AHIWE V.I.N.E.C. (2024) 6 NWLR (PT. 1935) 437
ON WHETHER PERSON CONSTITUTIONALLY QUALIFIED FOR ELECTION AS GOVERNOR OF A STATE CAN BE DISQUALIFIED UNDER ANY OTHER GROUND NOT STATED IN 1999 CONSTITUTION
Once a person satisfies the criteria prescribed in section 177 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), such person becomes automatically qualified for election to the office of Governor. Any criterion not provided for in section 177 or any factor not listed under section 182 of the 1999 Constitution is not valid as a qualifying criterion or disqualifying factor under the respective section. [Oni v. Oyebanji (2023) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1902) 544; Shinkafi v. Yari (2016) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1511) 340; Jegede v. I.N.E.C. [2021] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1797) 409; A.P.P.v. Obaseki (2022) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1846) 1; Jegede v.I.N.E.C. (2021) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1797) 409; Faleke v.I.N.E.C. (2016) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1543) 61 referred to (P. 468, paras. C-E & G-H).
AMINU V. I.N.E.C. (2024) 9 NWLR (PT. 1944) 589 SC
ON ONUS OF PROOF IN ELECTION PETITION
He who alleges must prove. In an election petition, the petitioner will fail if no evidence is given by him to support his petition. The onus of proof is on the petitioner. The burden of proof lies on the petitioner to prove the averments and allegations in his petition in areas where issues have been joined. Even where the respondent in an election petition did not lead evidence to dislodge the petition of the petitioner and choose to remain mute, the petitioner has the bounden duty and obligation to prove his petition against the respondents. [Omoboriowo v. Ajasin (1984) 1 SCNLR 108; Oyetola v. INEC (2023)11 NWLR (Pt. 1894) 125 referred to.] (Pp. 608-609,paras. E-C.
BARDE v. INEC (2024) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1932) 561
ON WHEN PETITIONER ALLEGING NON-COMPLIANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF ELECTORAL ACT NEED NOT CALL ORAL EVIDENCE
By virtue of section 137 of the Electoral Act, 2022, it shall not be necessary for a party who alleges non-compliance with the provision of the Act for the conduct of elections to call oral evidence if originals or certified true copies manifestly disclose the non-compliance. The provision has not absolved a petitioner of the need to lead credible evidence to prove non-compliance. It states clearly that oral evidence may not be necessary if and only if originals or certified true copies manifestly disclose non- compliance. [Oyetola v. I.N.E.C. (2023) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1894) 125; Abubakar v. I.N.E.C. (2020) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1737) 37 referred to.] (P. 607, paras. D-F).
AHIWE V.I.N.E.C. (2024) 6 NWLR (PT. 1935) 437
ON WHEN APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH ELECTORAL ACT IS NECESSARY
The doctrine of substantial compliance is that its consideration will only arise where the petitioner has succeeded in establishing substantial non-compliance with the principles of the Electoral Act, etc. or, in the substantial effect on the election result of any infraction of the Electoral Act, etc. no matter how minuscule the transgression may be. In this case, there is no proof of substantial non-compliance to justify tampering with the judgment of the Court of Appeal. [Omisore v. Aregbesola (2015) 15 NWLR (Pt.1482) 205 referred to.] (Pp. 467-468, paras. G-A).
AMINU V. I.N.E.C. (2024) 9 NWLR (PT. 1944) 589 SC
ON PROOF OF ALLEGATION OF FORGERY OF CERTIFICATE FOR GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION
The allegation of forgery of certificate for governorship election has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt to bring the forger to conviction by the court before he stands disqualified to contest the governorship election. From the moment a party or adverse party in an election discovers the presentation of a forged certificate or forgery, he goes to the Federal High Court to seek for redress and it is the judgment of the Federal High Court convicting or establishing forgery that can be used to disqualify such a candidate. Thus, the issue of disqualification for election and nomination ought to be a pre-election matter. (P. 611, paras. A-D.
AMINU V. I.N.E.C. (2024) 9 NWLR (PT. 1944) 589 SC
ON JURISDICTION OF ELECTION PETITION TRIBUNAL
The election petition tribunal is not established to handle pre-election matters or cases arising before the election but post-election matters. (P. 611, paras. E).
IFEANYI V. I.N.E.C. [2024]10 NWLR (1946) 243 (SC)
ON ROLE OF COLLATION SYSTEM AND INEC RESULT VIEWING (IREV) PORTAL IN ELECTION PROCESS
Whereas the purpose of the Collation System is meant to provide the relevant collation officer the means to confirm/verify a polling unit result, the IReV Portal was deployed to allow the public view results in real-time. With this in mind, and having regard to the fact that neither the Electoral Act nor the Regulations and Guidelines, mandate that the election results be electronically transmitted, thereby allowing for manual transmission, it cannot then be heard that failure to upload result with the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) machines or device on the IReV Portal is a non- compliance of such nature that will substantially affect the outcome of the election. Therefore, the question as to whether there was non-compliance with the Electoral Act, 2022 by the failure to electronically transmit election result or whether the appellants have discharged the burden of proving the non-compliance alleged by the 1strespondent, did not arise in the instant case. Neither the Electoral Act, 2022 nor the Regulations and Guidelines mandate the electronic transmission/collation of election results by the 1st respondent.
OBI V. I.N.E.C. (NO.2) (2023) 19 NWLR (PT 1917) 711
ON PROOF OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION AND SENTENCE
Where there is an allegation that there had been a criminal conviction and sentence, as in this case, the criminal conviction and sentence must be proved by production of the certified true copy of the judgment of court delivered or any admissible way of proving same and the said judgment must reflect all the ingredients of a valid judgment to bind the parties concerned.
OBI V. I.N.E.C. (NO.2) (2023) 19 NWLR (PT 1917) 711
ON QUALIFICATION FOR ELECTION TO OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA AND WHETHER CANDIDATE REQUIRED TO SCORE 25% OF VOTES CAST IN FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY
The constitutional or statutory requirements to be satisfied for a candidate to be declared elected must be the ones expressly and clearly prescribed in the Constitution or statute as the case may be. A requirement that is not expressly and clearly prescribed cannot be assumed or implied to exist under any guise. Since section 134(2) or any other part of the 1999 Constitution did not expressly and distinctly prescribe that a Presidential candidate must have not less than one-quarter of the votes cast in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja as a third requirement additional to the two expressly prescribed, before he or she can be deemed duly elected as President, it is not a requirement for election to that office. Section 134 (2)(b) clearly refers to two-thirds of all the constituents of the group enumerated therein as the minimum number from each of which a candidate must have one-quarter of the votes cast therein. There is nothing in subsection (2)(b) that requires or suggests that it will not apply to the areas listed therein as a group. If section 134(2) of the 1999 Constitution intended that the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja should be distinct from States of the Federation as a distinct entity it would not have listed it together with states of the Federation in section 134 (2)(b). Also, if section 134(2) had intended having one-quarter of the votes cast in the Federal Capital Territory Abuja as a separate requirement additional to the ones enumerated therein, it would have clearly stated so in a separate paragraph numbered (c).Section 134(2) prescribes two requirements that must be cumulatively satisfied by a Presidential candidate in an election contested by not less than two candidates, before he or she can be deemed duly elected President. It prescribes the first requirement in and the second one in (b). It does not impose a third requirement and so there is no(c) therein. (Pp. 757-758, paras. D-C).
ATIKU V. I.N.E.C. (NO.2) [2023]19 NWLR (PT 1917) 761
ON SUI GENERIS NATURE OF ELECTION PETITIONS AND IMPLICATION THEREOF
Where cases or cause of actions are time-bound or subject to time, the evidence and facts to make a litigant win his case are part and parcel of the time prescribed to be sourced for and adduced within that time, otherwise he goes empty handed for non-suit or judgment against him for not proving his case on the preponderance of evidence or his case becomes stale and expired. Just as a statute-barred case cannot be resurrected and awakened because there is fresh or additional evidence for it, so it is with an election petition that is generally sui generis and time-bound. (P. 872, paras. C-D).
ATIKU V. I.N.E.C. (NO.2) [2023]19 NWLR (PT 1917) 761
ON WHETHER AMENDMENT CAN BE MADE TO PETITION AFTER EXPIRATION OF PERIOD TO PRESENT PETITION
The law does not allow any amendment of an election petition after the expiration of the time limited and prescribed by the Electoral Act and Practice Directions, specifically enacted to regulate and govern election petition proceedings. A discretion is exercised by the court in circumstances where the court has the jurisdiction to exercise it. In the instant case, the request of the appellants in their application to adduce fresh/additional evidence was fettered and prescribed by law that the Supreme Court did not have the jurisdiction or the discretion to go contrary to the express provision of the law. Thus, no amendment whatsoever can be entertained by the tribunal or court after the expiration of the period within which to present an election petition [Oke v. Mimiko (No.1) (2014)1 NWLR (Pt. 1388 ) 225; A.P.C. v. Marafa (2020) 6 NWLR (Pt.1721) 383; P.D.P. v. Otu (2017) 5 NWLR(Pt. 1558) 265; Bello v. Yusuf (2019) 15 NWLR (Pt.1695) 250; Buhari v. I.N.E.C. (2008) 4 NWLR (Pt.1078) 546; Odon v. Barigha-Amange (No. 1) (2010)12 NWLR (Pt. 1207) 1; Mato v. Hember (2018) 5NWLR (Pt. 1612) 258; Ugba v. Suswan (2013) 4NWLR (Pt.1345) 427 referred to.] (Pp. 872-873, paras. F-A; 919, paras. F-G).
ATIKU V. I.N.E.C. (NO.2) [2023]19 NWLR (PT 1917) 761
ON FUNCTION OF IREV AND WHETHER SAME AS COLLATION SYSTEM
The INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV) is not a collation system. There is a difference between a collation system and the IReV portal though both are part of the election process. Whereas the collation system is made up of the centres where results are collated at various stages of the election, the IReV Portal is to give the public the opportunity to view the polling unit results on the Election Day. What this means is that where the IReV portal fails, it does not stop the collation of results which up to the last election was manually done. The failure or malfunctioning of the IReV deprives the public and even election administrators and monitors the opportunity of viewing the portal and comparing the result collated with the ones transmitted into the IReV. [Oyetola v. I.N.E.C. (2023) 11 NWLR (Pt.1894) 125 referred to.] (P. 849, paras. B-D).
ATIKU V. I.N.E.C. (NO.2) [2023]19 NWLR (PT 1917) 761
ON POWER OF INEC TO PRESCRIBE MANNER OF TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION RESULTS
The combined effect of sections 60(5), 62(1), 64(4) of the Electoral Act, 2022, suggests that INEC is at liberty to prescribe the manner in which election results are to be transmitted. It is a hybrid system meant to be a buffer and cushion to the erstwhile manual system that encouraged and facilitated falsification and manipulation of results. Although the word “shall” is used therein, it denotes obligation where all things are equal. Moreover, subsection of section 60 of the Electoral Act directs and gives liberty and latitude to INEC to “transfer the results including total number of accredited voters and the results of the ballot in a manner as prescribed by the Commission”. Thus, although it is desirable that electronic transmission of election results is made mandatory, nevertheless the appellants would still have to prove that they would have won the election, whether it was used or not. (Pp. 875, paras. E-G; 876, paras. E-F).
ATIKU V. I.N.E.C. (NO.2) [2023]19 NWLR (PT 1917) 761
ON NEED FOR PLEADINGS IN ELECTION PETITION NOT TO BE VAGUE, EVASIVE OR IMPRECISE
By virtue of Paragraph 4(1) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2022 an election petition must demonstrate with specificity the complaints of the petitioner and the relief sought from the court. It gives no room for vagueness and imprecision. This is in line with the rule of pleading that where an averment is not supported by evidence the averment is deemed abandoned; for, in keeping with the audi alteram partem rule to prevent surprise or ambush on the defendant, it is the plaintiff’s claim that would enable him to file his defence. It follows therefore that a petition must be detailed and comprehensive on material facts depending on the reliefs sought, and not evasive or vague so as to elicit a response from the respondents. [Ekwunife v. Wayne (W/A) Ltd. (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 122) 422; Akande v. Adisa (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1324) 538; P.D.P. v. I.N.E.C. (2012) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1300) 538 referred.] (P. 860, paras. F-H).
ATIKU V. I.N.E.C. (NO.2) [2023]19 NWLR (PT 1917) 761
ON WHEN PETITIONER CANNOT CALL ADDITIONAL WITNESS OR EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
A party to an election petition will not be allowed to call additional witness or rely on additional facts after the 21 days allowed for filing election petition has lapsed, or to bring in an amendment of the nature of the fresh evidence sought to be adduced by the appellants. The Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court had lost the jurisdiction to entertain any fresh/additional evidence after the appellants had filed their witness statements on oath and their respective documents in support of their petition. The deposition sought to be freshly relied upon was not part of the listed documents. Thus, the Supreme Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the appellants’ motion for fresh document on non-qualification of the 2nd respondent. (Pp. 832-833, paras. F-B; 835-836, paras. H-A).
ATIKU V. I.N.E.C. (NO.2) [2023]19 NWLR (PT 1917) 761
ON NEED TO FILE WITNESS STATEMENT ON OATH OF SUBPOENAED WITNESS ALONG WITH PETITION
Although paragraph 54 of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2022 allows resort to the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, it is only where such is not present or provided for in the Electoral Act. Paragraph 54 qualifies, limits and restricts the applicability of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules. It permits the application of the Federal High Court Rules with such modification as would render them applicable having regard to the Electoral Act and the Schedule thereto. Thus, Order 3 rule 3(1)(e) of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2009 which permits that depositions of subpoenaed witnesses need not be filed at the commencement of the suit cannot apply to defeat or negate the time limits set in the Electoral Act, 2022. To allow a petitioner to file an additional witness statement at any stage of the election petition proceedings would destroy the regulated environment that must exist to ensure that both parties to the petition are expeditiously heard and the petition determined within 180 days from the date the petition was filed. The current approach of the courts in Nigeria is to apply the electoral laws. [Ogba v. Vincent (2015) LPELR-40719 referred to.] (P. 892, paras. B-G).
AUGUSTINE V. I.N.E.C. [2024]10 NWLR (1947) 409
ON ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE REQUIRED TO PROVE ALLEGATION OF OVER-VOTING
The essential documents which must be put in evidence to prove an allegation of over-voting are:
- the voters register for the affected polling units to show the number of registered voters;
- the BVAS machines used in those polling units to show the number of accredited voters; and
- the result sheets of the disputed polling units in Forms EC8A to show the number of votes cast at the polling units.
AUGUSTINE V. I.N.E.C. [2024]10 NWLR (1947) 409
ON HOW TO PROVE CRIME ALLEGED IN ELECTION PETITION
Where crime is alleged in an election petition, the petitioner must prove:
- That the respondent whose election is being challenged personally committed the corrupt acts or aided, abetted, consented to or procured the commission of the alleged corrupt practices.
- That where the alleged act was committed through an agent, that the agent was expressly authorized to act in that capacity or granted authority.
- That the corrupt practice substantially affected the outcome of the election and how it affected it.
UMAR V. SOKOTO (2024) 15 NWLR (PT. 1960) 51
ON TIME LIMIT FOR FILING OF ELECTION PETITION
By the provision of section 285(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), a petitioner who intends to challenge the outcome of an election is mandated to file his petition within twenty-one days of the declaration of results. The provision being a constitutional provision is sacrosanct. [Maku v. Sule (2022) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1817))231 referred to.] (P. 81, paras. A-C).
UMAR V. SOKOTO (2024) 15 NWLR (PT. 1960) 51
ON COMPETENCE OF SUBPOENAED WITNESS TO GIVE EVIDENCE IN ELECTION PETITION WHERE STATEMENT ON OATH NOT FRONTLOADED ALONG WITH ELECTION PETITION
A subpoenaed witness whose statement on oath is not frontloaded is incompetent to give evidence in election petition proceedings. [Obi v. I.N.E.C. (No.2) (2023) 19 NWLR (Pt.1917) 711; Abubakar v. I.N.E.C. (2020) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1737) 37 referred to.] (P. 98, paras. F-G).
UMAR V. SOKOTO (2024) 15 NWLR (PT. 1960) 51
ON QUALIFICATION FOR GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION
By virtue of section 177 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), a person shall be qualified for election to the office of Governor if:
- he is a citizen of Nigeria by birth;
- he has attained the age of thirty-five years; and
- he has been educated up to at least the School Certificate level or its equivalent.
- (P. 97, paras. A-B).
UMAR V. SOKOTO (2024) 15 NWLR (PT. 1960) 51
ON STANDARD OF PROOF OF ALLEGATION OF FORGERY
When a person makes an allegation of forgery against another, such a person should prove same beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, a petitioner making such allegations should go beyond merely making allegations but should also present substantial, credible and cogent evidence which will prove the allegation beyond reasonable doubt. (P. 85, paras. E-F).
NNEJI V. INEC (2025) 4 NWLR (PT. 1981) 1
ON ROLE OF BIMODAL VOTER ACCREDITATION SYSTEM (BVAS) IN ACCREDITATION OF VOTERS
Accreditation is the foundational step in the process of an election. The Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) is a device used to register voters. It accredits voters before voting on election day and is used for transmitting results to INEC’s viewing portal after voting. It is not in doubt that the BVAS machine used for accreditation at the polls are the primary source of accreditation data. Therefore, in proof of non-accreditation of voters or non-use of BVAS in the conduct of an election, the petitioner has a duty to produce the BVAS machine together with the voters register and Form EC8A to establish that although there was non-accreditation or non-use of BVAS machine yet voting occurred in those polling units. In the instant appeal, the appellants tendered Form EC8A, voters register, the BVAS report in proof of the allegation of over voting, non-accreditation, and non-use of BVAS machine in conduct of accreditation. The tendering of the BVAS report instead of the BVAS machine put the Tribunal in a position of inadequate essential evidential materials to determine the proof or otherwise of non-accreditation or non-use of BVAS machines in the polling units as alleged by the appellants. This is because, BVAS backend report is not recognized by law. [Oyetola v. INEC (2023) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1894) 125. referred to.] (Pp. 42, paras. A-C; 44-46, paras. G-B).
NNEJI V. INEC (2025) 4 NWLR (PT. 1981) 1
ON PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN FAVOUR OF INEC
There is a presumption of regularity in favour of INEC by virtue of the provisions of section 168 of the Evidence Act that it has kept proper record and such regularity can only be rebutted by cogent and credible evidence and not presumptuous postulations. Therefore, the submission of counsel for the appellants that the 1st respondent had the duty to prove facts within its knowledge as the statutory custodian of the said forms, was misconceived as section 168 of the Evidence Act establishes a presumption of regularity hence the burden of proof is on the party who alleges irregularity to prove same. [Emmanuel v. Umana (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt.1528) 179; CPC v. INEC (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1279) 493; Patrick v. INEC (2024) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1937) 193 referred to.] (Pp. 40-41, paras. C-D).