PRECISION ASSO. LTD. V. FED. MIN., FINANCE (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 175
ON APPLICATION AND EFFECT OF THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS
The doctrine of judicial precedents, as espoused by the maxim “stare decisis et non quieta movere”, literally means to stand by previous decisions and not to disturb settled matters, to adhere to precedents, and not to depart from established principles.
Under this principle of law, the decisions of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, the highest and final appellate court in Nigeria, bind every court, authority, or person in Nigeria.
By the doctrine of stare decisis, the courts below the Supreme Court are bound to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court. The doctrine is a sine qua non for certainty in the practice and application of law.
[Dalhatu v. Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 843) 310; Okorocha v. P.D.P. (2014) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1406) 213 referred to.] (Pp. 196-197, paras. G-B)
PRECISION ASSO. LTD. V. FED. MIN., FINANCE (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 175
ON WHETHER SUPREME COURT IS BOUND BY DECISIONS OF COURTS OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The Supreme Court is not bound by the decisions of courts of other jurisdictions; the decisions of courts in other jurisdictions are merely of persuasive authority.
[Alli v. Okulaja (1972) 2 AII NLR 351; Dada v. State (1977) 2 NLR 135; Eliochin (Nig.) Ltd. v. Mbadiwe (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 14) 47; Ajomale v. Yaduat (No. 2) (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 191) 266; Inakoju v. Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 427 referred to.] (P. 197, paras. B-D)
PRECISION ASSO. LTD. V. FED. MIN., FINANCE (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2004) 175
ON WHICH OF ITS TWO CONFLICTING DECISIONS THE SUPREME COURT SUBSEQUENTLY FOLLOWS
The Supreme Court is only bound by its own decisions. Where there are two conflicting decisions of the court, the latter decision should be applied and followed.
In this case, the crux of decisions of the Supreme Court subsequent to its decision in NEPA v. Edegbero (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 79 on the interpretation of the provisions in sections 251(1)(p) and (q) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), is that notwithstanding that the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party to any cause or matter, the nature of the claim is a determining factor of whether or not the Federal High Court has jurisdiction or exclusive jurisdiction over such cause or matter.
[Okpozo v. Bendel Newspaper Corporation (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 153) 652; Osakue v. F.C.E., Asaba (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1201) 1; Nigerian Air Force v. Chia (Unreported appeal No. SC/CV/1076/2021 delivered on 21/2/2025).] (Pp. 197-200, paras. D-H)
AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC V. C.B.N. (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 255
ON WHEN SUPREME COURT WILL DEPART FROM ITS PREVIOUS DECISION
For the Supreme Court to depart from its previous decision, at least one of the following conditions must exist, to wit:
(a) the previous decision is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution; or
(b) the previous decision was given per incuriam; or
(c) the previous decision is proved to perpetuate injustice and hardship.
In the instant case, the appellants did not show the existence of any of those conditions. Thus, the decision in Agip (Nig.) Ltd. v. Agip Petroli Int’l (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1187) 348 was made on firm foundation. It was therefore not a decision made per incuriam requiring the Supreme Court to depart from it. [Okulate v. Awosanya (2000) 2 NWLR (Pt. 646) 530; Oshoboja v. Amuda (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1172) 188 referred to.] (P. 293, paras. C-G)
C.B.N. V. OCHIFE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 1
ON HOW JUDGMENT SHOULD BE USED AS AN AUTHORITY
A judgment should be read in the light of the peculiar facts on which it was based.
[Dongtoe v. C.S.C., Plateau State (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt. 717) 132 referred to.]
(P. 111, para. F)
C.B.N. V. OCHIFE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 1
ON WHAT SUPREME COURT DECIDED IN C.B.N. V. INTERSTELLA COMMUNICATIONS LTD (2018) 7 NWLR (PT. 1618) 294 AND RATIONALE THEREFOR
The conclusions of the Supreme Court in C.B.N. v. Interstella Communications Ltd (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 294 are that:
(a) Where the office of the Attorney General of the Federation had been involved in arriving at a consent judgment between the parties, the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation is taken as given to garnishee proceedings.
(b) Where the Attorney General of the Federation or of a State is the judgment debtor, then the requirement that the judgment creditor should seek the consent of its debtor cannot be in consonant with the rule of law.
(c) Where the Attorney General of the Federation is merely a neutral/nominal party in the transactions and proceedings giving rise to the application for garnishee order nisi, and he not being the debtor, the case comes within the purview of section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act.
(d) Where the cause of action is a judgment debt for which a garnishee order is being sought, and the Central Bank of Nigeria is a party to the garnishee proceedings, the Central Bank of Nigeria merely stands as a banker to the Federal Government funds with respect to the government funds in its custody and not as a public officer in such a situation.
(e) The Central Bank of Nigeria is ordinarily a “public officer”. But within the context of section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, it may not be regarded as a public officer if the relationship between the Central Bank of Nigeria and the judgment debtor is nothing more than a banker/customer relationship.
In other words, the decision did not change the meaning of a “public officer” as interpreted in Ibrahim v. J.S.C. (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1.
(f) There was no need to seek the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation in the peculiar circumstances of the case.
The Supreme Court specially explained severally that the facts of the case was the basis of its judgment.
The decision of the Supreme Court was shaped by the peculiar circumstances of the case and the need to enforce the enthronement of substantial justice to ensure that the State did not renege on its obligations voluntarily entered into by hiding behind section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act.
In effect, neither party in this case could claim victory based on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case.
(Pp. 107-111, paras B-E)
HERITAGE BANK LTD .v. MEENS NIGERIA LTD. (2025) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1994) 321 (SC)
ON PURPOSE AND APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (usually abridged to stare decisis) — to stand by things decided and not to disturb settled points — is rooted deeply in Nigerian law.
It was invented to ensure certainty and eschew fluidity in law. It operates where and when the facts of cases are in pari materia. But it is inapplicable where facts of cases are not on all fours.
In this case, in so far as the material facts of Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 52 and this appeal are incompatible and distinguishable, the doctrine of stare decisis is inapplicable to grant the Supreme Court the needed licence to follow its previous decision in this case as sought by the appellant.
(P. 364, paras. B-F)
OMBUGADU V. ALHAJI [2024] 7 NWLR (PT. 1936) 73
ON OPERATION OF DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS
By the doctrine of stare decisis, every inferior court is bound by the decision of a superior court of record and must apply it, however sure it may be that it was wrongly decided. The place of precedent, the doctrine of stare decisis, in adjudication is an eminent one. The question whether or not the decision of the Supreme Court binds a subordinate court and the court itself is no longer open to argument. The doctrine directs that once a point of law has earlier been pronounced upon by a court of competent jurisdiction, the court and those subordinate to it are bound by such pronouncement on the very principle in a subsequent case. If any of the section of a statute to be interpreted had previously been interpreted, the court will be bound by its earlier construction except same is demonstrated to be reached per incuriam or is unjust to persist. Section287 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) has codified the common law doctrine. [P.D.P. v Oranezi (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 260; N.E.P.A. v. Onah (1997) 1 NWLR (Pt. 484) 680; Atolagbe v. Awuni (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt. 522) 536; A.-G., Abia State v. A.-G., Fed. (2022) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1856) 205; Adeyemi v. Achimu/NDIC (2023) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1866)583 referred.] (P. 105, paras. A-F).
ORIOKE V. ONAYEMI (2024) 14 NWLR (PT. 1959) 557
ON NATURE OF ORDER OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND WHEN MAY BE GRANTED
The grant of an order for specific performance is an equitable remedy granted at the court’s discretion after taking into account all the facts and circumstances of the case. Being an equitable relief, an order for specific performance will not be made where the plaintiff would be adequately compensated by the common law remedy of damages. The jurisdiction to order specific performance is anchored on the inadequacy of the remedy of damages at law. Even where the contract is valid in law, specific performance may be refused on general equitable principles. Specific performance is not obtainable as of right, like damages. It will only be ordered where it is just and equitable to do so. Specific performance may also be refused in case of severe hardship to the defendant. The fundamental rule is that specific performance will not be decreed if there is an absolute remedy at law in answer to the plaintiffs claim, that is to say; where the plaintiff would be adequately compensated by the common law remedy of damages. There can be no order for specific performance unless there is a definite and certain contract between the parties to the suit before the court. [Ezenwa v. Oko (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1075)610; Universal Valcanizing (Nig.) Ltd v. Ijesha United Trading & Transport Co. Ltd. (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 266)388; Help (Nig.) Ltd. v. Silver Anchor (Nig.) Ltd. (2001)4 NWLR (Pt. 702) 31; Afrotech Tech. Services (Nig)Ltd. v. M.I.A & Sons Ltd. (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt. 692)730; Oloja v. Governor, Benue State (2022) 3 NWLR(Pt.1816) 1; Best (Nig.) Ltd. v. Blackwood Hodge (Nig)Ltd . (2011) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1239) 95; Nlewedim v. Uduma (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 402) 383 referred to.] (Pp. 580-581, paras H-F).
ORIOKE V. ONAYEMI (2024) 14 NWLR (PT. 1959) 557
ON WHEN DAMAGES WILL BE GRANTED INSTEAD OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Where the necessary consent for concluding the transaction has not been given, or is unlikely to be given because the property has been sold to a third person, the plaintiff would be entitled to the alternative remedy of damages for breach of contract, where he has sought the said relief. [I.T.I.(Nig.) Ltd. v. Aderemi (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt.614) 268referred to.] (P. 585, paras. D-E).
A.G., BAYELSA STATE V. ODOK (2025) 4 NWLR (PT. 1982) 385
ON APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS
Central to the principle of stare decisis is that cases are only authorities for what they decide. In other words, judicial authorities cannot be applied across board in total disregard of the peculiar facts in which they were decided. Furthermore, it will be dangerous to consider any pronouncement of any court even the Supreme Court in vacuo without reference to the peculiar facts of the cases in which those pronouncements were made as those facts framed the issues that were decided. [Fawehinmi v. N.B.A. (No.2) (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 105) 558; Clement v. Iwuanyanwu (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 107) 39; Interdrill (Nig.) Ltd. v. U.B.A. Plc (2017) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1581) 52; Oteri Holdings Ltd. v. Oluwa (2021)4 NWLR (Pt. 1766) 334 referred to.] (Pp. 405-406, paras. E-H).
NIGER DELTA P.H. CO. LTD. V. MICHAEL (2025) 4 NWLR (PT. 1983) 489
ON WHETHER DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS IS INFLEXIBLE
The doctrine of stare decisis, which is an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what the law is and its application to individual cases, and therefore, vital to our legal system, is not inflexible. The doctrine provides at least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of legal rules. At the same time, it allows for the law to evolve to meet the demands of justice and societal progression especially in a dynamic society. (Pp. 529-530, paras. G-A).
NIGER DELTA P.H. CO. LTD. V. MICHAEL (2025) 4 NWLR (PT. 1983) 489
ON EFFECT OF RIGID ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT
Rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and unduly restrict the proper development of the law. In considering whether to depart from a past decision or not, the Supreme Court must evaluate whether adherence to the precedent would perpetuate injustice or is no longer applicable due to changes in legal or societal contexts. The dynamic nature of our development as an organised society will be held captive where recourse is had to rigid and blind adherence to precedent or adherence to precedent is placed over and above the demands for doing substantial justice, and charting more meaningful interpretation to the clear intent and purpose of the provisions of the Constitution. [Amale v. Sokoto L.G. (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1292) 181 overruled.] (P. 530, paras. A-C).
A.G. LAGOS STATE V. A.-G., FED. (2025) 5 NWLR (PT. 1984) 43
ON BINDINGNESS OF FOREIGN DECISIONS ON NIGERIAN COURTS
The decisions of foreign courts are not binding on Nigerian courts. However, the decisions of foreign courts hold persuasive authority particularly where Nigerian laws and decisions are silent on the point of law. [Obi v. INEC (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt.1046) 560; Yahaya v. State (2002) 3 NWLR (Pt. 754)289; Inakoju v. Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025)427 referred to.] (Pp. 100-101, paras. G-A).
NIGER DELTA P.H. CO. LTD. V. MICHAEL (2025) 4 NWLR (PT. 1983) 489
ON WHEN A DECISION CONSTITUTES PRECEDENT FOR SUBSEQUENT CASE
Judicial decisions are precedents only for what they decided. As such, a decision of the Supreme Court will only bind it and subordinate courts in a subsequent case if the facts and the law which inform the earlier decision are the same or similar to those in the subsequent case. Where the facts or the legislation or both of which were the basis of the decision of a case are different from those in a subsequent case, the earlier decision cannot serve as a precedent for deciding the subsequent case. [Clement v. Iwuanyanwu (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 107)39; Olafisoye v. F.R.N. (2004) 4 NWLR (Pt. 864) 580; Ugwuanyi v. Nicon Insurance Plc (2013) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1366) 546 referred to.] (P. 538, paras. A-C).
TAAN V. SCOA (NIG.) PLC (2025) 6 NWLR (PT. 1985) 1
ON WHAT CONSTITUTES JUST DECISION OF CASE
It is a principle of jurisprudence that a decision of court which goes against an avalanche of other case law authorities on the same point does not constitute a just decision or does not amount to good law. A just decision of a case will be a decision in accord with the many authorities and previous decisions of Nigerian courts as well as English decisions which Nigerian courts have followed and adopted. A decision that throws all Nigerian existing authorities to the wind will be an alarming decision but hardly a just decision. In the instant case, the attempt by the appellant’s counsel to rely on the decision of the Supreme Court in Benjamin v. Kalio (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1641) 38 was inapposite. The decision went against a several decisions of the Supreme Court on the same point. Thus, the decision in Benjamin v. Kalio (2018) 18 NWLR (Pt.1641) 38 did not jurisprudentially constitute good law upon which the court could have relied. [Onuoha v. State (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 101) 23 referred to.] (P.64, paras. C-F).