endorsement stipulated by section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act is competent and valid. Further, the transfer of the case from the Lagos Judicial Division to Kaduna Judicial Division of the Federal High Court cured the defect in the filing of the original writ of summons in the Lagos Judicial Division. Consequently, the question of whether the participation of the appellant’s husband at trial amounted to a waiver of section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act is an academic issue. [Samuel v. A.P.C. (2023) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1892)195; Biem v. S.D.P. (2019) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1687)377; P.D.P. v. Uche (2023) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1890) 523 referred to.] (Pp. 95, paras. A-B; 96 paras. A-B; 113, paras. E-F).
ORIOKE V. ONAYEMI (2024) 14 NWLR (PT. 1959) 557
ON WHETHER CORRECT DECISION OF A LOWER COURT MAY BE OVERTURNED WHERE BASED ON A WRONG REASON
The decision of a lower court will not be overturned by an appellate court where the conclusion is correct although the reasons may be wrong. [Kwara State Judicial Service Commission v. Tolani (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt.1364) 382; Main street Bank Capital Ltd. v. Nigeria Re-Insurance Corporation Plc (2018) 14 NWLR (1640) 423; Ndayako v. Dantoro (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889)187; A.I.C. Ltd. v. N.N.P.C. (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt. 937) 563 referred to.] (P. 582, para. B).
ORIOKE V. ONAYEMI (2024) 14 NWLR (PT. 1959) 557
ON IMPLICATION OF MAKING ALTERNATIVE CLAIMS IN AN ACTION
When a party makes a claim in the alternative, the belief is that he wants either of the reliefs sought, in which case when he is granted any of the reliefs, it suffices for the purpose of satisfying his claim. An alternative relief arises in an “either/or” situation. If the main relief is granted, there would be no need to consider the alternative relief. If the main relief is refused, the court would be obliged to consider whether the claimant is entitled to any of the alternative reliefs. The alternative reliefs are part and parcel of the claim but would only be considered where the main claim has been considered and refused. [Help (Nig.) Ltd. v. Silver Anchor (Nig.) Ltd. (2001 4 NWLR (Pt. 702) 31; Nwoye v. F.A.A.N. (2019)5 NWLR (Pt. 1665) 193 referred to.] (P. 585, paras. E-H).
ORIOKE V. ONAYEMI (2024) 14 NWLR (PT. 1959) 557
ON IMPLICATION OF SEEKING ALTERNATIVE RELIEFS IN AN ACTION
When a plaintiff seeks alternative reliefs, he is deemed to have accepted that the court may not grant his main relief and he would thus be satisfied with and ready to accept the grant of either the main relief or the alternative relief. In other words, when a party makes a claim in the alternative, the belief is that he wants either of the reliefs sought, in which case when he is granted any of the reliefs it suffices for the purpose of satisfying his claim. [Help (Nig.) Ltd. v. Silver Anchor (Nig.) Ltd. (2006) 5 NWLR (Pt. 972) 196 referred to.] (Pp. 589-590, paras. F-A).
ONUEGBU V. GOV., IMO STATE (2024) 15 NWLR (PT. 1962) 419
ON WHAT CONSTITUTES ABUSE OF COURT PROCESS
An abuse of court process is an improper use of judicial process by a party in litigation. It is aimed at targeting interference with due administration of justice. It includes a situation where a party improperly uses the judicial process to the irritation, harassment and annoyance of his opponent and the interference with the effective and efficient administration of justice. (P. 440, paras. A-B).
ONUEGBU V. GOV., IMO STATE (2024) 15 NWLR (PT. 1962) 419
ON WHAT CONSTITUTES ABUSE OF COURT PROCESS
Abuse of court process has an element of malice in it. To amount to an abuse of process, the proceeding or step in the proceeding complained of will, in any event, be lacking in bona fides. It has to be an improper use or perversion of process after it had been issued. It thus has to be a malicious perversion of a regularly issued process, civil or criminal, for a purpose and to obtain a result not lawfully warranted or properly attainable thereby. [PML(Nig.) Ltd. v. F.R.N. (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 448 referred to.] (Pp. 440-441, paras. G-A).
ONUEGBU V. GOV., IMO STATE (2024) 15 NWLR (PT. 1962) 419
ON EXCEPTIONS TO RULE THAT ERROR OF COUNSEL SHOULD NOT BE VISITED ON LITIGANT
It is the equitable practice of the court not to visit the sins of counsel on the litigant. However, the concept must not be jeopardised by indiscriminate applications. Mischief, ineptitude or strategic blunders are not envisaged by the rule that inadvertence of counsel should not be visited on the litigant. Thus, the rule cannot be applied to foist injustice on another party. The rule will not apply in a clear case of abuse of court process. (P. 436, paras. C-E).
ONUEGBU V. GOV., IMO STATE (2024) 15 NWLR (PT. 1962) 419
ON DUTY ON COURT NOT TO SPECULATE OR ENGAGE IN CONJECTURE
It is not within the jurisdiction of the court to speculate or engage in conjecture or guesswork. A court cannot decide issues on speculation no matter how close what it relies on may seem to be to the facts. Speculation is not an aspect of inference that may be drawn from facts that are laid before the court. Inference is a reasonable deduction from facts whereas speculation is a mere variant of imaginative guess which, even when it appears plausible should never be allowed by a court of law to fill any hiatus in the evidence before it.
TOTAL EXP. & PROD. (NIG.) LTD. V. OKWU (2024) 17 NWLR (PT. 1967) 379
ON WHEN FINDING OF COURT IS PERVERSE
A finding of court will be said to be perverse and to have occasioned a miscarriage of justice where it is shown to have not emanated from the evidence on record and that the lower court took into account what it ought not to have considered and or shut its eyes to the obvious and where the finding is consequent upon wrong application of the law to facts.
MACFRANKLYN ENGR. & SERV. V. DAEWOO (NIG.) LTD. (2025) 1 NWLR (PT. 1973) 383 SC
ON PROPER STEP FOR APPLICANT WHOSE APPLICATION WAS NOT DETERMINED ON MERITS BUT DISMISSED AS INCOMPETENT
Where a trial court did not determine the merit of an application, but merely terminated it for being incompetent as a consequence of being filed out of time, the prudent step for the applicant is to file another application including a prayer for extension of time. The order of dismissal of the application cannot operate to bar a repeat of the application by the applicant because the application was held to be incompetent. Such a dismissal operates as an order of striking out.
E.C.N. V. PSC IND. LTD. (2025) 2 NWLR (PT. 1975) 67
ON EFFECT OF PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITY
Once the procedure used in a matter brings the issues in contention into focus, it will not matter that the procedure was wrong. This is because the rules of procedure are made for the convenience and orderly hearing of cases in court. They are made to help the cause of justice and not to defeat
justice. The rules are therefore aids to the court. They are not masters of the court, and should not be followed slavishly or read in the absolute without recourse to the justice of the cause. [F.G.N. v. Zebra Energy Ltd. (2002) 18NWLR (Pt. 798) 162; U.T.C. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Pamotei (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 103) 244; Nwosu v. I.S.E.S.A. (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 135) 688; Taiwo v. F.R.N. (2022)13 NWLR (Pt. 1846) 61 referred to.] (P. 86, paras. A-E).
ABINDE V. SALAKO (2025) 3 NWLR (PT. 1978) 159
ON WHEN WARRANT OF EXECUTION UNENFORCEABLE
By Order IV rule 10 of the Judgments (Enforcement) Rules of the Sheriffs and Civil Processes Act, a warrant of execution becomes stale and unenforceable where execution does not take place within one year after the warrant was issued. In the instant case, after the judgment in default in 1998, the warrant of execution and possession obtained by the appellants to enforce the judgment was dated 3rd November 2000. By the time the execution took place on 15th October 2009, more than one year after it was issued, the warrant of execution had become stale and unenforceable. It had been in force for more than one year, contrary to Order IV rule 10 of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules, thereby rendering the execution invalid, ineffective and illegal. (P. 181, paras. F-H).
ABINDE V. SALAKO (2025) 3 NWLR (PT. 1978) 159
ON WHEN COURT CAN SET ASIDE ITS JUDGMENT
A court can set aside its own judgment which is a nullity. Where judgment was given in the absence of a party, a court of coordinate jurisdiction has the vires to set aside such a judgment given without jurisdiction. A judgment can be set aside where it was made without statutory jurisdiction or a condition precedent for the court to assume jurisdiction has not been fulfilled. Therefore, a court is not functus officio if it is persuaded to set aside a null judgment. [Wimpey (Nig.) Ltd. v. Balogun (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt.28) 324; Ugba v. Suswam (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1427)264 referred to.] (P. 182, paras. B-D).
ABINDE V. SALAKO (2025) 3 NWLR (PT. 1978) 159
ON WHEN APPEAL DEEMED ENTERED
An appeal is entered when the record of appeal is received and entered in the cause list. The giving of notice does not constitute the entering of appeal. An appeal is not an alternative remedy to any proceeding in a court of law. Between the time an appeal is filed at the trial court but before the record is transmitted to the appellate court, the trial court can entertain some interlocutory applications but cannot re-open the case. In effect, when the record of proceedings has been transmitted to the appellate court whereby the court is seised of the matter, the trial court lacks vires to take any proceedings, interlocutory or otherwise. In other words, an appeal is said to be entered once the lower court transmits the record of appeal to the appellate court and until that is done the appellate court cannot be said to be seised of the matter.
ABINDE V. SALAKO (2025) 3 NWLR (PT. 1978) 159
ON WHO CAN SIGN COURT PROCESS
A court process must be signed by a party himself or his/her chosen legal representative. To “sign’” means to identify it by means of a signature, mark or other symbol with the intent to authenticate it as an act or agreement of the person identifying it. So, a signature is not a mere jargon on a piece of paper. It symbolises authorship of the content of the document. Thus, a person who signs a document indicates to the whole world that he has knowledge of and is willing to take responsibility and be held accountable for the content of the document. (P.191, paras. E-G).
ABINDE V. SALAKO (2025) 3 NWLR (PT. 1978) 159
ON WHO CAN SIGN COURT PROCESS
It is the seal or signature of the author on a document that authenticates the document. A legal document or process of court must be settled or signed by either the legal practitioner of the choice of the litigant or the litigant himself. Where ex facie it is uncertain if a court process was signed by the litigant or the legal practitioner representing him, the process is incompetent. A court process must either be signed by the litigant himself or by the legal practitioner retained by him. A court process that purports to be settled by a legal practitioner must, as a requirement of statute, have not only the signature of the legal practitioner but also his name clearly shown and indicating that the signature is his. For the signature thereon appended to be valid, it must be traceable to a legal practitioner. The process must have the signature or mark of the legal practitioner either against his name, or over and above his name. In the instant case, where the processes at the trial court were signed, there was no name of an identified legal practitioner attached to the processes. [G.T.B. Plc. v. Innoson Nig. Ltd. (2017)16 NWLR (Pt. 1591) 181; SLB Consortium Ltd. v. N.N.P.C. (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt.1252) 317 referred to.] (Pp. 190-191, paras. F-E).
ABINDE V. SALAKO (2025) 3 NWLR (PT. 1978) 159
ON HOW TO SIGN COURT PROCESS
All processes filed in court are to be signed as follows:
(a) first, the signature of counsel, which may be any contraption;
(b) secondly, the name of counsel clearly written;
(c) thirdly, who counsel represents;
(d) fourthly, name and address of legal firm.
[SLB Consortium Ltd. v. N.N.P.C. (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1252) 317 referred to.] (P. 192, paras. D-F).
ABINDE V. SALAKO (2025) 3 NWLR (PT. 1978) 159
ON NEED FOR AUTHOR OF COURT PROCESS TO BE ASCERTAINABLE
Litigation is serious business. When a suit is filed in court, the court must be able to ascertain who the author of the process is. There have been cases where the court has condemned or punished counsel by way of cost for filing a frivolous process. When a condemnation or cost is issued against a counsel, it is not against the law firm but personal to the lawyer who signed the court process. This is why a document filed in court must have a clear author for the purpose of accountability. (P. 191, paras. G-B).
ABINDE V. SALAKO (2025) 3 NWLR (PT. 1978) 159
ON IMPORTANCE OF ORIGINATING PROCESS
An originating process or initiating process is the process that births legal proceedings such as a suit or an appeal. Being the process by which actions are commenced, its importance cannot be over-emphasised. In order for an action to be competent, the initiating process itself must not suffer from any fundamental defect; otherwise, the action will be on quicksand. Therefore, the competence of an originating process goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the court. A competent originating process is crucial in activating the jurisdiction of court because of the relationship between an originating process and jurisdiction. On the other hand, the incompetence of an originating process such as the writ of summons contaminates the entire proceedings, including processes filed and the judgment or decision rendered. Such an incompetent originating process is inchoate, lifeless and in the eyes of the law, non-existent. It cannot give life to the proceedings before the court, thereby rendering every step taken null and void ab initio. [Ashaka v. Nwachukwu (2024) 8 NWLR (Pt.1942)149; Akingbulugbe v. Nigerian Romanian Wood Industries Ltd. (2023) 11 NWLR (Pt.1895) 339; Ani v. Effiok (2023) 8 NWLR (Pt.1887) 463; Kente v. Ishaku (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt.1587) 94; Okpe v. Fan Milk Plc (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt.1549) 282; Braithwaite v. Skye Bank Plc (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt.1346) 1 referred to.] (Pp. 195-196, paras. D-A).
ABINDE V. SALAKO (2025) 3 NWLR (PT. 1978) 159
ON EFFECT WHERE COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT NOT FILED TO AFFIDAVIT
Where there is no counter-affidavit to affidavit evidence, the facts stated therein are deemed admitted. [Nika Fishing Co. Ltd. v. Lavina Corp. (2008)16 NWLR (Pt. 1114) 509; N.N.B. Plc v. Denclag Ltd. (2001) 1 NWLR (Pt. 695) 542; Evuleocha v. A.C.B. Plc (2001) 5 NWLR (Pt. 707) 672 referred to.] (P.182, paras. A-B).
MAINSTREET BANK REG. LTD. V. OSHINUGA (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 727
ON EFFECT OF FAILURE TO SERVE PRE-ACTION NOTICE WHERE REQUIRED
The non-service of a pre-action notice merely puts the jurisdiction of a court on hold pending compliance with the pre-condition. Failure to serve the notice where required amounts to an irregularity that renders the suit incompetent. [Nigercare Development Co. Ltd. v. Adamawa State Water Board. (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1093) 498 referred to.] (P. 779, paras. B-C).
SIFAX (NIG.) LTD V. PHOENIX CAPITAL LTD. (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 199
ON MEANING OF RECUSAL WITH RESPECT TO JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Recusal, with respect to judicial proceedings is the stepping aside or disqualification of a judicial officer from a case on the ground of personal interest in the matter, bias, prejudice, or conflict of interest, or if he has conducted himself in such a way that he could be regarded as having become, directly or indirectly, a party to the proceedings. (P. 234, paras. C-D).
SIFAX (NIG.) LTD V. PHOENIX CAPITAL LTD. (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 199
ON HOW TO APPLY FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE
An application for the recusal of a judge should be brought before the judge sought to be recused. It is improper to write a petition to higher authorities against the judex to trigger a recusal. A motion on notice should be filed with relevant reasons and facts before the court or an oral application to the court can be made to initiate a recusal of the judex. It is after notice has been given of the anxiety by one of the parties that there may be likelihood of bias in the course of the proceedings and the application is refused by the court that it automatically becomes a ground of appeal. (P. 234, paras. E-G).
SIFAX (NIG.) LTD V. PHOENIX CAPITAL LTD. (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 199
ON MEANING OF BIAS
Bias is a state of mind and is not amenable to any precise definition or proof. It is idle to speculate on what goes on in the mind of another person but the inference of bias can be drawn from the proceedings.
(P. 234, para. H).
SIFAX (NIG.) LTD V. PHOENIX CAPITAL LTD. (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 199
ON CATEGORIES OF BIAS
BIAS CAN BE OF THREE CATEGORIES:
(a) pecuniary bias as exhibited by a member of the tribunal or court having a pecuniary interest in the subject matter of the dispute;
(b) personal bias shown in the existence of close relationship between a member of the tribunal or court and one of the parties to the dispute; and
(c) official bias shown in an abnormal desire or inclination to pursue a pre-determined line of action which would prevent an impartial adjudication of the dispute between the parties.
[Adebesin v. State (2014) 9 NWLR (Pt.1413) 609referred to.] (P. 234, Paras. A-C).
ETSAKO WEST LOCAL GOVT. V. CHRISTOPHER (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 585
ON NEED FOR AN END TO LITIGATION ON A MATTER
There must be an end to litigation. Litigation does not continue for eternity and the courts are not a circus where a case continues to go round and round ad infinitum.
ETSAKO WEST LOCAL GOVT. V. CHRISTOPHER (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 585
ON NATURE OF GROUND OF APPEAL AGAINST DISMISSAL OF APPEAL FOR WANT OF DILIGENT PROSECUTION DESPITE PENDING OPPOSED RESPONDENT’S MOTION CHALLENGING COMPETENCE OF APPEAL
A ground of appeal that the Court of Appeal erred in dismissing an appeal before it for want of diligent prosecution at a time when there was a pending motion by the respondent challenging the competence of the notice of appeal is a ground of law. This is so because the issue of whether a notice of appeal is competent or not is a question of law; and because the Court of Appeal being a superior court of record ought to be bound by its own record. In this case, ground 1 of the appellant’s notice of appeal raised a question of law. So, the notice of appeal is competent. Accordingly, the respondent’s preliminary objection ought to be discountenanced and dismissed for being devoid of merits. (Pp. 604-605, paras. A-A; 605, paras. F-H).