PRECISION ASSO. LTD. V. FED. MIN., FINANCE (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 175
ON DUTY ON COURT TO DETERMINE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION FIRST WHERE RAISED
Since jurisdiction is an issue which goes to the very root of a court’s power to entertain or hear a case, once it is raised, the court has a duty to determine it first.
[General Electric Company v. Akande (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1225) 596; Garba v. Mohammed (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 114; Ali v. Maiduguri (2024) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1967) 273 referred to.] (P. 194, paras. C-E)
PRECISION ASSO. LTD. V. FED. MIN., FINANCE (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 175
ON ATTITUDE OF COURT TO SPENT AND ACADEMIC ISSUES
A court will not consider spent and academic issues.
[Odedo v. INEC (2018) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1117) 554 referred to.] (P. 123, paras. E-F)
BAGUDU V. KYAUTA (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 379 S.C
ON DUTY ON COURT TO DETERMINE ALL ISSUES VALIDLY RAISED BY THE PARTIES BEFORE IT AND EXCEPTION THERETO
A court is bound to determine all issues validly raised by the parties before it. This principle is, however, a general one, amendable to exceptions. One such exception is where the issue left undetermined has been subsumed in other issues already determined by the court. So, the Court of Appeal, though an intermediate appellate court, will be exempted from determining afresh an issue which it has determined in a sister appeal, involving the same parties/issues and arising from the same judgment of the trial court. Under such circumstances, such undetermined issue would be considered subsumed in the issues determined and disposed of in the sister appeal. [4.P.C. v. A.I.E.S.C. (2022) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1845) 411 referred to.] (P. 399, paras. D-H)
BAGUDU V. KYAUTA (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 379 S.C
ON POWER OF SUPREME COURT TO MAKE ORDER COURT OF APPEAL SHOULD HAVE MADE
Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act, 1960 entitles the Supreme Court, in appropriate cases, to make an order which the Court of Appeal would have made. A pronouncement on the merits of the appellant’s appeal to the Court of Appeal on the strength of the reasoning and conclusions reached by the Court of Appeal in the sister appeal is one that the Supreme Court can make in the circumstances of this case under its powers in section 22 of the Supreme Court Act. In the circumstance, the order of the Court of Appeal striking out the appeal of the appellant is set aside and an order dismissing the appeal on the merits is made in its stead. [Nishizawa v. Jethwani (1984) 12 SC 234; Macaulay v. NAL Merchant Bank Ltd. (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 144) 283; Otogbolu v. Okeluwa (1981) 6-7 SC 99; A.-G., Oyo State v. Fairlakes Hotel Ltd. (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt. 92) 1; Jallco Ltd v. Owoniboys Technical Services Ltd. (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 391) 534; G & C Lines v. Hengrace (Nig.) Ltd. (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt. 711) 51 referred to.] (P. 401, paras. E-B)
BAGUDU V BALKISU [2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 317 S.C
ON ROLE OF APPELLATE COURTS UNDER ISLAMIC LAW AND PROCEDURE
The role of appellate courts in appeals based on Islamic law is different from the role of such courts under the common law system. Thus, under Islamic law, unlike the position under the common law system, the appellate courts are not restricted to the grounds or issues raised by the parties before them. At the appellate stage, the appeal court can re-hear or re-try the case in whole or in part. [Dauda v. Asabe (1998) 1 NWLR (Pt. 532) 102; Danja v. Danj (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt. 550) 467; Nasi v. Haruna (2002) 2 NWLR (Pt. 750) 240 referred to.] (P. 360, paras. G-H)
BAGUDU V BALKISU [2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 317 S.C
ON DUTY ON COURT TO GUARD AGAINST DISREGARD OF ITS PROCESS AND PROCEDURE
A court has a duty to jealously guard and protect its processes and procedure from being generally disregarded by a litigant. ITS Industries Ltd v. F.B.N. PLC (No. 1) (2012) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1320) 353; Council of Legal Baucation V. Dange (2024) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1955) 307 referred to.] (Pp. 355-356, paras. H-A)
C.B.N. V. OCHIFE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 1
ON EFFECT AND DUTY ON COURT WHERE JUDGMENT CREDITOR FAILS TO CONTROVERT GARNISHEE’S AFFIDAVIT DENYING GENERAL ASSERTION OF HOLDING JUDGMENT DEBTOR’S FUNDS
Where a garnishee order nisi is granted on the basis of a general statement of a judgment creditor that monies of a judgment debtor are in the hands of a garnishee, and the affidavit to show cause of the garnishee denying liability similarly contains a general statement that the monies of the judgment debtor are not in its hands, without either affidavits stating material particulars, such that the depositions in the two affidavits do not outweigh each other, there is an equilibrium.
And the burden shifts back on the judgment creditor to further show (not in general terms) the evidence that the garnishee in fact is in custody of the funds of the judgment debtor. Where there is no further affidavit from both sides except a statement of general belief by both parties, their affidavit evidence is cancelled out and the onus of proof that the garnishee is in possession of the funds of the judgment debtor remains that of the judgment creditor.
In that circumstance, the court will discharge the garnishee as the judgment creditor who has the onus to show that monies belonging to the judgment debtor are in the hands of the garnishee will be held not have discharged the burden of proof.
This is so because civil matters are proved on the basis of preponderance of evidence. In this case, the 1st respondent (judgment creditor) merely asserted both in his application and grounds for the garnishee order nisi and the affidavit in support of same that the appellant holds the sum of N50 million to the credit of the 2nd – 4th respondent in their accounts under the Treasury Single Accounts (TSA) policy.
In response, the appellant stated boldly that it did not hold accounts in the names of the 2nd – 4th respondents. And that assertion was never contradicted by the 1st respondent. The balance of probability on the affidavit evidence was that the 2nd – 4th respondents did not maintain a Treasury Single Account at the Central Bank of Nigeria (the appellant) from which the judgment debt could have been recovered.
Thus, the garnishee order absolute would have been in vain as one impossible to execute. As a result, the order that the 2nd – 4th respondents are MDAs and that the Appellant maintained accounts in their names under the Treasury Single Accounts Policy of the Federal Government of Nigeria was a decision founded on wrong factual and legal premises devoid of supporting evidence and must be set aside.
[Polaris Bank Plc v. Gumau (2019) LPELR 47066; Sterling Bank Plc v. Gumau (2019) LPELR 47067; Ezukwu v. Ukachukwu (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt. 642) 657; Ukaegbu v. Nwololo (2009) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1127) 194; Igwe v. Alozieuwa (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 141) 735 referred to.]
(Pp. 87-88, paras. G-E; 148-149, paras. C-D & H; 150, paras. A-D)
C.B.N. V. OCHIFE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 1
ON DUTY ON COURT TO EVALUATE AFFIDAVIT EVIDENCE OF BOTH JUDGMENT CREDITOR AND GARNISHEE IN DETERMINING ISSUE OF LIABILITY IN GARNISHEE PROCEEDINGS
What a court hearing a garnishee proceeding should do when a garnishee files an affidavit to show cause is to evaluate the depositions in the affidavit upon which the garnishee order nisi was granted vis-à-vis the depositions in the affidavit to show cause and determine on a preponderance of evidence if there is a real dispute of liability.
And the evaluation of the evidence must be done with the understanding that the primary onus of proof in the garnishee proceedings is on the judgment creditor, and not on the garnishee.
Since the essence of a garnishee order is to attach any debt owing to the judgment debtor from any person or body within the jurisdiction of the court to satisfy the judgment debt, a judgment creditor cannot by means of attachment, stand in a better position as regards the garnishee than the judgment debtor did because he can only obtain what the judgment debtor could honestly give him.
The judgment creditor must thus show by credible evidence that monies belonging to the judgment debtor are indeed in the hands of the garnishee.
[Sterling Bank Plc v. Gumau (2019) LPELR 47067; Fidelity Bank Plc v. Gumau (2019) LPELR 47068; FBN Plc v. Yegwa (2023) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1874) 323; UBA Plc v. France Appro SAS (2015) LPELR 40394 referred to.]
(Pp. 88-89, paras. E-F
C.B.N. V. OCHIFE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 1
ON WHEN PROPER FOR COURT OF APPEAL TO DECIDE ON MERIT OF CASE INSTEAD OF REMITTING IT TO TRIAL COURT
The Court of Appeal can rely on section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act and Order 20 Rule 11 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2016 to ensure that where it will not cause miscarriage of justice to any party and in suitable circumstances, the Court of Appeal acts quickly to decide the merit of the case between the parties because that is what enthrones justice.
In this case, the Court of Appeal rightly acted under the provisions of the Act and its Rules to decide the substantive garnishee application after it found that the trial court erred by holding that the affidavit to show cause was filed by the appellant out of time and that the appellant was not entitled to a hearing on the substantive application.
(Pp. 144-145, paras. E-F)
C.B.N. V. OCHIFE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 1
ON WHETHER COURTS MAKE VAIN ORDERS
Judges do not make orders in vain. In this case, the appellant stated that it did not hold accounts in the names of the 2nd – 4th respondents who are the Inspector General of Police; the Commissioner of Police, Federal Capital Territory; and O/C Intelligence Response Team (Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), Nigerian Police Force. The appellant’s assertion was not contradicted by the 1st respondent. The balance of probability on the affidavit evidence was that the 2nd – 4th respondents did not maintain a TSA Account at the Central Bank of Nigeria (the appellant) from which the judgment debt could have been recovered.
Thus, the garnishee order absolute would have been in vain as one impossible to execute.
(Pp. 149-150, paras. H-D
NWIZI V. OKE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 589
ON DUTY OF COURT WHERE IT RAISES ISSUE SUO MOTU AND EXCEPTIONS THERETO
Justice never allows one-sided approach in its dispensation. When an issue is raised, the other party must be given a chance to choose to reply. When a court raises an issue suo motu, the law generally requires that the parties be given an opportunity to be heard. There are, however, exceptions which have been identified by the Supreme Court in a plethora of cases. The need to give the parties a hearing where a judge raises an issue on his own motion or suo motu would not be necessary if:
(a) the issue related to the court’s own jurisdiction; and
(b) both parties are/were not aware or ignore a statute which may have bearing on the case. That is, to say, where by virtue of statutory provision, the Judge is expected to take judicial notice.
In the instant appeal, the issue of the probative value and the integrity of exhibit A was not before the court. The Customary Court of Appeal suo motu raised it and thereby used it to regard exhibit A non-admissible and that it was of a questionable origin. This was a landmine of injustice perpetrated.
The appropriate step in the interest of justice was for the court to invite the parties to address it on that vital issue. Therefore, the right of the respondent to fair hearing was truly breached as found by the Court of Appeal.
[Owners of the MT Marigold v. NNPC (2022) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1828) 165 referred to.]
(Pp. 626–627, paras. E–C)
C.B.N. V. OCHIFE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 1
ON DUTY ON APPELLATE COURT TO SET ASIDE A PERVERSE DECISION OF LOWER COURT
An appellate court is enjoined and obligated to set aside a perverse decision of a lower court.
[Ekpenyong v. Nyong (1975) 2 SC 71; C. D. C. (Nig.) Ltd. v. SCOA (Nigeria) Ltd. (2007) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1030) 300; State v. Solomon (2021) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1793) 301 referred to.]
(P. 92, paras. C-D)
UDOH V. MIN., F.M.I.T. & INV. (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 419
ON POWER OF COURT TO RELY ON DOCUMENT IN ITS RECORD IN DETERMINING ISSUE BEFORE IT
A court of law can make use of or rely on any document or fact already put before it or forming part of its record in the determination of any issue before it.
Thus, as regards the absence of the 2nd respondent’s counsel at the trial court and the fact that the trial court deemed its processes adopted, the trial court did not descend into the arena of conflict.
The court was right in deeming the processes already filed on behalf of the 2nd respondent, including the counter-affidavit, as adopted in the absence of counsel who filed same.
[Nigergate Ltd. v. Niger State Government (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1103) 111 applied; Lawson v. Afam Continental Co. (Nig.) Ltd. (2002) 2 NWLR (Pt. 752) 585 distinguished.]
(P. 447, paras. A–E)