LAWAL V G.O.C I, MECHANISED DIVISION KADUNA (2025)12 NWLR 33 SC
ON WHEN APPEAL FROM DECISION OF COURT OF APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT LIES AS OF RIGHT IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
By the provisions of section 233(2)(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the only rights of appeal in criminal proceedings are where the grounds involve questions of law alone, questions as to the application or interpretation of the Constitution, questions as to whether any of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution has been breached and where the Court of Appeal has affirmed a sentence of death by any lower court. In the instant case, by the provision of section 233 of the Constitution, an appeal of the nature of the appellant’s appeal does not lie to the Supreme Court as of right. He ought to have obtained leave of court for his appeal to be competent. (Pp. 46-47, paras.H-B)
LAWAL V G.O.C I, MECHANISED DIVISION KADUNA (2025)12 NWLR 33 SC
ON EFFECT OF FAILURE TO SEEK AND OBTAIN LEAVE TO APPEAL WHERE REQUIRED
Where leave is required, any notice of appeal filed without leave having been first obtained is incompetent and the appeal is liable to be struck out. Where leave is required for the doing of an act or taking of any step, the failure to obtain the leave renders the act or step a nullity. In the instant case, the failure of the appellant to obtain leave of court, before filing his notice of appeal rendered the appeal incompetent and liable to be struck out. [Mohammed v. State (2024) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1964) 199 referred to.] (P. 47, paras. B-D)
LAWAL V G.O.C I, MECHANISED DIVISION KADUNA (2025)12 NWLR 33 SC
ON ATTITUDE OF SUPREME COURT TO CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF FACT BY TRIAL COURT AND COURT OF APPEAL
The Supreme Court is always loath in disturbing or interfering with concurrent findings or decisions of both the Court of Appeal and a court or tribunal below it. For concurrent findings of two lower courts to be interfered with and set aside by the Supreme Court, the appellant must show that the findings are patently erroneous. [Nasamu v. State (1979) 6 – 9 SC 153; Chinwendu v. Mbamali (1980) 3 SC 31; Lokoyi v. Olojo (1983) 2 SCNLR 127: Mogaji v. Cadbury (Nig.) Ltd. (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 7) 393; Ogundivan v. State (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt. 181) 519; Akalazu v. State (2022) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1848) 453; Mohammed v. State (2024) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1964) 199 referred to.] (P. 50, paras. C-F)
LAWAL V G.O.C I, MECHANISED DIVISION KADUNA (2025)12 NWLR 33 SC
ON WHEN SUPREME COURT WILL INTERFERE WITH CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF FACT BY TRIAL COURT AND COURT OF APPEAL
The Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by a trial court and the Court of Appeal unless such findings are perverse, are not supported by the evidence on record or where there is a clear error of law or fact on the face of the record, which had occasioned a miscarriage of justice. The main grounds or reasons upon which the Supreme Court will interfere in assisting or intervene to assist an appellant in an appeal against concurrent findings of two lower court courts are where the findings violate some principles of law or procedure, where the findings are perverse, completely unreasonable, not supported by the evidence on record and have occasioned a miscarriage of justice or where the findings are based on non-evaluation or wrong evaluation of the evidence or case. Therefore, where there is sufficient evidence to support concurrent findings of fact by two lower courts, such findings should not be disturbed unless there is a substantial error apparent on the record, that is, the findings have been shown to be perverse or some miscarriage of justice or some material violation of some principle of law or procedure is shown. [Abdullahi V. F.R.N. (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1521) 475; Ogoala v. State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.175) 509 referred to.] (Pp. 50-51, paras. F-E)
LAWAL V G.O.C I, MECHANISED DIVISION KADUNA (2025)12 NWLR 33 SC
ON NEED FOR GROUND OF APPEAL TO RELATE TO AND CHALLENGE RATIO DECIDENDI OF THE DECISION APPEALED AGAINST
A ground of appeal must relate to and be a challenge of a ratio decidendi of the decision appealed against. Every ground of appeal must attack the ratio decidendi of the decision being appealed against. [Abdu v. State (2023) 1 NWLR (Pt.1865) 339; Yusuf v. State (2019) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1680) 269 referred to.] (P. 57, paras. B-D)
LAWAL V G.O.C I, MECHANISED DIVISION KADUNA (2025)12 NWLR 33 SC
ON NEED FOR GROUND OF APPEAL TO ARISE FROM JUDGMENT APPEALED AGAINST
An appeal is a review by the appellate court of how the lower court resolved the case before it to determine whether an appellant is justified in his or her grievance and complaint against the decision of the lower court. It is on that premise that the rule that a ground of appeal must arise from the judgment of the court appealed against was developed. Except for a complaint that the lower court neglected an issue validly raised before it, any other ground or issue in an appeal not arising from the judgment appealed against is plagued by incompetence. In the instant case, the twin issues of evidence of the prosecution being at variance with the charge and material contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution giving rise to doubt were different from the points canvassed by the appellant at the Court of Appeal. (Pp. 60-61, paras. G-B)
Per UMAR, J.S.C. at page 61, paras. E-H:
“Juxtaposing the points canvassed at the lower court with the issues and argument being canvassed by the appellant before this court did not only expose incompetence of the appeal but also the appellant’s desperation in prosecuting his case. Such a manner of presentation of a case cannot in reality be described as an appeal. Such manner of presentation of a case violates rules of procedure in many respects. Firstly, the twin issues of evidence of the prosecution being at variance with the charge and material contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution giving rise to doubt now being canvassed by the appellant ought to have been raised before the lower court. The appellate jurisdiction of this court is to consider complaints arising from the judgment of the Court of Appeal and not to consider an issue that was not raised before the Court of Appeal. Raising the issues being canvassed by the appellant before this court is an attempt to turn the rules of procedure upside down.”
LAWAL V G.O.C I, MECHANISED DIVISION KADUNA (2025)12 NWLR 33 SC
ON RAISING FRESH ISSUE ON APPEAL
There is need to first seek and obtain leave of court before raising fresh issue or issues on appeal. The rationale for the principle or rule of law is that there must be, and there are a number of cases where it is most desirable, especially in the case of an intermediate court of appeal, that the final court of appeal, which is the Supreme Court of Nigeria, should have the benefit of the opinion of that court on points raised before it, should it come up for further consideration by the Supreme Court. In other words, a party is at liberty to raise a fresh issue before an appellate court. However, a party intending to raise a fresh issue must fulfill the condition precedent of seeking the leave of the appellate court before raising such an issue. In the instant case, all the appellant’s grounds of appeal related to fresh issues not canvassed at the Court of Appeal. He ought to have obtained but did not obtain leave of court. Consequently, his notice of appeal was incompetent and his appeal, anchored on it, was fundamentally defective and liable to be struck out. Limothy v. F.R.N. (2013) 4 NWLR (Pt.1344) 213; Usman v. State (2014) 12 NWLR (Pt.1421) 207; Babalola v. State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt 115) 264; Obiakor v. State (2002) 10 NWLR ((Pt. 612) 776; Shuaibu v. State (2017) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1592) 396; Christopher v. State (2022) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1844) 319; Mohammed v. State (2024) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1964) 199; Odunayo v. State (1972) 8 – 9 SC (Reprint) 173; Obi v. Uzoewulu (2021) 8 NWLR (Pt.1778) 352; Statoil (Nig.) Ltd. v. Inducon (Nig.) Ltd. (2018) 9 NWLR (Pt.1626) 586; Owie v. Ighiwi (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt.917) 184 referred to.] (Pp. 58-59, paras. A-A)
MUSA V. STATE (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 207
ON ATTITUDE OF SUPREME COURT TO CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF LOWER COURTS
Concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and Court of Appeal should not be disturbed unless shown to be:
• Manifestly perverse, or
• Causing a miscarriage of justice, or
• Violating fundamental doctrines of law or procedure.
In the instant case, the appellant did not demonstrate any special circumstance justifying intervention by the Supreme Court with the concurrent findings.
[C.O.P. v. Amuta (2017) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1556) 379; Mohammed v. State (2018) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1635) 85; Amadi v. A.-G., Imo State (2017) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1575) 92; Ogoala v. State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 175) 509 referred to.]
(P. 258, paras. B-D)
IREGU V. STATE (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 189
ON WHEN SUPREME COURT CAN INTERFERE WITH CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF FACT BY TRIAL COURT AND COURT OF APPEAL
Where there are concurrent findings by the trial court and the Court of Appeal, the appellant will have to, first, appeal against such concurrent findings of fact and, secondly, give reasons why the Supreme Court should interfere with such findings.
The trial court is in a peculiar advantageous position in the determination of facts. Hence, findings of fact made after hearing witnesses and observing their demeanour are seldom disturbed by the Court of Appeal.
In the instant case, the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeal on the voluntariness of exhibit “B” were concurrent. However, the appellant did not show or demonstrate why the Supreme Court should interfere with such concurrent findings. In other words, the appellant did not show that the concurrent findings were perverse or that there were special circumstances requiring the findings to be disturbed by the Supreme Court.
No miscarriage of justice occurred that warranted interference with the concurrent findings.
[Simeon v. State (2018) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1635) 128; Adekoya v. State (2017) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1565) 343; Adeyemo v. State (2015) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1485) 311; Ejinima v. State (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 200) 627; Addo v. State (2021) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1791) 427; Okolie v. State (2023) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1894) 1 referred to.]
(P. 241, paras. C–F)
MUSA V. STATE (2025) 14 NWLR (PT. 2005) 207
ON POWER OF APPELLATE COURT TO FORMULATE OR RE-FORMULATE ISSUES FROM GROUNDS OF APPEAL
The appellate court has the discretion to re-formulate issues or formulate issues from the grounds of appeal to facilitate proper adjudication.
[Ishola v. Folorunso (2010) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1210) 169; Kayode v. State (2016) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1511) 199; Shema v. F.R.N. (2018) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1624) 337; Ukpong v. State (2019) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1667) 1; Okonkwo v. Ezeaku (2020) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1718) 477 referred to.]
(P. 233, paras. B-C)
IREGU V. STATE (2025) 13 NWLR (PT. 2002) 189
ON CONDITION PRECEDENT TO RAISING FRESH ISSUE ON APPEAL
Leave of court is a condition precedent which must be sought and obtained before raising a fresh issue at the Supreme Court.
In the instant case, the appellant contended that since he was taken before a superior police officer by PW2 who recorded his statement, exhibit “B”, for confirmation whether or not the statement was indeed voluntarily made, the failure of the prosecution to call the superior police officer to testify was vital to the admissibility of the statement.
However, the appellant’s argument on the failure of the prosecution to call the superior police officer to testify during the trial-within-trial was not raised at the Court of Appeal. It was raised as a new or fresh issue at the Supreme Court without leave of the Supreme Court being sought or obtained. The issue was liable to be discountenanced.
[Bello v. F.R.N. (2019) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 193; Obi v. Uzoewulu (2021) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1778) 352; Statoil (Nig.) Ltd. v. Inducon (Nig.) Ltd. (2018) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1625) 586 referred to.]
(Pp. 228–229, paras. G–B)
YAKUBU V. STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 233
ON RAISING FRESH ISSUE ON APPEAL
Where a fresh issue is raised for the first time on appeal without seeking and obtaining the prior leave of court, the issue or point is incompetent and liable to be discountenanced.
In other words, where a party seeks to raise a fresh issue on appeal, he must seek leave of court to do so.
Where he fails to do so, the issue would be liable to be struck out.
In the instant case, the appellant’s complaint on the failure of the trial court to record in the record of proceedings that an interpreter was present in court on the day PW1 gave his evidence-in-chief and was cross-examined was not raised or canvassed before the Court of Appeal and neither was pronounced upon by the Court of Appeal.
It was a fresh issue and there was nothing in the records of the court showing that the appellant obtained the leave of court to raise and argue the issue in the appeal at the Supreme Court.
[Obiakor v. State (2002) 10 NWLR (Pt. 776) 612; Oyakhire v. State (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1001) 157; Gazzali v. State (2019) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1661) 98 referred to.]
(Pp. 255–256, paras. G-C)
AMEH V. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 559
ON PROPER PROCEDURE FOR CHALLENGING COMPETENCE OF GROUND OR GROUNDS OF APPEAL WHERE OTHER GROUNDS COMPETENT
The proper procedure for a respondent to challenge only one ground or more grounds of appeal, leaving other competent grounds which would validate the hearing of an appeal on its merits, is for the respondent to file a motion on notice challenging the ground or grounds in issue.
The purpose of filing a preliminary objection is to bring the hearing of the appeal to an end for being incompetent or fundamentally defective.
A preliminary objection is only filed against the hearing of an appeal.
Where there is an objection against some grounds of appeal but there are other grounds that can sustain the appeal, a preliminary objection would not be the appropriate procedure to adopt in the circumstances.
Where the subject-matter of the appeal is within the jurisdiction of the appellate court, the court’s jurisdiction will not be ousted simply because it lacks jurisdiction to grant some of the reliefs claimed.
In the instant case, the respondent in paragraph 11 of its further amended brief stated, as a preliminary point, that a ground of the grounds of appeal was incompetent.
For whatever it was intended to be, the respondent’s contention fell within the realm of a preliminary objection or a hybrid of an objection to the appeal.
The respondent’s purported preliminary objection was an attack on only ground 3 of the appellant’s grounds of appeal and thereby leaving the other grounds unchallenged.
[Garba v. Mohammed (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 114 referred to.] (Pp. 583-585, paras. H-A; E-C)
AMEH V. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2025) 12 NWLR (PT. 2000) 559
ON PURPOSE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION TO AN APPEAL
The purpose of a preliminary objection to an appeal is to determine the appeal in limine, thereby dispensing with the need or necessity to go into the merits of the appeal.
There is need for the court to first determine a preliminary objection being a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court.
[Akpan v. Bob (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 421; P.D.P. v. Umeh (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1579) 272; Garba v. Mohammed (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 114; Adamu v. State (2017) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1574) 463 referred to.] (P. 584, paras. A-E)
DANLADI BALA V. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (2025) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1994) 495
ON WHETHER DENIAL OF RIGHT TO INTERPRETER CAN BE INVOKED ON APPEAL AS GROUND FOR SETTING ASIDE CONVICTION
Once an accused person or his counsel fails to object to the non-provision of an interpreter at the trial, his right to do so would be lost forever, because such a right cannot be invoked on appeal.
In a worst-case scenario, if the accused person and his counsel did not ask for an interpreter during trial, the failure to supply one is treated as a matter of procedure, and a subsequent conviction would stand except the trial court is satisfied that the failure to supply an interpreter led to a miscarriage of justice.
Thus, where an accused person is represented by counsel, an objection to a failure to provide an interpreter must be taken at the trial and not on appeal. The reasoning is that an accused person and his counsel acquiesced to an irregular procedure, and where there is no miscarriage of justice, he cannot be heard to complain of the procedure on appeal.
In the instant case, there was nowhere in the record of proceedings at the trial court that the appellant’s counsel objected to the breach of his right to fair hearing by reason of non-provision of an interpreter until on appeal. There was no objection to the non-provision of an interpreter at the trial court by the appellant or his counsel, and neither was there an objection at the Court of Appeal. The issue came up for the first time in the Supreme Court. [Okoro v. State (2012) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1290) 351; Egbedi v. State (1981) 11–12 SC 98; Nwokocha v. A.-G., Imo State (2016) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1513) 141; State v. Gwonto (1983) 1 SCNLR 142 referred to.]
(Pp. 530–531, paras. D–A)
DANLADI BALA V. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (2025) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1994) 495
ON DUTY OF APPELLATE COURT WHERE THERE IS AN APPEAL AGAINST THE DECISION OF A LOWER COURT
It is the duty of an appellate court to examine the record of proceedings and the judgment of the trial court to ensure that the decision reached was based on credible evidence and a correct application of the law. In the instant case, the Court of Appeal meticulously reviewed the evidence and the findings of the trial court and correctly affirmed the conviction and sentence of the appellant.AKPUTA V. STATE (2024) 13 NWLR (PT. 1956) 429
ON SUPERSESSION OF GROUNDS OF APPEAL ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
The issues for determination in a brief of argument though necessarily based on the grounds of appeal are considered to have displaced the grounds of appeal. Hence, the argument in the brief follows the issues for determination and not the grounds of appeal directly. The issues may comprise the substance of the grounds of appeal or may contain less but cannot contain more than what have been alleged by the grounds of appeal.
C.O.P. V. ABDULLAHI (2024) 8 NWLR (PT. 1940) 227 SC
ON BINDINGNESS OF FINDING OF FACT AND DECISION OF COURT NOT APPEALED AGAINST
A finding by the court that is not appealed against is deemed accepted as correct and conclusive by the party against whom it was made and it is binding on that party. In the same way, where there is no ground of appeal against a decision of the trial court in an appeal to the Court of Appeal, the person against whom the decision was given is deemed to have accepted the decision of the trial court as correct, conclusive and binding.
C.O.P. V. ABDULLAHI (2024) 8 NWLR (PT. 1940) 227 SC
ON PURPOSE OF FORMULATION OF ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
The purpose of raising issues for determination in an appeal is to identify what is in issue in the complaints against specified and identified portions of the judgment appealed against in the grounds of appeal. Just as the grounds of appeal from which they are raised, the issues for determination must raise questions concerning the particular portion of the judgment complained against in the ground or grounds of appeal so as to enable the determination of the real questions in controversy in the grounds of appeal. (P. 243, paras. G-H).
C.O.P. V. ABDULLAHI (2024) 8 NWLR (PT. 1940) 227 SC
ON HOW TO COUCH ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
Since issues for determination emanate from the grounds of the appeal, they must be couched in a manner to state accurately, clearly, and with brevity, the core issues in controversy in the complaints in the grounds of appeal. Where an issue for determination is not couched in a manner as to narrow it to the complaints in any grounds of the appeal about the specific portion of the judgment appealed against, it does not qualify as an issue for determination and would not be valid for consideration. This is because the determination of an appeal is restricted to the portion of the judgment appealed against in the grounds for the appeal. The entire case from which an appeal arises is not open for determination at large.
SUNDAY V. STATE [2024]10 NWLR (PT. 1945) 177 SC
ON WHEN SUPREME COURT WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF TWO LOWER COURTS
Concurrent findings of the lower courts will not be disturbed unless they are perverse or led to miscarriage of justice. In the instant case, having painstakingly gone through the record of appeal and the arguments of both counsel, and the totality of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the two lower courts were right to have found the appellant guilty as charged for the offence of armed robbery. There was absolutely nothing perverse in the judgment and no miscarriage of justice occurred that would warrant interference with the concurrent findings of the two lower courts. [Addo v. State (2021) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1791)427; Okolie v. State (2023) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1894) 1; Abdullahi v. State (2023) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1869) 407referred to.] (Pp. 191, para. G; 199, paras. F-H).
BAKARI V. STATE (2025) 2 NWLR (PT. 1975) 33
ON TREATMENT OF INCORRECT DECISION OF TRIAL COURT BY AN APPELLATE COURT
Where a trial court came to a decision which no reasonable court or tribunal, applying its mind to proper considerations, can come, then an appeal court having jurisdictional competence to entertain an appeal from such a decision only on a point of law, would reverse such a decision. In essence, the appellate court only sit to review the trial court’s decision on points of law, being bound by the fact which they find, provided always that there is evidence on which the justices can come to the conclusions of fact at which they arrive. [Rabiu v. State (1981) 2 NCLR 117 referred to.] (Pp. 60-61, paras. G-B).