KEHINDE ISMAILA V. THE STATE (2025) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1995) 153
ON CULPABILITY OF UNARMED PERSON IN COMPANY OF ARMED PERSONS
Under section 1 of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act, an unarmed participant with armed robbers is treated as an armed robber. [Musa v. State (2018); F.R.N. v. Usman (2012); Alor v. State (1997)] (P. 176, paras. B-C)
F.R.N. V. NNAJIOFOR (2024) 10 NWLR (PT. 1947) 443
ON PURPOSE OF LEGISLATIVE PROVISION THAT VESTS PUBLIC DUTY ON PUBLIC OFFICER FOR THE BENEFIT OF ANY PERSON
The purpose or objective or intendment of a legislative provision that vests a public duty on a public officer for the benefit of any person is to make the execution or performance of the duty mandatory, irrespective of whether it is a permissive or mandatory word that is used to impose the duty. So that where, as in this present case, the permissive or discretionary word ‘may’ is used to impose a duty on a public officer to observe or protect the right of an arrested suspect not to be forced to confess that he committed the offence he is suspected of committing, the courts have consistently, over time, decided that the word ‘may’ is legislatively intended to impose a mandatory duty to observe and protect the right of the arrested suspect against forced self-incrimination. (P. 483, paras. B-D).
LAWAN V. F.R.N. (2024) 12 NWLR (PT. 1953) 501
ON WHO IS A “PUBLIC OFFICER”
Section 2 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 defines public officer as a person, employed or engaged in any capacity in the public service of the Federation, State or Local Government, public corporations or private company wholly or jointly floated by any government or its agency, including the subsidiary of any such company whether located within or outside Nigeria, and includes Judicial officers serving in Magistrates, Area or Customary Courts or Tribunals. From the definition, a public officer is a person employed or engaged in any capacity in the public service of the Federation, State or Local Government amongst others. (Pp. 533, paras. D-F, 560paras. D-F).
LAWAN V. F.R.N. (2024) 12 NWLR (PT. 1953) 501
ON WHO IS A “PUBLIC OFFICER”
A “public officer” is a person who has been legally elected or appointed to office and who exercises government functions. (P. 562, para. A).
LAWAN V. F.R.N. (2024) 12 NWLR (PT. 1953) 501
WHETHER MEMBER OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IS A “PUBLIC OFFICER”
From a combined reading of section 2 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000, section 318 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act, a person who is a public officer is clearly identified as a person who is employed or engaged in the public service of the Federal, State or Local government and their affiliated companies or corporation. He is without doubt a holder or occupant of a public office. He is a person who discharges any duty in which the public are interested. That person must also, in the discharge of such public functions, be paid out of a fund provided by the public. In other words, under the referred constitutional and statutory provisions, any legislative member of either the National Assembly or a State House of Assembly is duly deemed to be a public officer to all intent and purposes. In this case, the appellant was a public officer at all material times. (Pp. 535, paras. A-H;561, paras. F-H).
BALA V. NIGERIAN ARMY (2024) 15 NWLR (PT. 1962) 447
ON MEANING OF “QUASH”
The term “quash” denotes where a valid order of a court arrived at on a wrong premise is found wanting at law and is set aside and the consequential orders are quashed. A judgment is valid once it is handed down by a competent court after due process when there is nothing extrinsic to nullify same. The conclusions in the judgment can only be set aside by an appellate court and its consequential orders quashed. [Osafile v. Odi (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 137) 130; Nwokedi v. Okugo (2002) 16 NWLR (Pt.794) 441 referred to.] (P. 475, paras. B-D).
MELROSE GENERAL SERVICES LTD. V. E.F.C.C. (2025) 1 NWLR (PT. 1972) 1
ON WHETHER USE OF SECTION 17 OF ADVANCE FEE FRAUD AND OTHER FRAUD RELATED OFFENCES ACT, 2006 TO RECOVER MONEY LAWFULLY PAID UNDER CONTRACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The use of section 17 of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences Act, 2006 and similar legislations to recover or retrieve money paid to a consultant for the satisfactory execution of its contractual obligation under a contract is a gross abuse of legal process and violates the provisions of section 44(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 against compulsory acquisition of movable property or interest in such property. (P. 102, paras. B-C).
MELROSE GENERAL SERVICES LTD. V. E.F.C.C. (2025) 1 NWLR (PT. 1972) 1
ON CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY PROVISION EXPRESSLY MENTIONING SPECIFIC THINGS OR MATTERS
It is a rule of interpretation, which is now of general application that a syntactical presumption may be made that an express mention of a thing or matter, excludes those not mentioned. This is often expressed in the Latin maxim, expressio unius estexclusio alterius. In this case, by expressly listing the legislations to which section 17 of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences Act, 2006 applies, the section excludes those not listed. If the legislative intendment or object of the section is that it should apply to all unlawful activities or unlawful activities under all legislations, it would not have limited its application only to the unlawful activity under the statutes listed therein. Put differently, by virtue of the clear words of the provisions of the section, an order of interim or final forfeiture of property cannot be made by a court under the Act unless the applicant has shown that the property is reasonably suspected to be proceeds of some unlawful activity under the Act, the Money Laundering Act, 2004; the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment, Etc.) Act, 2004; or any other law enforceable under the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment, Etc.) Act, 2004. (Pp. 102-103, paras. H-C).
MELROSE GENERAL SERVICES LTD. V. E.F.C.C. (2025) 1 NWLR (PT. 1972) 1
ON CONSTRUCTION OF EXPROPRIATORY STATUTES AND NEED FOR STRICT COMPLIANCE THEREWITH
Any law that restricts or encroaches on a person’s right to property is applied strictissimi juris. The conditions precedent for the deprivation of a person’s property stipulated by the statute must be strictly complied with or satisfied for such deprivation or denial of a person’s property to be valid. Section 17 of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences Act, 2006 is a statutory provision with expropriatory features because it provides for the taking away or the forfeiture of a person’s property and the vesting same in the Federal Government of Nigeria. So, section 17 of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences Act, 2006 or like legislations must be interpreted and applied strictly. [Provost, Lagos State College of Education v. Edun (2004) 6 N WLR (Pt. 870) 476 referred to.] (P.104, paras. A-E).