TOTAL EXP. & PROD. (NIG.) LTD. V. OKWU (2024) 17 NWLR (PT. 1967) 379
ON WHETHER TWO OR MORE PERSONS CAN FILE JOINT APPLICATION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
It is not correct law that two or more persons cannot jointly file one application for the enforcement of their respective fundamental rights alleged to have been breached or violated by a common act of one or more respondents. It is true that section 46 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and Order II rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 state that “any person” who alleges that any of the fundamental rights provided for in the Constitution to which he is entitled has been, is being or likely to be infringed, may apply to court for redress. It is also correct that the word “person” is in the singular. However, it is an elementary universal rule of statutory construction that where the singular is used in a statute it includes the plural and vice versa except it is expressly stated otherwise. That rule of interpretation is stated in section 14(b) of the Interpretation Act, 1964, which provides that in an enactment, words in the singular include the plural and words in the plural include the singular. Further, by section 315 of the 1999 Constitution, the Interpretation Act is an Act of the National Assembly which has been incorporated by reference into the Constitution and section 318(4) of Constitution, which provides explicitly that the Interpretation Act shall apply for the purpose of interpreting the provisions of the Constitution. Therefore, the word “person” used in section 46 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and Order II rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure Rules) 2009 admits the plural and can be interpreted as referring to more than one person. Thus, the phrase “any person” used in section 46 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and Order II rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 can be interpreted to mean multiple persons. [Saraki v. F.R.N. (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1500) 531 referred to.] (Pp. 439-440, paras. G-F).
SCC (NIG.) LTD. V. GEORGE (2024) 18 NWLR (PT. 1971) 421
ON COURT VESTED WITH JURISDICTION OVER ACTION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
The original jurisdiction of a court in fundamental rights proceedings is donated by section 46 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). The words used in the provisions of section 46 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) are simple and unambiguous and must be accorded their natural and literal meanings. By sub-section1 of the section, any person who alleges that any of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any state in relation to him may apply to a High Court in the State for redress. Sub-section 2 further states that subject to the provisions of the Constitution, a High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made to it in pursuance of the provisions of the section and may make such orders, issue such writ and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement within that state of any right to which the person who makes the application may be entitled under the Chapter. The provisions of the section 46(1) and of the Constitution grant prospective or actual victims of fundamental rights abuse unfettered access to a High Court for redress. The purport of the provisions is to empower both the Federal High Court and the High Court of a State or the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, as the case may be, to entertain applications for the enforcement of fundamental rights as long as the court is in the State where the breach is said to have occurred, is occurring or is about to occur. Thus, the Federal High Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court of a State and the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory on fundamental rights enforcement actions, irrespective of the parties to the suit or the subject matter of the fundamental rights breach. The reason for the concurrent jurisdiction shared by High Courts is to avoid putting a clog in the wheel of the right of access to court for a potential applicant who wishes to enforce his fundamental rights. Thus, in this case, the trial court rightly assumed jurisdiction over the 1st respondent’s action. [F.U.T., Minna v. Olutayo (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 176; E.F.C.C. v. Reinl (2020) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1730) 489; Ihim v. Maduagwu (2021) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1770) 584 referred to.].
UKEGBU V. N.B.C. (2025) 2 NWLR (PT. 1976) 283
ON WHETHER PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS WAS PERMITTED PRIOR TO ENACTMENTOF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURE) RULES 2009
Public interest litigation on fundamental rights was not accommodated under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979 as it is provided for under Article 3(e) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009. The position of the law with respect to public interest litigation before the coming into force of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 was that a general interest common to all members of the public is not a litigable interest to accord locus standi to an individual. Therefore, to entitle a person to invoke judicial power to determine the constitutionality of such an action, he must show that either his personal interest or special interest will immediately be or has been adversely affected by the action or that he sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury to himself. In the instant case, the law at the time the cause of action arose is applicable for the determination of the appeal. In determining the respondent’s preliminary objection, the trial court gave the appellant access to ventilate his grievances based on his allegation that his constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right was being infringed upon. The appellant, however, failed to discharge the burden of proof on him that his personal or special interest had been adversely affected by the respondent’s action or that he sustained or was in immediate danger of sustaining an injury to himself. So, the appellant cannot be said to have locus standi to institute the action. [Adesanya v. President, F.R.N. (1981) 2 NCLR 358; Ojukwu v. Ojukwu (2008) 18NWLR (Pt.1119) 439; Owodunni v. Reg. Trustees of C.C.C. (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 675) 315 referred to.] (Pp. 321-323, paras. F-A).
NIGER DELTA P.H. CO. LTD. V. MICHAEL (2025) 4 NWLR (PT. 1983) 489
ON MEANING OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNIVERSAL NATURE OF
Human rights are things which are owed to man because of the very fact that he is a man. They are frequently held to be universal in the sense that all people have and should enjoy them, and to be independent in the sense that they exist and are available as standards of justification and criticism, whether or not they are recognized and implemented by the legal system or officials of a country. The moral doctrine of human rights aims at identifying the fundamental prerequisites for each human being leading a minimally good life. [Hassan v. E.F.C.C. (2014) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1389) 607referred to.] (P. 536, paras. B-E).
NIGER DELTA P.H. CO. LTD. V. MICHAEL (2025) 4 NWLR (PT. 1983) 489
ON PURPORT OF AND SCOPE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Fundamental rights are intrinsic to the dignity and liberty of individuals, and are protected to ensure a just and equitable society. They are guaranteed under the Constitution to ensure protection from arbitrary actions by the State and other entities. The fundamental rights are not just declaratory but are enforceable against any infringement by individuals, corporations, or government. They include the right to life, personal liberty, dignity of the human person, fair hearing, private and family life, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and the right to property, among others. Fundamental rights are not absolute and may have certain restrictions. Restrictions to fundamental rights must be reasonable, justifiable, and in accordance with the law. (Pp. 526, paras. B-C; G-A).
NIGER DELTA P.H. CO. LTD. V. MICHAEL (2025) 4 NWLR (PT. 1983) 489
ON HOW TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN ACTION IS PROPERLY COMMENCED UNDER THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURE) RULES, 2009
To determine whether an action is properly or competently commenced under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009, the court must be satisfied that the action involves a direct and substantial claim of the infringement of a fundamental right as guaranteed under Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), with the applicant showing how the right has been infringed upon. To this extent, therefore, the fundamental right in question must be the central issue in the action, it must be the principal claim, and not merely incidental or ancillary to other claims. The correct approach will be to examine the reliefs sought, the grounds for such reliefs, and the facts relied upon. Accordingly, where the facts relied upon disclose a breach of the fundamental right of the applicant as the basis of the claim, there is a redress through the enforcement of such rights through the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009. [Opara v. S.P.D.C.N. Ltd. (2015) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1479) 307; Sea Trucks (Nig.) Ltd. v. Anigboro (2001) 2 NWLR (Pt. 696) 159referred to.] (P. 527, paras. A-D).
NIGER DELTA P.H. CO. LTD. V. MICHAEL (2025) 4 NWLR (PT. 1983) 489
ON RELEVANT PROCESS COURT WILL CONSIDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT HAS JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS MATTER
Only the originating process and the supporting process need to be considered by the court to determine whether it has jurisdiction to adjudicate over a fundamental rights matter. The court will not concern itself with opposing process or processes such as statement of defence, counter-affidavit, etc. In a nutshell, in the determination of the question whether an action is properly commenced under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules for the enforcement of fundamental rights action or not, the court would have recourse only to the facts contained in the statement of claim or the statement/affidavit filed in support of the originating process to ascertain if the facts therein disclosed a prima facie breach of the rights as guaranteed under Chapter IV of the Constitution. In the instant case, the respondent’s claims pertained to the alleged compulsory acquisition of his property without following due process and compensation. These claims directly invoked the constitutional protections under section 44(1) of the1999 Constitution (as amended). (Pp. 527, paras. D-F, 528, para. C).
NIGER DELTA P.H. CO. LTD. V. MICHAEL (2025) 4 NWLR (PT. 1983) 489
APPLICABILITY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURE) RULES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHT TO PROPERTY GUARANTEED UNDER SECTION 44(1) OF THE 1999 CONSTITUTION (AS AMENDED)
The previous decision of the court in Amale v. Sokoto Local Government (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt.1292) 181, which unduly restricted the scope of enforcement of the fundamental right to property guaranteed under section 44(1) of the Constitution, is with all due respect no longer helpful to our current state of development, the continued application of the decision will visit harm and injury to public interest and ultimately defeat the ends of justice, and occasion mishap. By narrowly applying the provision of the Fundamental Right (Enforcement Procedure) Rules and section 44(1) of the Constitution, the decision has potentially barred genuine grievances from being heard and inadvertently derecognised the right to property duly guaranteed under the Constitution, thereby undermining the essence of fundamental rights protection. Accordingly, the case of Amale v. Sokoto Local Government (supra)is no longer sustainable and should no longer be cited as a precedent on the issue. In this case, the Court of Appeal applied the position of the law correctly when it held that the trial court erred when it held that the respondent’s action was not a fundamental right action. [Amale v. Sokoto Local Government (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1292) 181overruled.] (Pp. 530, paras. C-F; 532, paras. C-D).
NIGER DELTA P.H. CO. LTD. V. MICHAEL (2025) 4 NWLR (PT. 1983) 489
ON WHAT PRINCIPAL CLAIM IN AN ACTION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS MUST DISCLOSE
In an action for enforcement of fundamental right, the principal claim or crux of the complaint must disclose a breach of the fundamental right of the applicant. In other words, the main relief sought by the applicant must be for securing the enforcement of his fundamental right. In the instant case, it was glaring that the respondent’s main claim was for an order of court awarding him the sum of N100,000,000.00 against the appellant for unlawful compulsory acquisition of his plots of land without payment of compensation, and in breach of his right provided under section 44(1)(a) of the Constitution. The respondent’s claim was not for declaration of title but for compulsory acquisition of property without compensation. The action was therefore properly brought under the Fundamental Right Enforcement Procedure (FREP) Rules. The chances of success or otherwise of the claim was not determinable at the preliminary stage but until the case was heard on the merit. [F.R.N. v. Ifegwu (2003)15 NWLR (Pt. 842) 113; Sea Trucks (Nig.) Limited v. Anigboro (2001) 2 NWLR (Pt.696) 159; Abdulhamid v. Akar (2006) 13 NWLR (Pt.996) 127 referred to.] (P. 534, paras. B-H).